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Abstract 
 
Purpose: The impact of the mandate type used and real estate agents’ ideological 
outlook on conflict of interests and compromising of principals’ interests together with 
their effect on the ultimate outcomes has largely been ignored in the South African 
real estate industry. The purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of dual 
mandate system and ideology on the outcomes to buyers and sellers of properties. 
This was achieved by investigating their influence on the conflict of interests and 
compromising the interests of the principals and how these in turn lead to suboptimal 
outcomes for the industry. 
Method: Stratified random sampling was used for information gathering. Data were 
collected using face-to-face filling in of the survey instrument and 204 participants 
agreed to take part in the study. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was employed to 
assess the reliability and validity of the results. 
Findings: The results reveal that the dual mandate system and ideological persuasion 
of actors in the real estate industry does positively impact on conflict of interests and 
also compromises the interests of the principals. Conflict of interests and 
compromising principals interests have also been found to negatively affect the 
resultant outcomes for the principals. 
Practical implications: The dual mandate system should be reconsidered with the 
view of revising or changing it altogether. Also, practices of real estate agents should 
be closely monitored by relevant authorities to ensure that they do not disadvantage 
other consumers. Insights gained from this study provide the basis for future policy-
making by government and for academic activity on training of new real estate agents. 
The findings of this study are expected to assist the Estate Agency Affairs Board 
(EAAB) as the custodians of licensing of real estate agents.   
Research limitations: The participants were all from Gauteng Province which might 
limit generalizability prospects to other provinces. Also, some respondents might have 
given biased responses by attempting to prove that they were not ignorant of how the 
industry operates.  
Key concepts: Dual mandate system, Ideological outlook, Conflict of interests, 
compromising of principals and Outcomes.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 
1.1: INTRODUCTION 
 
A home is usually the most expensive product in the budgets of most families and 
individuals (Zahiron-Herbert & Chatterjee, 2011; Quigley & Raphael, 2004). A large 
amount of individual wealth is imbedded in houses (Das & Gupta, 2009). In addition, 
a small percentage change in the housing prices will have large impacts on non-
housing consumption and household well-being. It is axiomatic that information is 
needed to support real estate purchase decision making and equally true that this 
information has become progressively easy to obtain (Changha & Gallimore, 2010).  
When home owners choose to sell their homes, they first need to determine the asking 
price for their property (Baracha & Seile, 2014). Determining the asking price include 
many subjective elements, which create challenges. Most sellers contract with an 
agent who helps with valuation and to set an asking/listing price and then merely 
negotiate on the ultimate sale price (Herrin, Knight & Sirmans, 2004).  
 
According to Arnold (1999), asking prices play two important roles. They influence the 
rate at which offers arise and serve as the initial offer in the bargaining game. A higher 
asking price leads to longer time on market (TOM), other things equal (Anglin, 
Rutherford & Springer, 2003). This would be of concern to any seller to whom time is 
of essence. Housing sale transactions are further complicated by the fact that houses 
are heterogeneous products with overly varying characteristics and relatively, they 
trade infrequently. Generally, individuals (both buyers and sellers) transact 
infrequently in the housing markets and will have imperfect pre-search information 
(Macklennan & O’Sullivan, 2012). It is widely believed that the seller of a 
heterogeneous product (houses are heterogeneous) faces a trade-off between sale 
price and expected time until sale (Orr, Dunse & Martin, 2003). They face a trade-off 
between two conflicting requirements which are to maximize the sale price while 
minimising the time until sale (Orr, et al., 2003). Time until sale (TUS) or the marketing 
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time (TMT) of house measures the duration from the listing date until the time the 
house is sold (Hanrin, 1998).  Herrin, Knight and Sirmans (2004) state that a sale 
requires matching sellers with buyers and the process requires time. The starting point 
for both seller and buyer is generally an unknown selling price and marketing time. 
The present study focuses on the South African (SA) residential real estate industry 
(REI) and the areas of interest are the mandate system in the light of the principal-
agent (PA) relationships (which give rise to the valuation and marketing role of the real 
estate agent (REA)) and the role of the REA’s normative political ideology in residential 
real estate industry (RREI) in SA.  
The topic of the study is: ‘The influence of the mandate system and the political 
ideological persuasion on the performance of South Africa’s real estate industry’. The 
project concentrates on the role that agents/brokers play and how it affects all 
consumers, namely; buyers, sellers, financers, investors, construction companies and 
insurers. The study critically examines the Valuation and Marketing roles of the REA. 
It also delves into how the REA’s normative political ideology impacts the SA real 
estate industry (REI), the economy and the SA transformation agenda. Moreover, their 
particular impact on the settlement pattern in SA will get a special attention. Therefore, 
the project is done in two sections. One section examines the most visible actions of 
REAs in their role of valuations and marketing of properties. In contrast, the other 
section concentrates on the less visible side, which is how their political ideologies 
influence their work. The present assumptions are stated in hypotheses below. 
 
1.2: STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM   
 
The problem addressed in the present study can be stated as: The dual mandate 
system (DMS) and ideological outlook (IO)’s of role players in the SA REI seem to 
exert an influence on conflict of interests (COI) and compromising of principal’s 
interests (CP) and these influences result in suboptimal outcomes (OT) for their 
principals. The real estate business incorporates virtually every other business: 
engineering, design, construction, and all planning activities imaginable (Wafford, 
Troilo & Dorchester, 2010). It forms a huge chunk of the SA economy as following 
statistics reveal:   
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 It has been estimated that the REI contributed 8.3% toward the gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 2009 (SAPOA, 2012); 
 In 2012, the RE industry contributed about R191.4 billion to the GDP (Tau-
Sekati, 2014); 
 Of that figure (R191,4 billion), R80.9billion came from commercial and non-
residential properties; 
 Residential portion accounted for about R110.1 billion which is the main focus 
of this study (Anderson , 2014); 
 The present size of the SA REI was estimated to be worth about R4.9 trillion in 
2012 (Tau-Sekati, 2012); and  
 The residential part was worth R3.9 trillion, which was about two thirds of the 
total worth of the industry (Tau-Sekati, 2012). 
What happens in this industry is likely to have serious repercussions in other areas of 
the economy. Like any other industry, there are issues that deserve close scrutiny by 
academics. The issues of interest in the present studies are the dual mandate (DM) 
system (which derives from dual agency (DA) and the principal-agency (PA) 
relationship), the specific roles of the REAs and how that is influenced by their personal 
Ideological persuasion. The DM system is imbedded in the DA and the PA systems as 
in the SA context, a REA represents the two transacting parties, the buyer and the 
seller in the same deal. 
  
The roots of agency theory are in economics (Friedman, 1995). An agent is someone 
with special skills necessary for the fulfilment of the principal’s goals (Friedman, 1995). 
The principal-agent relationship arises when a principal contracts with an agent to 
perform some tasks on behalf of the principal (Petersen, 1993). When hiring an agent, 
the firm or individual is buying knowledge and expertise and the relationship creates 
an information asymmetry (IA) (McAllister, Hughes & Gallimore, 2008). To describe 
issues of IA, Arrow (1985) introduces two concepts, namely; hidden action and hidden 
information concepts. Hidden action entails the situation where the principal is not 
observing the action but only the outcome and the agent observing both. Conversely, 
in hidden information, the principal observes actions but not the factors influencing 
them and the agent observes random factors influencing the outcome before choosing 
the action (Petersen, 1993). In executing the tasks, the agent chooses an action which 
has an/the outcome(s) which affect(s) the welfare of both the principal and agent 
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(Petersen, 1993). Both the principal and agent can observe the outcomes but only the 
agent observes both action and type. These describe the setting under which the 
interactions between principal and agent take place. It is against this background that 
the study has been initiated. There are both advantages and disadvantages of the PA 
relationships for both the sellers and buyers in the REI, but for a buyer the 
disadvantages seem to be more. For purposes of this study, buyers are defined as 
those who desire, are able and normally motivated to buy while sellers are those 
desiring, able and normally motivated to sell with adequate marketing (Petersen, 
1993). 
 
In the SA REI, both the buyer and seller contract with the same agent to represent 
them due to general practice in the industry, information advantage that REAs are 
perceived to possess and the cost of acquiring that information independently (Wiley 
& Waller, 2013). The agent becomes a dual agent as he/she represents both parties. 
Under ideal circumstances, dual agency creates opportunity for efficiency gain by 
reducing search costs (Wiley & Waller, 2013). On the other hand, the listing REA can 
be informed of both buyer and seller’s reservation price along with other proprietary 
information like urgency, motivation and constraints. This clearly brings about IA in the 
relationship. This information asymmetry may lead to agency problems due to 
misaligned incentives as the transacting parties’ interests are not exclusively 
represented by the REA (Wiley & Waller, 2013). Considering the property selling price 
only, the transaction can be viewed as a zero sum game in which the interests of the 
seller and buyer directly conflict (Brastow & Waller, 2013).  Listing agent’s incentives 
may be compatible with those of seller or the buyer but rarely both (Brastow & Waller, 
2013). According to Wiley and Waller (2013), for the buyer, the problem arises as 
he/she is usually unrepresented when the selling agent is initially contacted. Also, the 
REA’s commission incentive is a function of the selling price, introducing a possibility 
of the REA inflating the price. Key information on market activity may also be 
concealed from buyers unless they buy expertise from elsewhere. The REA is trying 
to get the seller the highest and best offer as quickly as possible but the interest of the 
buyer is completely different (Neher, 1996). Equally, possibilities for the agent to 
pursue their own interest at the expense of the seller also abound. The commission 
structure and information advantage of agents may lead to homeowners being poorly 
served by, for instance, advising them to sell too quickly and too low (McAllister, 
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Hughes & Gallimore, 2008). In other countries, REAs are prevented from representing 
both buyers and sellers in the absence of an informed consent from both parties as 
the conflict of interests may arise (Clauretie & Daneshuary, 2008). 
In the SA situation, REA can have a binding exclusive mandate to be agents not only 
of a single property; they can actually have it for the whole community, especially in 
complexes and gated communities and this has recently been sanctioned by the Real 
Estate Agency Affairs Board (EAAB) (The Star, 2014). For instance, it has been shown 
that in a DA situation, sales are more likely to occur at the beginning or end of listing 
contract (Brastow & Waller, 2013). How the DMS affects both the parties can further 
be illustrated by the REAs major roles, which are valuation and marketing roles. 
  
REAs are routinely required to determine prices willing buyers would pay to buy 
properties from willing sellers in a free market (Clark & Stark, 2013; Weinberger, 
2010). In addition, Weinberger (2010) argues that market value does not have to be 
based on the property’s highest and best use in every instance. It has to be 
emphasised that values must always be qualified as in liquidation value, investment 
value et cetera (Clark & Stark, 2013). Valuation is a public interest profession, and 
mistrust in the national valuation profession is a barrier to international monetary flow 
and direct investment (Artemenkov, 2010). It is suggested that when doing property 
valuation, the REA should consider property productivity, transaction area, and it 
should be carried out after a thorough demand and supply analysis (Rattermann, 
2009; Dell, 2013). But appraisers frequently deal with incomplete information and use 
judgmental samples based on personal judgment and thoughts (Del, 2013). The 
valuation stage is a very sensitive one for all major players in the industry. In fact, in 
the United States (US) property market, sales and valuation are succinctly separate 
functions and agents are typically not trained or experienced in valuation (Matthew & 
Hansz, 2003). Furthermore, there is (in the US) a prescribed appraisal model in the 
valuation process (Diaz, Gallimore & Levy, 2002).  In the US, United Kingdom (UK) 
and New Zealand (NZ) valuers are educated to bachelor’s degree level (Matthew & 
Hansz, 2003). On the contrary, in SA, valuation is normally performed by the REA 
without any specialised training. Problems may arise when market participants 
consider different property features in arriving at market prices either due to under-
assessment or over-assessment (Matthew & Hansz, 2003). 
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As mentioned above, the REA is involved right from the initial valuation to set the list 
price and determine subsequent marketing activities. This creates an opportunity to 
engage in actions that serve the agent’s interests at the expense of either of the two 
principals or both. The promotion and viewing patterns can be manipulated to achieve 
what the agent desires. Possibilities of adding unwritten mandate instructions also 
exist in order to serve a specific ideological persuasion of the REA, buyers and sellers. 
Elsewhere in the world, it has been shown that REAs do engage in activities that can 
be said to be aimed at influencing settlement patterns and thus serving a 
discriminatory agenda (Crockett & Wallendorf, 2004; Baressi, 1968). Dual agency or 
mandate arrangement may distort both the distribution of buyers who are shown a 
given property and the distribution of the houses that are shown to the agent’s internal 
buyers (Brastow & Waller, 2013). Other potential buyers ‘may only be considered 
when property fails to sell quickly to avoid increasing opportunity and reputational 
costs’. Near the end of the listing contract, the incentives of sellers and agents may be 
in conflict (Brastow & Waller, 2013). Clearly, from this argument, the marketing 
activities of the REA can adversely affect both principals. The question is: Is such 
behaviour also prevalent in SA and if so, what form does it take? Does political 
ideology have anything to do with this practice and if so, what should be done about 
it?  The above discussion reveals that there is a vast untapped area of research worth 
pursuing. However, there seems to be a dearth of technical and theoretically-based 
approach to understanding how and why real estate business is done the way it is. 
The material upon which one depends when engaging with the industry is mostly 
based on the advertisements and statements from different Real Estate Firms (REFs) 
and banks punting their latest service offers. In order to gain more insight, one needs 
to use literature developed elsewhere in the world and that can be problematic for 
policy makers in the SA context. This will be due to issues like which country’s model 
to adopt and which one not to use.  
 
Financial institutions, investors, buyers and sellers rely on REAs to make financing 
decisions. However, their expectations are not the same. This further emphasises the 
role of REAs’ objectives, especially valuation mandate. In addition, there is a suspicion 
that the average REA is not properly qualified and objective when serving different 
sections (such as buyers or sellers) of the SA society due to the level of training, the 
dual roles they fulfil and their ideological outlook. Twenty one (21) years after the 
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advent of democracy, a measure of concern still lingers with regard to how REAs use 
their position to favour one group against the other, especially with regards to their 
main functions, namely; valuation role and marketing actions. Valuation for rates 
collection purposes is another contentious issue in the City of Johannesburg. 
Government is heavily reliant on property values as they use them to charge property 
taxes (Hoon, Kim & Shilling, 2012). Furthermore, government’s role is not only 
restricted to valuation for tax collection purposes, they also play a policy-making and 
regulatory roles for the residential property market (RPM) as well. An example would 
be the setting of rules that restrict how much money home buyers can borrow for the 
purchase of housing (Hoon, et al., 2012). Therefore, property valuation needs to be 
approached with great caution as it has been a cause of many disagreements between 
different consumers and government departments. Key role players in the valuation 
industry should be individuals in whom all stakeholders can have confidence. In the 
SA context, the issue is highlighted by the complaints on property valuations used by 
municipalities. There is also a general lack of vigorous academic debate in the REI, 
which is evidenced by non-availability of academic literature in the field. Whenever a 
debate happens, it is normally driven by the major property marketing firms and 
mortgage financers as mentioned above. Professional and academic involvement is 
generally thin compared to other countries. On the whole, it is accepted that the 
industry relies heavily on the real estate agents (REAs).  
 
As highlighted before, REAs’ political ideological persuasion seems to play a role in 
the way they do their work. This also brings into focus the principal-agent (PA) 
relationships between REAs on one hand and sellers and buyers on the other. The 
PA relationship has a direct bearing on the types of mandates used in SA and the 
general operation of the industry. The pertinent question is whose interest are the 
agents serving; that of the industry (and by implication the SA economy) or some 
political ideological interest? It must be mentioned that the two roles are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. For both the sellers and buyers, the presence of PA 
information asymmetry (IA) complicates their positions because this places them 
entirely at the mercy of the agents. In the light of the above background information, 
the problem addressed in the present study can be stated as: The dual mandate 
system (DMS) and ideological outlook (IO)’s of role players in the SA REI seem to 
exert an influence on conflict of interests (COI) and compromising of principal’s 
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interests (CP) and these influences result in suboptimal outcomes (OT) for their 
principals. This study seeks to highlight such issues as the role of the REA in property 
valuation and how this and their other roles are informed by socio-political ideological 
persuasion. It also seeks to investigate the value that different stakeholders obtain 
from the valuation reports and the reliability thereof. The study will delve deep into the 
objectivity of the Market values (MVs) supplied by REAs in the light of both their PA 
position and ideological persuasion. It further seeks to bridge the gap between the 
expectations of the different stakeholders (Lorenz, 2008). It is expected to serve as a 
guideline for future academic studies on how the REI operates in SA. It is envisaged 
that ground-breaking work for the training of future real estate practitioners will be 
another off-shoot of this study. REAs’ licensing policies by EAAB stand to benefit from 
this particular project. This study fills some of the gaps in the literature with three 
envisaged contributions, namely; assisting the concerned government department 
(Human Settlement) on policy-formulation regarding how deals are done in the 
industry, initiating academic debates on this crucial area of the economy, assisting the 
Estate Agency Affairs Board (EAAB) in creating policies that are beneficial to the REI. 
It will also help in the preparations of future REI practitioners. Many new entrants in 
the industry as REAs have only the old incumbents to teach them the ropes and that 
also creates other self-reinforcing concerns. The impression created is that present 
practices will be continued until something different comes about. 
 
1.3: WHAT IS KNOWN IN THE FIELD 
 
Housing markets are highly illiquid as it takes time and effort for buyers to find suitable 
homes and vice versa (Genesove & Han, 2012). The Department of Human 
Settlement is directly tasked with policy-making role for the REI. The Estate Agency 
Affairs Board (EAAB) is the body that is tasked with issues of REAs’ licensing and 
regulations. Property valuations are done on daily basis by estate agents and their 
reports can precipitate outcomes with far-reaching consequences; for example, in a 
sale for a divorce settlement. Both government departments and financiers are also 
consumers of the valuation reports. The major players in the industry and their roles 
are briefly summarised in Figure 1.1 below and their roles will be further be expanded 
on in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
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Player Roles 
  
Department of Human Settlement Real estate policy-making 
Reserve Bank of SA Regulating banks and determining Interest rates  
Banks and Private bond companies Financing of real estate assets 
Real estate firms Employ real estate agents 
Real estate agents Valuation and marketing of properties 
Lawyers Property and bond registration  
Deeds offices Deeds registration and transaction records 
EAAB Licensing and control of real estate agents’ activities 
Buyers and sellers Transacting parties in real estate sale 
Construction companies Building of houses 
Investors Buy, sell and rent out properties 
 
Figure1.1: Real estate industry role players 
 
Foreign property investors also take an interest in a well-run REI with clear guidelines 
on property ownership. For such target market, it would be fair to expect them not to 
be interested in countries where the academic/theoretical backing to policies is not 
strong. Leishman (2003) states that investment in RE is associated with considerable 
uncertainty. According to Yang (2000), greater uncertainty exists in RE investment 
than in other areas. 
 
1.4: PURPOSE OF STUDY 
 
The purpose of the current study is to investigate the influence of the mandate system 
and the political ideology outlook on conflict of interest, compromised principals and 
sub-optimal outcomes in South Africa’s real estate industry (REI). The objectives can 
be further subdivided into theoretical objectives and empirical ones. 
 
1.4.1: Theoretical objectives 
 
The objective of this study was also to review literature on the possible influence of 
the mandate types and REAs’ ideological outlook on the operation of the REI in SA. 
To that end, literature was reviewed on: the dual representation mandate type which 
is used in SA REI (with the view of exposing potential dangers and testing whether 
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there would be any acceptance of the changes to the present SA one), the impact of 
ideology on the work of agents (whether the agent’s socio-political ideological 
inclination play a role in how SA REAs do their business) and how residential real 
estate business is conducted in other countries (countries from which SA can learn). 
The rationale for the choice is given below: 
  
Literature shows that there are serious issues with contract type in a principal-agent 
relationship (Geltner, Kluger & Miller, 1991; Nanda & Pancak, 2010), dual 
representation by agents give rise to numerous problems (Clauritie, Daneshuary, 
2008; Elder, Zumpano & Barlya, 2000; Kadiyali, Prince & Simon, 2014) and that other 
countries do not allow dual representation (Black & Nourse, 1995). It has been shown 
in other contexts that agents’ ideologies influence the way they do business (Galster 
& Godfrey, 2005; Ondrich, Stricker & Yinger 1998; Kwate, Goodman, Jackson & 
Harris, 2013). Extensive studies have also been done internationally on the operations 
of the industry on areas such as: marketing activities by REAs (Zheng, Deng, Gabriel 
& Nishimura, 2008; Gardiner, Heisler, Kalberg & Liu, 2007; Zhao 2004), evaluation 
activities by agents (Green, & Vandel, 1995; Yavas & Yang, 1995; Arnold, 1992; 
Knight, Sirmans, & Turnbull, 1998). These and other studies have exposed possible 
dangers to the functioning of the SA REI if checks and balances are not put in place. 
    
1.4.2: Primary Empirical Objectives 
 
The primary empirical objectives with specific reference to the SA REI can be listed as 
follows: 
 To investigate whether DMS positively/negatively influence COI; 
 To investigate whether DMS positively/negatively influence CP; 
 To investigate whether IO positively/negatively influence COI; 
 To investigate whether IO positively/negatively influence CP; 
 To investigate whether COI positively/negatively influence OT; and 
 To investigate whether CP positively/negatively influence OT. 
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1.4.3: Secondary Empirical Objectives 
 
The City of Johannesburg in Gauteng Province was used as the main source of 
information and data gathering. In summary, the secondary objectives of the study are 
listed as follows: 
 
 To extract information on when REAs do property valuation and who gets to 
see the report. Questions will also be asked as to how this information is used 
by the agents;  
 The study also seeks to investigate the PA relationships between the two 
principals and the REA. It will also attempt to find out whose interests are more 
important to the agent when confronted with opportunities of sacrificing one of 
them. This will ascertain an existence of or lack of conflict of interest in the way 
the relationship functions in the REI; and   
 It also aims to investigate whether political ideology has an impact on the day-
to-day activities of agents in general, especially when it comes to where buyer 
principals, be it business or individuals locate. This will go a long way toward 
identifying how agents aid or retard transformation through their actions. 
 
1.4.4: Contribution of the Study  
  
The mandate type generally used by REAs in SA is broadly embedded in the Agency 
theory (AT). The AT is based on certain assumptions (Kerr, 2006; Walking & Long, 
1984; Kurland, 1991). The assumptions are in turn anchored on self-interests of 
people and the divergence of interests between contracting parties (Hill & Jones, 1992; 
Ross, Anderson & Weitz, 1997), agency costs due to dissimilarity of goals between 
contracting parties (Walking, & Long, 1984) and that agents are capable of acting 
opportunistically by exploiting IA to their advantage (Van Slyker, 2006). The principal-
agent (PA) relationship resulting from REA contracting with his/her principal is fiduciary 
in nature (Marsh & Zumpana, 1988; Havenga, Havenga, Hurter, Kelbrick, Manamela, 
Manamela, Schulze & Stoop, 2007; Gibson, 1991; Barker, 2007). A review of literature 
suggests that, issues of trust and IA between the principals and the REA are crucial 
(see among others Cullen, Johnson & Sakano, 2000; Freybote & Gibler, 2011; Lohtia, 
Bello & Porter, 2009; Scott & Lizieri, 2012). In the South African REI, the REA serves 
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two competing interests which are those of buyers and those of sellers (Salvador, 
2011). This is what is referred to as the Dual Mandate system (DMS) (Clauritie & 
Daneshuary, 2008). Many South African writers have shown the advantages that this 
mandate type gives to the consumer (Goslett, 2013; Spies, 2013; Erasmus, 2006). 
Given the importance of the DMS and the risks of COI and CP, conceptual and 
empirical studies of these issues are essential. Although there have been a plethora 
of debates about the PA relationships elsewhere (see among others Kerr, 2006; 
Jensen & Meckling; Kurland, 1991), to the author’s knowledge, no attempt has been 
made in the South African context to investigate how the DMS may lead to COI and 
to principals’ interests being compromised (CP) and how these two may in turn lead 
to suboptimal outcomes OT for the two principals.   
 
Also, REAs are people with their own values and ideological outlook (IO) (Roseberg, 
1956; Layman, 1997, Barnea & Swartz, 1998), who prefer certain states of affairs and 
most probably often attempt to promote their interests at the expense of others 
(Hofstede, 1980; Van Dijk, 1998). For instance, it has been shown that dissimilarities 
of goals between agents and their principals can be associated with conflict of interests 
and one party getting compromised in other contexts (Dombalagian, 2011; Ross, 
Anderson & Weitz, 1997). The impact of the IO on COI and CP in the SA REI has not 
received attention in the empirical literature and therefore warrants special academic 
attention. Therefore, this study also attempts to investigate the relationship that IO has 
with COI, CP and how these ultimately impact on OT. The variables of interests can 
be given as per the table below: 
 
Predictor variables Mediating variables Outcome variables 
   
Dual mandate system 
(DMS) 
Conflict of interest (COI) Suboptimal outcomes 
(OT) 
Ideological outlook (IO) Compromising of 
principals (CP) 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Major variables of the study  
 
The study is an attempt to develop a theoretical framework for understanding the 
functioning of the SA REI for both academics and policy-makers. It is hoped that it will 
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ignite an active interest among academics to undertake research on the direction the 
REI should take after the results of this dissertation will have been made public. It will 
both sensitise the SA population about practices in the industry and assist 
stakeholders to rationally do business and maximise benefits not only for themselves, 
but for the whole SA economy. This by extension will also assist the Department of 
Human Settlement to institute policies that are backed up by properly researched 
guidelines. It is hoped that the study will contribute to academic knowledge on this 
area that is not well researched. It is also expected to aid economic growth as foreign 
investment in the REI will be simplified. It is further expected to aid the EAAB and the 
REAs when they do business to be aware of those issues that are important to REA 
property industry. The study will also assist financers when making financing decisions 
for the safety of the industry and the economy at large. 
  
Knowledge on property valuations in SA will be advanced as the project will also 
stimulate academic debates about this role for which as is the general practice at the 
moment, REAs are not trained to do appraisals. It is envisaged that one of the off-
shoots of the study will be a clear demarcation between REAs and professional 
appraisers and therefore mitigating conflict of interests for these players. Aspiring 
entrants into the industry will be aided in terms of their formal training in academic 
institutions and thus firmly grounding their practice on sound theoretical basis. The 
study might also give direction on the curriculum requirements for marketing of real 
estate in academic institutions. The following framework represents the practical and 
graphical operation of the industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
\ 
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1.4.5: Industry operation framework 
 
The framework given in Figure 1.2 will be further clarified in Chapter 2 of the 
dissertation. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Research framework (Own sources) 
 
1.5: RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The questions will subdivided into primary research questions and the secondary 
ones. 
 
 
 
 
Seller
s 
Valuation 
Agent 
(REA) 
Buyer
s 
List price 
 
Advert 
Screen 
Gate
Matching 
Promo 
Viewing 
Marketing 
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1.5.1: Primary Research Questions:  
  
This study will seek to tackle the primary questions listed below. 
 
 Is DMS positively or negatively related to COI in the South African REI? 
 Is DMS positively or negatively related to CP in the SA REI?  
 Is IO positively or negatively related to COI in the SA REI? 
 Is IO positively or negatively related to CP in the SA REI? 
 Is COI positively or negatively related to OT in the SA REI? 
 Is CP positively or negatively related to OT in the SA REI? 
In order to attempt to answer these questions the following model in Figure 1.1 and 
hypotheses are proposed. 
 
 1.5.2: Secondary Research Questions 
 
In getting answers to the questions posed above, light will be shed on the secondary 
questions listed below. 
 Does SA mandate system give more power to the agent than sellers and 
buyers? 
 Does Dual mandate system compromise one of the principals and if yes, who 
stands to benefit more, the seller or the buyer in any given transaction? 
 Is the REA’s ideological outlook positively correlated with conflict of interest 
and does that also relate to the agent compromising one of the principals? 
 Are there positive relationships between compromising the principal and the 
suboptimal outcomes and the societal divisions? 
 Does it also lead to conflict of interest and compromised service to either of 
the principals? 
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1.6: PROPOSED CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES STATEMENTS 
 
The proposed model is given below together with the hypotheses that were tested. 
 
  
1.6.1: Proposed Conceptual model  
 
The development of the model given in Figure 1.3 is shown in Chapter 4 (Conceptual 
model and hypotheses development) of the dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1.4: Research model 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
1.6.2: Hypotheses statements 
 
Drawings from the conceptual model for the SA REI, the following hypotheses are 
posited: 
 There is a positive relationship between dual mandate system and conflict of 
interests in the SA real estate industry (REI) (H1); 
 There is a positive relationship between dual mandate system and 
compromised principal in the SA REI (H2); 
 There is a positive relationship between the ideological outlook of role players 
and conflict of interests in the SA REI (H3);  
 There is a positive relationship between real estate agents’ ideological outlook 
and compromised principals in the SA REI (H4); 
 There is a positive relationship between conflict of interests and sub-optimal 
outcomes  in the SA REI (H5); and 
DM
S 
CO
I 
OT 
H1 
H5 
H2 
IO CP 
H3 
H4 
H6 
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 There is a positive relationship between compromised principal and sub-
optimal outcomes in the SA REI (H6) 
 
1.7: PROCESS OVERVIEW  
  
Below is the research process description. 
 
1.7.1: Process overview 
 
A scientific research approach adopted in this study involved a step-by-step logical, 
organised and rigorous sequence of identifying problems, gathering data, analysing 
the data and drawing valid conclusions (Chinomona, 2010). The motivation for the 
research and the main purpose of the study is supplied above. Before doing related 
literature review, a chapter on the operation of the SA REI will be given in order to 
position the project in a proper perspective. Thereafter, related literatures on the 
problem of research interest will be reviewed. The fourth chapter will draw from the 
reviewed theoretical and empirical literatures to build a conceptual framework, 
research model and develop research hypotheses. Following hypotheses 
development, the fifth chapter explains the measure of methodology undertaken prior 
to data collection. Thereafter, the conceptualized model and posited hypotheses will 
be empirically tested using data collected and the results will then be interpreted. 
Finally, in the last section, findings, conclusions, recommendations, implications of the 
study and concluding remarks will be provided. Also to be included in this chapter will 
be theoretical and practical implications of the thesis and suggestions for future 
research. In summary, the final chapters will be as per the structure given in the 
programme organisation below. 
 
1.7.2: Programme organisation 
 
Chapter 2: Real Estate Business in South Africa: This will include all the steps and 
parties involved from mandate to the conclusion of the transaction. It will cover the 
different stakeholders in the industry and their respective roles. In particular, the roles 
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of: the Reserve Bank, the EAAB, the banking industry, lawyers, deeds office, REIs, 
REAs and transaction flows will also be provided.  
 
Chapter 3:  Literature review: The chapter will concentrate on economic theories 
that have a bearing on the REI in general. The major emphasis will be on basic 
economics as applied to REI, Dual agency, PA relationships, IA, valuation and 
marketing of properties. The project will be looking at how these concepts interact in 
the SA REI and also how they relate to the variables of interest which are DMS, IO, 
COI, CP and OT. The development of the above proposed conceptual model will be 
highlighted in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 4: Conceptual Model and Hypotheses Development: This chapter will 
deal with the proposed model that will be empirically tested. The section will also 
contain the frameworks on how the SA REI works and the steps from mandate to 
deeds office registration. 
 
Chapter 5: Research methods: The chapter will include: Research design, 
Participants, Instrumentation Research procedure, data analysis, Assumptions and 
limitations. Latest approaches to the above tested concepts will be employed. 
      
Chapter 6: Data measurement results: It will include data analysis and presentation. 
Tables and graphs will be used and interpretation of results will be discussed. 
Descriptive statistics will be used in order to come to academically sound conclusions. 
 
Chapter 7: Findings, conclusions, recommendations, study limitations and 
conclusion: This chapter will discuss results summary, state major conclusions, give 
recommendations and suggests pointers for future studies. 
 
1.8: CHAPTER 1 SUMMARY 
 
The chapter can briefly be summarised as follows: The first part is the introduction of 
the major issues in the REI followed by a brief background of the study with the 
introduction of the topic. This is followed by the problem statement and discussion of 
the identified gaps. The section also deals with those issues that are of concern to the 
present study with a brief description of how they relate to each other. Following this 
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section is a subsection that gives those issues that are generally known in the industry 
and the major role players. This is followed by an operation framework of the industry. 
Thereafter, the purpose of the study is formally introduced and what it aims to achieve. 
Research questions, proposed research model and hypotheses follow this stage. The 
subsequent operation framework aims to give a picture of the present operation of the 
REI and how each role player influences the industry. It includes other actors not 
directly dealt with in the present study.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
2.1: INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter aims to supply information on the present state of the real estate industry 
(REI) in SA. It concentrates on government departments that affect the industry and 
relevant acts that govern the activities in the industry, implementation organisations 
taking their mandates from these departments, private sector players and their role in 
the industry and finally the consumers and how all these other players impact on them. 
The last part of the chapter will be a brief discussion on the real estate firms (REFs), 
real estate agents (REAs) and the consumers of all the services.  Chapter objectives 
are summarised below. 
 
2.2: CHAPTER OBJECTIVES 
 
The preamble to the Housing Act 107 (South Africa, 1998) defines Housing as an 
adequate shelter that fulfils basic human needs which is a vital part of integrated 
development planning. It goes on to describe housing as a key part of the national 
economy, a vital component for socio-economic well-being of the nation. From the 
government side, the real estate industry (REI) is clearly a very important part of the 
overall economic development whose operation needs to be understood. The African 
National Congress (ANC) election manifesto (ANC, 2014) also brings into sharp focus 
the ambitious plans that the governing party has brought into the public domain. 
Targets by the ANC election manifesto for human settlements are twofold: ensuring 
that all SA have access to adequate human settlements and quality living conditions; 
and to provide one million housing opportunities for qualifying households over the 
next five years. The fulfilment of those plans rest with a well-coordinated REI. The 
main objective of this chapter can be given as to give an intense discussion on how 
the REI in SA operates and how the different parts of the industry interact with each 
other. In this chapter, a list of some government departments whose role impacts the 
REI directly/indirectly will be given and a brief description of the acts governing their 
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involvement. Major constitutional organizations getting their mandate from those 
government departments will also be given together with a brief discussion on how 
these influence the industry. The role of the private sector in the industry will also be 
highlighted in the SA REI. Towards the end of the chapter, the interaction of all the 
different stakeholders will be shown. 
A real estate transaction organogram from one of the conveyancing attorneys’ firm is 
also supplied in this chapter. A summary list of government departments that impact 
the REI is given below and brief discussion follows thereafter. 
 
Government department  Mandating Act Leadership REI responsibilities 
    
I. Human Settlement Housing Act 107 of 1997 
Home loan and Mortgage 
disclosure Act 63 of 2000 
Sisulu L.N. 
(Minister) and 
Zulu T. (DG) 
Housing policies 
Home loans 
Housing consumers 
protection 
 
II. National Treasury Chapter 2 of the 
constitution of PFMA 
Gordhan, P. 
(Minister) 
Fuzile L. 
(Director) 
Banking  regulator 
SARB 
SARS 
 
III. Justice and Constitutional 
development 
Attorney’s Act 53 of 1995, 
Constitution of the RSA 
108 of 1996 and 
Companies Act 
Immovable property Act 
94 0f 1965 
Masutha T.M. 
(Minister) 
Sindane N. (DG) 
Deeds endorsement 
Conveyancing 
IV. Rural development and Land 
reform 
Deeds registration Act of 
1937 and Section 24, 25 
and 27 of the Constitution 
Nkwiti G.E. 
(Minister) 
Shobane P.M. 
(Director) 
Property valuation and 
registration 
V. Trade and industry National credit Act 34 of 
2005 
Davies R. 
(Minister) 
October L. (DG) 
Credit regulation via NCR 
 
Figure 2.1: Government departments 
 
NB: The leadership and responsibilities shown for the different departments are those 
that pertain to the REI which may change if there is, for instance, a cabinet reshuffle. 
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Here are some statistics worth taking note of as the discussion continues. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Change in demographics of property buyers in Gauteng 
 
Generally, foreign interest in SA property market remains strong (Peacock, 2014). 
According to Peacock’s (2014) Business times article of the 28/09/2014:   
 Gauteng is the leading province in the whole of SA in terms of the number of 
properties bought and sold to foreigners; 
 Sales by foreigners outnumbered purchases by the same group; 
 In the past 12 months, 8530 of the 280395 properties sold in SA were bought 
by foreigners and Gauteng had 4000 share of that figure; 
 Big attraction for Gauteng seems to be access it gives to business to the rest 
of Africa; 
 Rand depreciation made SA properties tempting for people using Dollars, Euros 
and Pounds; and 
 Total purchases for the 12 months were worth R9.68 billion and the average 
price was R1.2 million. For the same period total sales raked in R11.28 billion. 
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2.3: SA GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND THEIR ROLE IN THE REAL ESTATE 
INDUSTRY  
 
The above departments will be discussed in the following order: Department of Human 
Settlements, National Treasury, Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development, Rural Development and Land Reform and the Department of Trade and 
Industry. 
 
2.3.1: Department of Human Settlements (DHS) 
 
The department derives its mandate from Housing Act 107 (South Africa, 1998) and 
Home loan and Mortgage disclosure Act 63 (South Africa, 2000). The responsible 
Minister is Sisulu L.N. and Zulu T. is the Director General as shown in the table above 
(dhs.gov.za, accessed on 2/11/2015). The department has a responsibility for home 
loans and housing consumers’ protection. The department is also responsible for the 
regulation of the REI via the Estate Agent Affairs Board (EAAB), which is the 
organisation that has a direct influence on the present study. 
 
2.3.2: National Treasury (NT) 
 
This government department derives its mandate from Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
Gordhan P. is the current Cabinet Minister and Fuzile L is the Director General at the 
time of the compilation of this report. The major tasks related to the REI are performed 
via the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) which in turn exercises the banking sector 
regulatory functions. The department is also tasked with the administration of the 
Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), Municipal Finance Management Act 
(MFMA) and the South African Revenue Services (SARS). 
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2.3.3: Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DJCD) 
 
The department derives its mandate from the Attorney’s Act 53 (South Africa, 1995), 
Section 108 of the Constitution of the RSA (South Africa, 1996) and Companies Act, 
Immovable Property Act 94 (South Africa, 1965). Conveyancers’ operations are 
governed by this department. 
 
2.3.4: Department of Rural Development and Land reform (DRDLR) 
 
This government department derives its mandate from the Deeds Registration Act 
(South Africa, 1937) and Section 24, 25 and 27 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa. Nkwinti G.E. is the current Minister and Shobane P.M. is the Director 
General. The department is responsible for the property valuation and registration via 
the deeds offices. The deeds offices employ examiners and registrars who together 
with conveyancers complete the property transfer registration. 
 
2.3.5: Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
 
The department derives its mandate from the National Credit Act 34 (South Africa, 
2005) and National Credit Amendment Act 19 (South Africa, 2014). The present 
Cabinet Minister is Davies R. and the Director General is October L. The department’s 
role it is to control how much credit can legally be advanced to any individual. It 
controls the credit market via an organisation called the National Credit Regulation 
(NCR) which is discussed separately in this chapter. The attention now turns to the 
constitutional and regulatory organisations in the REI. 
  
2.4: HOW REGULATORY BODIES INFLUENCE THE REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY 
 
It has already been shown that government departments influence the REI via some 
constitutionally created organisations. The constitutional organizations of interest are 
the EAAB, the South African the Reserve Bank (SARB), the Financial Services Board 
(FSB), Financial Intelligence Act (FICA), South African Revenue Services (SARS), 
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Lawyers/Conveyancers, the Deeds Office (DO) and the National Credit Regulator 
(NCR). 
The subsequent discussion will also show how these organisations relate to the 
relevant department and the acts governing their operations and existence. 
 
2.4.1: The Estate Agency Affairs Board (EAAB) 
  
The EAAB is the body created to regulate the affairs of REFs and REAs in SA. It came 
about from the Estate Agency Affairs Act 112 of 1976 which mandated the 
establishment of this body and Estates Fidelity Fund for the control of certain activities 
of agents in the public interest. The EAAB initially reported to the Department of Trade 
and Industry since 1976 and was transferred to DHS on the 17/05/2012 by 
proclamation of the President of the RSA. The current CEO is Brian Chaplog. It is the 
official quality authority for the estate agency industry in SA. The EAAB oversees the 
compulsory qualifications of estate agents and agency principals and ensures the 
compliance of agents to the Estate agent’s code of conduct by obliging them to register 
and obtain a new Fidelity Fund Certificate (FFC) every year. One of the mandates of 
the board is to ensure the national imperative of the transformation of the Estate 
Agency sector so that it more fully aligns with the demographic realities of a democratic 
SA (Agent, 2014). It ensures management of the registration process of all 
applications pertaining to FFC, which is the licence to practice as an estate agent in 
South Africa. This organization is also tasked with registration of change of ownership 
of REFs, registration of change of trading names applications of REFs, processing of 
new principal applications, processing of new interns applications, full agent status 
applications processing, handling of annual renewals applications, attending to 
submission of audit reports and trust accounts; and to deal with any consumer 
complaints against agents or an agency (Strategic objectives, 2015).  
 
2.4.2: The South African Reserve Bank (SARB)  
 
The SARB serves similar purpose to central banks elsewhere in the world, which is to 
promote financial stability (Gabilondo, 2012). This central bank was created in 1921 
after the First World War. The SARB operates under the National Treasury 
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Department. It is mandated by the SARB Act of 1989 which in turn is derived from 
sections 223 to 225 of the Constitution of RSA of 1996. It operates through regular 
consultation with National Treasury Department Minister and it is therefore ultimately 
accountable to Parliament. This is the major bank that regulates the activities of other 
banks via the control of interest rates that banks charge customers. Another 
responsibility that will be discussed separately under foreigner ownership of properties 
in SA is the levying of Capital Gains Tax. The interest rates can be seen as a price 
which equilibrates the desire for saving and investment demand (Ansga, 2013). 
Decrease in interest rates result in lower financing costs and that may unleash an 
increase in residential property market prices and thus stimulating recourse to 
mortgage credit (Ansga, 2013). Low interest rate leads to a higher number of loans. 
One of the reasons is that lower rates might lead to households preferring buying 
instead of renting. Also, low borrowing costs make real estate investment more 
attractive than financial investment (Stinglhamber, Van Nieuwenhuyze & Zachary, 
2011). Low interest regime encourages borrowers to get large sum with monthly 
payment unchanged as they have a leeway to diminish their down payment and/or 
purchase a more expensive property. More accessible loans imply availability to less 
wealthy borrowers for buying properties which do not necessarily mean large loans 
and resultant reduction in average amount borrowed (Ansga, 2013).The mandate for 
the SARB as gleaned from the banks’ publications can broadly be summarised as 
follows:  
 Provide an enabling framework for the operation of banks;  
 Formulating and implementation of monetary policies;  
 Influence the quantity of money by use of interest rates with the view of 
achieving stable prices;  
 Levying of cash reserves on banks against eligible collateral-assets that qualify 
as liquid assets, make, issue and destroy banknotes and coins; and 
 Manage liquidity in the financial market, achieve and maintain price stability by 
inflation targeting and to be a lender of last resort to commercial banks.  
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Here are some statistics of interest from some reports from the RBSA. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Banks in SA 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Composition of gross loans and advances % 
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NB: The above information has been sourced from cited journal articles and the SARB 
website. 
 
2.4.3: Financial services board (FSB) 
 
As previously mentioned, a huge amount of housing transactions are bond financed 
and the financial services providers are also regulated by this organisation. The 
Financial Services Board Act (Act 97 of 1990) mandates the Financial Services Board 
(FSB) to:  
“promote programmes and initiatives by financial institutions and bodies 
representing the financial services industry to inform and educate users and 
potential users of financial products and services.”  
 
This organisation’s strategy is geared toward delivering on a long-term vision of  “All 
South Africans managing their personal and family financial affairs soundly; and 
irresponsible financial service providers not being supported and getting reported to 
law enforcement agencies’’.  
This would be achieved by consumers taking responsibility for their financial future 
and decisions, acquiring information, making considered decisions and knowing how 
to act when things go wrong and Financial Service Providers being committed to fair 
treatment, providing appropriate information and acting professionally.  
 
A consequence of this would be a more efficient and effective regulation, stable and 
efficient financial markets, and a higher consumer and Financial Service Provider 
awareness of the regulatory environment. The success of the project will be indicated 
in a macro-economic sense by a greater savings culture in South Africa (reduced 
household debt ratio); reduced household debt; lower personal insolvency rates; lower 
bad debt levels; increased penetration of formal financial products into the population; 
less consumer complaints illustrating ignorance of responsibilities or unscrupulous 
operators; and an increased investment and planning for retirement (National 
Treasury, FSB). Another organisation whose functions are closely related to the FSB 
is the NCR (South Africa, 1990). 
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2.4.4: Financial Intelligence Act (FICA) 
 
REAs also have responsibilities with regard to prevention of unlawful activities in the 
REI (as shown under the EAAB responsibilities). It is actually a responsibility enforced 
by law. The National Credit Act (2005) that brought about the NCR also imposes strict 
requirements to REAs via the Financial Intelligence Act which was passed by 
Parliament in December 2001 and is being promulgated in a phased approach. In 
terms of FICA, the Money Laundering Advisory Council and Financial Intelligence 
Centre were established. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: SA green bar-coded ID  
 
All accountable institutions, including REAs, are called upon to prevent money 
laundering. Money laundering is the process of manipulating the proceeds of crime in 
order to conceal the nature of its true source. Money that started out dirty will end up 
clean and any act in connection with any proceeds of crime, whether it is in the form 
of money or property or any other form can constitute a laundering offence. Therefore, 
REAs are required to be always aware of these possibilities. In any transaction, the 
first issue that they would normally take care of would be the FICA documents that 
have to be submitted to transferring, bond registration lawyers and the REA.  
FICA imposes the duties of establishing and verifying the identity of clients, commonly 
referred to as the "know-your-client-requirement” on REAs. An estate agent may not 
establish a business relationship with a client unless the former (estate agent) has 
taken the prescribed steps to establish and verify the identity of the client. The client 
will be the person who has given an estate agent a mandate. It is important to get as 
much information as possible at the mandate stage and to inform the client as to what 
documentation is required. The client's identity must then be verified before the 
mandate is performed. FICA also imposes the duty to report suspicious transactions. 
An automatic reporting duty relating to cash transactions and electronic transfers of 
money to or from the Republic in excess of the prescribed amount (not yet 
implemented). This means the business believes it has received or is about to receive 
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the proceeds of unlawful activities. REAs are tasked with reporting of evasion or 
attempted evasion of a duty to pay a tax, duty or levy imposed by SARS and reporting 
that a business has been or is about to be used in any way for money laundering 
purposes.  There is a big gap between the public and the private sectors. The public 
sector is generally assumed to act in the interest of the public and the private sector 
to have a profit motive. FICA effectively establishes a partnership between the private 
and the public sector to assist in the identification of proceeds of unlawful activities 
thereby combating money laundering activities. 
 
2.4.5: National Credit Regulator (NCR)  
 
The other player that regulates the affairs of the banks is the NCR. It was established 
as the regulator under the National Credit Act 34 (South Africa, 2005). The responsible 
department under which the NCR falls is the Department of Trade and Industry. Davies 
R. is the present minister and October L. the Director General (Motshegare, 2005). 
As a constitutionally created organization, the NCR has a number of responsibilities 
which impact on the REI. It is an organization that has to promote and develop a fair, 
transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, effective and accessible 
credit market and industry. The NCR also has the duty to monitor credit availability, 
prices and market conditions, access to consumer credit (which according to DTI 
includes products such as housing loans and mortgages) by small business. The duty 
of monitoring levels of indebtedness and social effects of indebtedness and of 
registering credit providers, credit bureaux’s and debt counsellors is another 
responsibility of this organization. The NCR is supposed to increase knowledge of the 
SA public about the nature and dynamics of the credit market and industry and to 
promote public awareness of consumer credit matters (South Africa, 2005). It is also 
the body that enforces compliance with the Act (South Africa, 2005). Here are some 
statistics of interest gleaned from the NCR report. They are given in the diagrams 
below (Fig 2.4-2.9) with some short comments on what they tell us. 
The first diagram shows how much of credit Gauteng gets from all credit suppliers 
which are almost 50% of the total. The subsequent two tables show how mortgage 
loans have been growing by about 4.37%. The next table shows what is happening to 
the applications and the rejection rates. This one is also growing and the trend can 
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also be felt in the REI by REFs and REAs. When one considers those mortgage loans 
granted, it is clear that those individuals on the high earning side and the bigger size 
loans have a high success rate and on a year-on-year basis they are actually growing. 
With the history of SA being what it is, the figures might trigger some concerns. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6:  Provincial distribution of credit granted-2014 
 
 
 
Table 2.1:  Gross debtor’s book-credit type 
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Table 2.2:  Gross debtor’s book-mortgages 
 
 
 
Table 2.3:  Number of applications received and rejected 
 
 
 
Table 2.4: Mortgages granted-gross monthly income of individuals (no. of 
agreements) 
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Table 2.5: Mortgages granted-size of agreements 
 
As they say: It is not over until the fat lady sings; no formally recognised property 
transaction until the tax man gets his share. The attention will briefly be focused on 
how the REI is affected by the receiver of revenue. 
 
2.4.6: South African Revenue Services (SARS) 
 
This government entity derives its mandate from the different acts of Parliament. Two 
examples are the: Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 and SARS Act 1997 and 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. The organisation collects tax revenue on behalf of the 
state. The applicable taxes that directly impact the REI are Transfer Duty Tax and the 
Capital Gains Tax. Transfer Duty Tax applies to taxes levied on the value of any 
property acquired by any person by way of transaction or any other way and this 
include residential properties. The property buyer pays that tax through the 
conveyancer handling the transaction and the money is supposed to be paid over to 
SARS within six months from the date of acquisition. For that reason, conveyancers 
are also required to register with SARS. The other relevant tax is the Capital Gains 
Tax which applies to both SA residents and to non-SA residents. This is the tax 
responsibility that arises when one disposes of an asset on or after October 2001 for 
proceeds that exceed their base cost. It is mandated by schedule eight of Income Tax 
Act 58 of 1962. A buyer of any immovable property of more than R2m from a non-
resident has to withhold and pay over to SARS a 5% share and that share acts as an 
advanced payment toward the seller’s tax liability. For a SA resident, the Act applies 
to all assets located both in and outside of SA borders.  
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2.4.7: Lawyers/Conveyancers 
 
Lawyers’ activities are regulated by the Law Society of SA (LSSA) which has offices 
in different regions and they operate under the auspices of the Department of Justice 
and Constitutional Development. The relevant Act governing their practice is the 
Attorneys Act 53 of 1979 and section 3 of the Deeds Registration Act 47 of 1937. The 
other related legislation is the Constitution of the RSA Act 108 of 1996 and the 
Immovable Property Act 94 of 1965. Attorneys are bound by a strict professional code 
of practice contained in Act 28 of 2014 and they fall under the regulatory jurisdiction 
of the provincial law society where they are registered. Any property registration has 
to go through at least one law firm/lawyer as any real estate participant would know. 
There should be qualified conveyancing lawyers who deal with lodging and registration 
at the deeds offices and bond registration lawyers who normally take their mandates 
from banks to register bonds (Klinkenberg, 2014).  It can happen that a single firm gets 
both conveyancing and bond registration mandates. Their fees are recommended by 
the Law societies but they are still negotiable. The conveyancers usually get their 
mandate to register a matter from the seller and or the REA. Their registration gets 
completed at the deeds offices. 
 
Conveyancing means the process whereby a person, company or a close-corporation 
or trust becomes the registered and legal owner of immovable property and ensures 
that this ownership cannot be challenged. A conveyancer can be defined as an 
admitted attorney who has passed a specialised conveyancing examination and has 
been admitted as conveyancers of the court of SA (Aghdasi, 2011). A conveyancer’s 
status is obtained through an additional qualification that attorneys can obtain in order 
to be able to engage in drafting of deeds and property registration. The course that 
they complete deals with the practices and procedures of conveyancing and notarial 
practice. The institution responsible for this qualification is the Legal Education and 
Development (LEAD). Conveyancers must first pass the National Conveyancing 
examination (Aghdasi, 2011). 
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2.4.8: Deeds Office (DO) 
 
This is the government registry of all fixed property and rights in them. The Deeds 
Office operates under the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform Act 
and has offices all over the country. There is a deeds registration office in all nine 
provinces. This body derives its mandate from sections 24 to 25 and 27 (Property 
clause) which establish the framework for the implementation of land reform. The other 
relevant Act governing the operations is the Deeds Registration Act no.47 of 1937. 
There is also a Property Valuation Bill enacted from the same department with the 
view of employing a Valuer General (VG). The VG will assist the state with regard to 
acquisition of land/property to redress the effects of the past. There are deeds offices 
all over the country. Most importantly, property transfer is only completed legally when 
Deeds Office registration has been completed. There are examiners in these offices 
who scrutinise property transaction documents to ensure that they comply with 
relevant legislation and regulations. When they are satisfied that the documentations 
comply, they inform the conveyancers that the transaction is ready for registration and 
thereupon, in the presence of the conveyancers and the registrar of deeds the property 
is registered in the name of the purchaser. The bond is registered simultaneously with 
the property registration. The purchaser becomes the lawful owner of the property and 
his/her title cannot be upset by any person. The deeds office will thereafter release the 
title deed which will be handed over to the purchaser through the conveyancer or to 
the bondholder (Klinkenberg, 2014). A list of provincial deeds offices and contact 
details are supplied in the deeds office website. The gap between the private sector 
and the public is bridged by the constitutional organisations discussed above and how 
that takes place will be shown below. 
 
2.5: THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND THE CONSUMER  
 
Many private firms and individuals are involved in the REI and huge amounts of money 
exchange hands in this industry. Banks and other real estate financiers are involved 
in bond grants for property financing. REAs are normally called upon to do property 
valuations and therefore have an influence on the money spent when properties are 
bought. They are also responsible for marketing of houses and that also has an impact 
on the industry. All the activities of the banks and REAs are meant to serve buyers 
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and sellers. These stakeholders will therefore get special attention. The roles of these 
different stakeholders are discussed hereunder. 
 
2.5.1: Banks and other real estate financiers 
 
Banks are the institutions that lend money to buyers at a cost which is aligned to the 
interest rates and this is to a large extent determined by the SARB and the buyer’s 
credit situation. As it has been shown above, the credit market is also regulated by the 
NCR. Banks provide the necessary finance to eligible buyers. It is estimated that about 
80% of all properties bought in the suburbs is bond financed. There are other 
institutions that are not banks but are also involved in the property financing. Examples 
would be Eskom, SA Home Loans, Sanlam, et cetera. Banks play a very important 
part as shown by the percentage given above. Also, the property industry is a highly 
credit dependent (The Agent, 2013). In financing property transactions, the banks 
operate under the Home Loans Act (Act 63 of 2000). In many cases, banks depend 
heavily on central bank funding (Belke, 2012). Banks can also interlink closely with all 
economic and political actors and they are increasingly regarded as important 
contributors to financial and economic stability (DuFays, 2012). The original functions 
of the banks are financing the economy and this has a direct impact on the wealth of 
people, on company and consumer behaviour (DuFays, 2012). Different banks have 
different approaches to interest charges with some charging higher rates to similar 
customers than the others. The rates are also inflation linked. Recent mortgage 
financing trends are given below. When banks issue a bond, it is based on the 
underlying premise that mortgage property is a fairly liquid, marketable investment that 
will generally increase in value over time; real property is an appreciating investment 
that can be bought and sold at will (Yen, 2012). In general, the borrowers’ suitability 
standards focus on debt-to-income ratios and ability to make contractual required loan 
repayment (Yen, 2012). The trend for the banking industry is to do social banking - 
provision of bank and financial service that systematically pursues a positive 
contribution to the potential of all human beings to develop today and in the future. 
Social banking is meant to satisfy existing needs in the economy and in society while 
simultaneously taking into account clients’ social, cultural ecological and economic 
sustainability (Yen, 2012). This is closely related to what Yen (2012) calls ethical 
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banking which describes activity of banks committed to promoting environment, social 
projects and real economy. In addition to dealing with the well-being of employees, 
customer satisfaction, benefits, wages, and gender balance, they will look at the 
impact their banking practices have on the society and the environment. 
 
2.5.2: Real estate firms and real estate agents 
   
REFs and REAs are regulated by the EAAB as mentioned earlier. There are a good 
number of REAs working for REFs in different suburbs and others who operate as one 
man business from their homes. The requirements for anyone who does business as 
an agent are the same. They have to be licensed by the EAAB. An agent can go on to 
become a principal if certain requirements are met. The general route presently for an 
agent is: one becomes an Intern REA for a year and thereafter applies to be a fully-
fledged REA. For one to go on to become a  principal, further requirements are that 
they must have a registered company with a tax number, a known auditing firm and 
they have to get audited annually. There are about 30 REFs in the areas of interest 
and there is no fixed number of the agents as it is a fluid industry. Only an estimate 
can be given at any given time. The list of some of the major REFs is supplied on 
below in Figure 2.6. 
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Figure 2.7: Real estate firms 
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There are no college qualifications that one needs to complete in order to be an agent. 
However, there is Professional Designation Examination (PDE) courses that one 
needs to do and these are offered by private institutions and agents can get exempted 
from them under certain circumstances. REAs also have responsibilities with regard 
to prevention of unlawful activities in the REI as shown above under FICA. Valuations 
and Marketing are among other responsibilities that REFs and REAs carry out on 
behalf of their customers. 
 
2.5.2.1: The marketing role of the firms and agents and how that affects the 
industry 
 
The marketing responsibilities are generally carried out by use of both print and 
electronic media and road shows. REAs sometimes stage show houses over 
weekends to showcase their stock. However, the trend seems to be the electronic 
route. The major electronic property advertisement companies are Private Property, 
Gumtree, IOL and Property24. There are other companies also doing business but the 
given ones are the biggest in terms of number of ads and affiliation by the big REFs in 
SA. The print media are generally dominated by local property magazine 
advertisement companies, namely; Saturday Star and Sunday Times property 
sections. Examples of popular property magazines in the areas used in the present 
study are: Property Portfolio, Western Homefinder, Property Junction and many REFs 
sponsored magazines. Both the print and electronic space is usually dominated by the 
big REFs and REAs. 
 
The usual starting point for advertisement is that the REA obtains a sole mandate from 
the seller and go on to do valuation and subsequently list and market the property. To 
further simplify marketing, some companies and individual REAs join forces through 
Multiple Listing Services (MLS). This allows other firms and agents to also market the 
property for which a sole mandate has been signed. The MLS is a worldwide 
arrangement which started in the USA which assists the marketing of properties. MLS 
are said to increase a property’s exposure and the pool of potential buyers, facilitate 
orderly correlation and dissemination of listing information to better serve brokers’ 
clients, customers and the public, helps to facilitate cooperation with other brokers, 
assists REAs to earn commission from sale of properties listed by others and from 
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properties they help sell as buyer representative (Siddons, [s.a]) and help subscribers 
to search on MLS and retrieve information about all houses for sale by all participating 
brokers (Multi Listing Service, 2005). 
The system also has the following disadvantages:  
 It brings about unintended consequences like uncontrolled movements and 
possibilities of criminals gaining entry to the property;  
 MLS does not work directly with sellers and buyers, the agents are not 
committed to market that one property and mandated agents will often sit back 
and wait for buyers to come in from other agencies for which they generally get 
a 50/50 commission split;  
 There is little incentive to actively market the property if it is not the agent’s sole 
responsibility;  
 Many for sale signs and electronic adverts may be indicating discounted or 
distressed sale in the eyes of the buyers which has a capacity to significantly 
alter the perception of value; and lastly  
 REAs may actively push for lower prices in order to get a quick sale (Geffen, 
2008).  
The sole dual mandate is one of the major variables for the present study, which 
is further described in Chapter 3. The listing data stored in a MLS database is the 
proprietary information of the broker who obtained a listing agreement with the 
property seller. The information is used by REAs who agree to share their listing 
agreements with one another to locate willing and able buyers for properties more 
quickly than they could on their own.  
  
2.5.2.2: Desk-top valuation organizations and their influence on the industry  
   
In their valuation role, REAs are aided by desk-top valuation programmes which are 
linked to the deeds offices all over the country. The three major companies are 
Windeed, PropIQ (Day, 2014) and Lightstone (Watt, 2014). Windeed was founded in 
2002 by Day and Parker (Day, 2014). It is part of Korbitec, the company that owns 
Prop 24 (Day, 2014). By use of software, it offers electronic interface to the registration 
offices including the deeds. Other services include Bureaus, Experian Credit, CIPC, 
Transunion, such services as estimate property values. It gives maps, comparable 
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sales, deeds office property description, street address, suburb trends, owner 
information, bonds, surrounding amenities, municipal values, property history, et 
cetera (Day, 2014).  
 
Lightstone was formed in 2005 and its managing director is Andrew Watt (Watt, 2014). 
Lightstone prides itself in providing information on property reports, residential 
property information, property values; reduce exposure risk, doing automated property 
valuation and property validation (Watt, 2014). Why these companies are important to 
the present study is that many REAs use them on a daily basis for valuation report 
purposes. The valuation role of the REAs will be further elaborated on in the 
subsequent chapters. Again, there are questions with regards to how REAs do their 
valuation and how the ultimate principal and consumer benefit from the reports. The 
missing part to conclude the cycle in the property transaction is the sellers and 
consumers, who are the main focus of the study. 
 
2.5.3: Sellers and buyers of real estate      
 
Sellers are the people who want to sell at a price and voluntarily engage in the market. 
Different reasons have been documented on why people sell their properties. 
Conversely, there are many reasons as to why people buy properties. Some people 
buy for wealth accumulation. Housing is an asset and vehicle for wealth accumulation 
(McKee, 2012). Some people might sell or buy properties for health reasons as there 
are human ecology-factors that influence people’s health. As an illustration, some 
people are sensitive to chemicals and environmental factors (Peek & Wallace, 2014; 
Kang, Lyon & Kramp 2012). The other incentive for people who buy properties can be 
due to upgrading and change in social status. Neighbourhoods are significant markers 
in denoting social status through meanings and messages generated by where and 
how we live. Particular neighbourhoods confer status and distinction by virtue of being 
seen as exclusive (Cheshire & Wickes, 2012). Still others would buy in order to move 
into a socially homogeneous residential space and similar minded people (Cheshire & 
Wickes, 2012). 
Another unintended consequence of divorce is that it inevitably forces people to sell 
or buy properties. When people separate, chances are that the property they share 
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may be sold or one partner can sell his/her share as there is a strong association 
between local ties and moving after separation (Mulder & Wagner, 2010). People who 
are close to the end of their working life or whose economic conditions changes may 
downsize and this also brings them into the market either as buyers or sellers. When 
an individual’s economic position changes for the better or worse, they can experience 
housing induced burden and poverty as their ability to purchase other basic needs 
decreases (Cheshire & Wickes, 2012). Threshold for housing cost to income is 
assumed to be about 30% (Cheshire & Wickes, 2012). Other individuals are forced 
into the industry either as sellers or buyers due to financial distress via some 
foreclosure instances and forced sales. It has been said that people live in a global 
village. People also sell due to emigration in search of greener pastures.  
 
Some of the examples of reasons on why people sell can equally apply to why people 
buy properties in specific neighbourhoods. Buyers are the ones paying for the house 
and are also major players. Without buyers, there is no property market. Sellers allow 
their properties to be sold to people who want to buy and have the financial means to 
do so. These two groups can act as principals to REAs as has been shown in Chapter 
1 and this will subsequently be expanded on in the next chapter. Their positions are 
directly/indirectly affected by all the players discussed above. For instance, buyers can 
purchase property as their economic positions improve, in order to accumulate wealth, 
their status upgrade, after a divorce and et cetera. Sellers and buyers can also be 
subdivided into SA residents and non-residents. The non-residents warrant a special 
attention as their activities are governed by additional requirements and regulations. 
Before a brief discussion on these customers, a mechanism of how the different 
stakeholders discussed above affect the end-user is given. 
 
A government department, for instance, will not directly influence a transaction, but 
can do so via a statutory organisation. Given below is a diagram that shows how one 
part is connected to another and how they all impact the consumer in the industry. An 
example to illustrate the symbiotic relationship between the different parts will do. The 
DJCD governs the operations of lawyers who deal with bond registrations and final 
property transfer. The DHS is the government arm that is concerned with the housing 
policy in the RSA and EAAB falls directly under it. This is the organisation that 
regulates the affairs of REAs. The DRDLA is responsible for all property registration 
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via the deeds offices. National Treasury can be said to be the department that pulls 
the purse strings and ultimately determine bond payments and money availability in 
the economy. The DTI is responsible for the credit market via the NCR. Its activities 
will definitely affect the REI as it has a direct influence on how credit is extended to 
individuals in the country. All the players serve the ultimate consumer who is either the 
buyer or the seller. 
  
2.5.3.1: Non-resident buyer or seller of property in SA 
  
Any person or entity can buy properties in SA. The only difference is some additional 
conditions do apply to non-resident buyers or sellers. The SARB plays a big role in 
regulating this special class of consumers. In some recent reports, foreign home 
buyers from countries such as Cameroon, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Angola and 
Mozambique was in the increase to 19.5%. For instance, in Cape Town, 1497 sales 
were recorded for a value of R2.3 billion, in Eastern Cape 260 sales of total value 
R230 million (Weekend Argus, 2014). Foreign property ownership in SA is estimated 
at between 3 to 7% depending on who supplies the statistics (Golding, 2014). Clearly, 
then the REI contributes a good amount of foreign direct investment (FDI).  Some 
reasons for foreigners buying properties in SA are: to use them as second homes and 
for letting out purposes (Les Calvert, 2013). However, there are concerns from some 
quarters that foreign interest in the industry will lead to property price explosion as 
foreigners can afford to pay higher prices and thus make it unaffordable to SA 
residents (Ertner & Laubli, 2014). The general view is that SA is competing for FDI 
with other countries where investors can invest their money. Therefore, SA needs to 
play the game according to some rules. Indeed Golding (2014) states that the future 
success of the SA property market is closely connected to the performance of the 
country’s national economy and ability to attract FDI. In the same article, he argues 
that SA should follow the organization of economic cooperation and development 
(OECD)’s incentive investment guidelines policies of 2003 which are as follows: 
promotion of SA as an investment location; having a predictable and non-
discriminatory regulatory investment; safeguarding of public sector transparency and 
having an impartial system of courts and law enforcements; and ensuring that rules 
and their implementations rest on the principle of non-discrimination between foreign 
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and domestic enterprises and are in accordance with international law and removing 
obstacles to international trade.   
 
One of the biggest difficulties with SA REI is the country’s history. The 1913 Land Act 
is said to have allocated only 7% of SA land to blacks. It is estimated that to date 
whites still control 87% of commercial land (Timeslive, 2014). Presently, property 
ownership is still problematic for the government and the willing buyer-willing seller is 
part of the scheme. The DRDLA has appointed a Land Valuer General to assist with 
determination of compensation in cases of land expropriation in accordance with the 
Expropriation Act. This office is tasked with setting guidelines, norms, and standards 
to validate the integrity of valuation data and to prevent corruption and faulty land 
pricing (Groenewald, 2011). For purposes of this dissertation, the above ownership 
information will suffice. The attention now turns to the differences between a local and 
a non-resident buying and selling of properties. The salient features of property 
purchase by non-residents as given by Groenewald (2011) and Hunter (2013) are 
outlined below. 
The SA exchange control regulations determine the extent to which non-residents can 
borrow money locally to fund the purchase.  However, a non-resident not working in 
SA is not allowed to borrow more than 50% of the purchase price and the balance of 
the sale amount has to be paid up in cash. Non-residents on a temporary work permit 
may borrow more than 50% of purchase price depending on the bank’s lending criteria 
on condition that the purchaser reduces the bond to less than 50% of the registered 
amount before they return abroad. Foreigners who work in SA on the strength of their 
work permit are not regarded as foreigners by the SARB. They are residents for the 
duration of their work permit and as such are not restricted to the 50% rule stated 
above. If the non-resident decides to sell, their net profit is subject to Capital Gains 
Tax of 25%, as opposed to the SA seller whose proceeds only attract tax at R1.5 
million. If the property value for a non-resident seller is R2 million or more, 5% of the 
purchase amount is retained via the conveyancers to be paid over to the SARS (Smith 
& Boyes, 2014). The actual processes involved in the buying of property in SA are 
similar except for the differences shown in this subsection. 
The above discussion has shown how different government departments, the 
constitutional bodies and the private sector are jointed and coordinated to deliver a 
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final property transfer from seller to new owner. That interconnection can best be 
summarised diagrammatically as per Figure 2.8 below. 
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Figure 2.8: Interconnections between role players 
 
 
2.5.5: Registration process flows and organogram of property transaction 
 
This section will show how the actual deal gets taken from the agreement of sale to 
the conclusion of the transaction. The first part will be the process flow description and 
thereafter the organogram of the process will be given. The organogram is given in 
Figure 2.8.  
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2.5.5.1. Process flow of registration of Transfer 
 
Before a sale can be concluded, the Agreement of Sale has to be drawn and signed, 
after which it is sent to the appointed conveyancer. The purchaser thereafter applies 
for a bond loan (if applicable) and the bank appoints its conveyancer to 
simultaneously, with transfer, register the bond. The transfer attorney requests the title 
deed and cancellation figures from seller’s bond bank to cancel any and all existing 
bonds. The bank also appoints a conveyancer to cancel its bonds.  Thereafter, the 
transferring attorneys, bond and cancellation attorneys liaise over guarantees to 
secure the purchase price and payment of existing loans. After that stage, FICA 
documents are called from the transacting parties and transfer documents drafted.  
The drafted documents have to be signed by both the seller and the buyer. They are 
signed before a matter is registered. The certificates that have to be in place before 
transfer documents can be lodged at the Deeds Office are Municipal Rates and/or 
Body Corporate Levy Certificates; Transfer Duty Receipt from SARS; Electrical 
Compliance Certificate and Home Owners Association Certificate if applicable. In each 
instance, applications have to be made for settlement figures and payments have to 
be made before certificates can be issued. Thereafter, all role players lodge 
simultaneously (essential) at Deeds Office and the matters come up on “Preparation” 
within 7 to 12 working days of lodgement. Registration usually takes place between 
one or two days after preparation. Final accounts are only drawn and payments made 
to various parties. That is the stage when the seller gets paid and the REA get his/her 
commission. The above described process can be diagrammatically shown as in 
Figure 2.8 below. 
 
2.5.5.2: Organogram of property transactions 
 
The organogram has been taken from Otto Krause and is similar for other 
conveyancing firms. 
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Figure 2.9: Property transaction organogram (Otto Krause attorneys, 2014) 
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2.6: CHAPTER 2 SUMMARY  
 
The introductory part of chapter and the subsequent list of objectives set the stage for 
discussing the REI in SA by looking at the government departments, relevant acts of 
Parliament governing the industry, constitutional organisations that regulate the 
industry, the role of the private sector and ultimately the consumers. This section gives 
a general summary of what has in fact been covered. It can be summarised as follows: 
The first part has been the introduction and objectives of the chapter which also 
introduced the relevant government departments. The subsequent discussion has 
been on the five departments that govern the operation of the industry. They have 
been discussed in the order: DHS, NT, DJCD, DRDLA, and DTI. The discussion then 
gave an overview of the role of the organisations that the departments use to directly 
regulate the industry and they have been discussed in the order: EAAB, SARB, 
lawyers, deeds offices and NCR. The end of that part set the stage for discussion on 
the private sector involvement in the industry. Under this subsection, the role of 
financiers, the REFs and REAs was discussed. The emphasis of the REFs and REAs 
was on their marketing role by using print and electronic media and the desk-top 
valuation by making use of Lightstone and Windeed. The ultimate consumer was only 
discussed at the tail-end of the chapter. Briefly, the chapter gave some reasons on 
how people sell/buy properties before putting an interconnection diagram to show how 
all the parts are connected to each other, followed by a normal flow chart for a property 
transaction. That was followed by a summary of the chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1: INTRODUCTION 
 
In order to properly position this study, this chapter will deal with an in-depth review of 
available literature of interest for the present study. The major themes to be dealt with 
are: General economic theories that have a bearing on the REI, namely; the Agency 
theory (AT) and Principal agent (PA) relationships, Information asymmetry (IA), 
Conflict of interest (COI), Ideology, and REAs’ responsibilities in the light of the PA 
relationships. The REA’s roles entail valuation, marketing, giving information, sourcing 
finance and assisting in the conclusion of the deal. These issues will be handled in 
relation to the outcomes they produce to both principals in RE transactions. The 
agency theory will be discussed in the order definitions, legal context of the AT, 
Principal-Agent (PA) relationships, elements of AT and PA relationships, assumptions 
in AT, duties of agents in a PA relationship, Inherent REI issues in the PA relationship, 
trust issues in the PA relationship; and information asymmetry (IA) in the PA 
relationship. The DMS is the PA relationship that arises whenever a REA contracts 
with their principals. It will accordingly be further subdivided into DMS in general and 
application of DMS to the SA REI. Another variable of interest is the ideology of 
participants in a housing transaction. This also will be subdivided into: General 
discussion and possible impact of IO to practices in the REI. DMS and IO impact the 
real estate industry via the roles that REAs play in the majority of housing deals. These 
will be discussed under valuation; pricing and marketing. Possible links to COI and 
compromising of principals (CP) will be highlighted. Conflict of interest (COI) which is 
one of the mediator variables will in turn be discussed in the light of DMS, IO and the 
roles of REAs. The second mediator variable is compromising of principals’ interests 
(CP). It will also be discussed in the light of DMS, IO and the roles of REAs and finally, 
the outcomes variable (OT) will be discussed as the possible outcomes of COI and 
CP in SA REI.   
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3.2: RELEVANT ECONOMIC THEORY TO THE REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY: THE 
AGENCY THEORY (AT) 
 
The relationships between housing market and macro-economic activity have drawn 
special attention because housing investment is considered to be an important 
indicator of economic activity (Smith & Tesarek, 1991; Wheeler & Chowdhury, 1993). 
Moreover, housing investment is a substantial part of the total investment and housing 
market activity is important to the economy of the country (Ramazan, Bradley & 
Bahadir, 2007). In addition, Wheeler and Chowdhury (1993) suggest that the value of 
REI is a leading economic indicator. In order to appreciate the importance of the REI, 
one needs to first consider some theoretical notions that apply to the concept of market 
forces in the housing industry (Boelhouwer, 2005). The major theory that warrants 
special attention for purposes of this study is the Agency theory (AT) and the Principal-
Agent (PA) relationship in the REI. The subsequent discussion will use these concepts 
as the basis. 
 
3.2.1: Definitions 
 
Agency theory is undeniably among the dominant theories of economic organization 
(Bosse & Phillips, 2016; SALTAJI, 2013). Before going on to explain how the PA 
relationship finds expression in the REI, one needs to briefly discuss the legal basis 
for the AT. Agency relationship is generally organised around the objective of 
efficiency and attempts to make the goals of the principal and the agent congruent 
(Kurland, 1991). The word agent is most commonly used on a person whose activities 
are concerned with the formation, variation or termination of contractual obligations 
(Kerr, 2006). Silke (1981) defines an agent as a person who acts on behalf of another 
and whose authority covers the creation of contractual obligations between the 
principal and the third party. Gibson (1991) defines agency as a contract whereby one 
person is authorised and is usually required by another to contract or negotiate a 
contract on the latter’s behalf with a third party, and the parties also agree on the scope 
of that authority and on the commission. Therefore, an agent concludes a juristic act 
for or on behalf of another (principal) with the result that a legal tie arises between the 
principal and the third party (Havenga, Havenga, Hurter, Kelbrick, Manamela, 
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Manamela, Schulze & Stoop, 2011). Therefore, agency is a triangular relationship 
between principal, agent and the third party (Markesinis & Munday, 1986). The 
resultant arrangement between the seller, REA and the buyer can thus be represented 
as per Figure 3.1 below.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Triangular relationship between the REA, the seller and the buyer 
(Markesinis & Munday, 1986) 
 
NB: The usual starting point to this triangular link is the seller approaching the REA to 
agree and sign a sole mandate agreement. The REA can also initiate this relationship. 
Sometimes the buyer can contact the seller directly who would in turn refer the buyer 
to the REA. 
 
3.2.2: Legal context of the agency theory and Principal-Agent (PA) relationship 
 
The AT is a very broad theory that forms the basis for many economic activities ranging 
from financial services, company governance and many other areas of economic 
activities (Eisenhardt, 1989). It also forms the basis for the operation of the REI. The 
first part of this discussion concentrates on its background, definitions, its elements, 
the authority of the agents, assumptions in the AT, duties of agents in terms of the PA 
relationship and lastly, trust in a PA environment. One of the justifications for the 
inclusion of the AT is that the duty of the REA to his/her clients is fiduciary in nature 
Seller
BuyerREA
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(Marsh & Zumpana, 1988). The task of finding, evaluating and acquiring property 
assets for investment is complex. The existing lack of a central  trading system, the 
heterogeneous nature of assets and markets (De Wit & Van der Klaauw, 2012) and 
the extensive range of information that has to be gathered and assessed present a 
challenge to individuals and organisations (MacAllister, Hughes & Gallimore, 2008). 
For that reason, unsophisticated vendors and purchasers of residential properties rely 
heavily on the expertise of REAs in matters of market intelligence; searching for 
properties and buyers; data appraisal and pricing; financing advice; purchase terms 
and transaction management services; advice on conditions and habitability of the real 
estate in question despite the fact that conflicting loyalties and objectives commonly 
exist between the agents and their clients (Kroll, 2010 ; McAllister, et al., 2008). REAs 
can add value by transforming one set of data into more meaningful or usable 
information (Dombalagian, 2011). In addition, Dombalagian (2011) maintains that the 
transformational stage is heavily dependent on the discretion of the agent and that 
creates the potential for abuse. The aim of the appointment of an agent by the principal 
is the performance of a service for the latter (principal) (Kerr, 2006).   
An agency contract requires consensus and capacity on the part of both parties for 
delegation of object (Silke, 1981). For the rules of agency to come into play, one 
person must intend to act on behalf of another and the representation of one person 
by another must be meant to affect the principal’s legal position (Markesinis & Munday, 
1986). When a principal is contracted to an agent, a relationship of power and 
dependency is created based on a set of rules to ensure that those with power are 
accountable to those that depend on its appropriate use (Callison, 2012). The principal 
and agent are engaged in a cooperative behaviour but have partly differing goals and 
attitudes towards risk (Eisenhardt, 1989). The usual costs of contracting with an agent 
are incentives and the costs of monitoring their behaviour (Kaplan, 2012). PA 
relationships necessitate monitoring of activities of REAs by their principals 
(Waterman & Meier, 1998). 
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3.2.3: Elements of the Agency theory and the principal agent relationships 
   
The law of agency gives rise to contract of mandate which can be defined as an 
agreement whereby one person entrusts a commission to execute something to 
another (Gibson, 1991). Furthermore, Havenga et al. (2011) state that a contract of 
mandate arises when one party conclude a contract with another in terms of which the 
mandatary undertakes to perform a mandate (commission of a task) for the 
mandatory. The mandatary authority will frequently be agreed upon on the contract of 
mandate or may be inferred from it. Representation is implicit in the definition of an 
agent and agency is a combination of the principles of mandate and representation. 
Other authors also emphasise the same notion that agency combines the principles 
of mandate and representation (Havenga, et al., 2001; Gibson, 1991). An auctioneer 
is also regarded as an agent for purposes of this discussion. Generally, the principal 
gives and the agent accepts a prior authorisation or instruction to do the act or series 
of acts (Silke, 1981). Agent’s authorisation can be done by express agreement or can 
be implied by the nature of the business (Kerr, 2006). In the REI, one generally deals 
with what Kerr (2006) describes as an unempowered agent whose service contribute 
to bringing about an opportunity for the principal to enter into, vary or terminate a 
contract or contractual obligations but who does not himself do it on the principals’ 
behalf (Kerr, 2006).  
 
3.2.4: Assumptions in the agency theory 
 
The cornerstone of agency theory is the assumption that the interests of principals and 
agents diverge (Hill & Jones, 1992). The best interests of the agent differ from the best 
interests of principals and resolution of these differences may generate agency costs 
(Walking & Long, 1984; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). According to Kurland (1991), this 
is due to the basic assumptions underlying the theory which are that people are self-
interested, rational and risk-averse. Dissimilarity of goals can be associated with 
conflict (Ross, Anderson & Weitz, 1997). Another central assumption of agency theory 
is that the agent will act opportunistically and exploit information asymmetry at the 
expense of the principal (Van Slyker, 2006; Greenberg, Greenberg, Lederer & 
Antonucci, 2008; Williamson, 1975). There is a power differential-condition of unequal 
dependence between the two parties (Principal and agent) to an exchange (Emerson, 
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1962; Pfeffer 1981; Hill & Jones, 1992). PA contracts are used to align interests and 
monitor performance (Scott & Lizieri, 2012). Extensive work has been done in AT to 
examine the trade-offs necessary to reach the efficient solution between the cost of 
monitoring behaviour and the optimal output under conditions of information 
asymmetry (IA) (Kurland, 1991). It can also be said that higher level of monitoring 
leads to higher transaction costs and reduces the costs savings of outsourcing 
(Vosselman & Van Der Meer-Kooistra, 2006; Greenberg, et al., 2012). The incentive 
scheme for both principal and agent has to be positively correlated in order for the PA 
arrangement to function properly. 
 
3.2.5: Duties of agents in a PA relationship 
It is estimated that about 86% properties are sold by licensed brokers in the US 
(Barker, 2007). The agent owes the principal the following duties: fully and faithfully 
performance on the mandate; honesty in the performance; utmost good faith in the 
performance; not to make any secret profits out of the mandated transaction; and absence of 
conflict of interest (COI) and non-disclosure of information to third parties. In summary, the 
agent has to protect the interests of the principal. Also, implicit in the contract as well is that 
privity of contract does not arise even where delegation is permissible. According to 
Markesinis, et al. (1986), Gibson (1991) and Havenga, et al. (2011), agent’s duties 
can succinctly be listed as follows:  
 Act in terms of the agreed terms of the contract or perform his/her contractual 
undertakings (carry out mandate) personally;  
 Act with due care and in good faith, perform with skill and diligence, perform 
fiduciary responsibilities;  
 Not delegate unless where it is usual practice;  
 Not put himself in a situation where his duties to the principal conflict with his 
interests, not acquire benefits for himself; and 
 Not exceed delegated terms, not intentionally cause harm or injury and account 
to the principal. 
The nature of the PA relationship gives rise to trust issues between principals and 
agents. In the absence of trust, the PA relationship would be rendered almost non-
functional and very conflictual. Agency costs are incurred by principals in monitoring 
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agency behaviour because of lack of trust in the good faith of agents (Kaplan, 2012). 
When agents are hired they are meant to reduce information and transactional costs 
(French & Leyshon, 2004; Palazzo & Rethel, 2008). 
 
3.3: REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY ISSUES INHERENT IN THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT 
RELATIONSHIPS 
 
The major relevant issues coming out of the PA relationships are trust, conflict of 
interests and information asymmetry and these will be discussed before showing the 
relevance of the concepts to the SA REI.  
 
3.3.1: Trust: the glue that holds the principal-agent relationship 
 
As stated above, when an agent is appointed he/she assumes fiduciary relationship. 
Fiduciary relationship is in turn based on the concept of trust and truth (Mitnick, 1973; 
Yaari, 2007). Some authors identify two types of trusts, namely; calculative trust which 
can be relied upon to the extent to which it believes opportunistic behaviour will 
damage future returns (Gainey & Klaas, 2005); and relational trust which exists when 
the two parties develop deep personal ties, loyalty and concern for welfare for each 
other. Both parties have established normal clear expectations and understanding 
(Freybote & Gibler, 2011). 
 
Before showing the impact of trust on the REI, a brief discussion on these important 
concepts follows. Trust is the first major component of relationship capital and is based 
on beliefs about how an alliance partner will behave in the relationship (Cullen, 
Johnson & Sakano, 2000). It is regarded as a key ingredient for the development of 
long-term business and has been recognised as a highly significant tool for enhancing 
relationships (Berry, 1995; Ruyter, Moorman & Lemmink, 2001). Furthermore, trust 
has been widely recognised and reported as the main condition of exchange in the 
social exchange literature. According to Blau (1964), social exchange tends to 
engender feelings of personal obligation, gratitude, and trust; purely economic 
exchange as such does not. Social exchange is embedded in trust which in turn is 
essential for stable social relations. It is regarded as a critical factor underpinning 
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social exchanges in that the act of initiating social exchange relationships requires the 
originator to trust that the recipient will respond in kind (Blau, 1964; Aryee, Budhwar & 
Chen, 2002). Trust is generally based upon norms which are rules or guides to 
behaviour which determine what appropriate performance level is. The other basis for 
trust is ethical standards which are a level of effort that is considered appropriate 
behaviour and lastly, it is also based on altruism.  
Altruism is when the principal’s well-being correlates positively with the agent’s utility 
function (Cadesus-Masanell, 2004). In this kind of relationships, a major source of 
disagreement is the failure to carry out one’s role and obligations which is in turn a 
function of personnel competence (Ross, Anderson & Wietz, 1997). Trust has been 
conceptualised as a belief or confidence in another's reliability, integrity, credibility, 
honesty and truthful benevolence (Doney & Cannon, 1997; Ganesan, 1994; 
Geyskens, Steenkamp, Scheer & Kumar, 1996; Kumar, Scheer & Steenkamp, 1995; 
Morgan & Hunt, 1994), faith that another will meet obligations (Gundlach & Murphy, 
1993); and the expectation that another will act in accordance with an individual's 
beliefs (Sirdeshmukh, Singh & Sabol, 2002). Essentially, trust is confidence in 
another's goodwill and integrity as well as the belief in another's ability and credibility, 
and is associated with such qualities as being honest, faithful and truthful (Lohtia, Bello 
& Porter, 2009). In addition, Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar (1998) pointed out that 
most studies in marketing build on interpersonal research define trust as ‘the extent to 
which a firm believes that its exchange partner is honest and/or benevolent’ or some 
variant thereof. Moorman and Loewenstein (1992) define it as ‘a willingness to rely on 
an exchange partner in whom one has confidence. An important aspect of their 
definition is the concept of trust as a belief, feeling or expectation about an exchange 
partner which can be judged from the partner's expertise, reliability and intentions. 
Moorman, Zaltman and Deshpande’s (1992) definition, similar to those of Doney and 
Cannon (1997) and Morgan and Hunt (1994), reflects two components of trust, 
namely; credibility and benevolence. In the PA relationship, credibility would reflect a 
principal's belief that the agent has sufficient expertise to perform the job effectively 
and reliably and benevolence as the extent of the principal's belief that the agent's 
intentions and motives are beneficial to the principal even when new conditions arise 
about which a commitment was not made (Ganesan, 1994; Kumar, et al., 1995). 
Trust is difficult to build and easy to destroy (Ross, et al., 1997).  It is a fundamental 
ingredient and lubricant and an unavoidable dimension of social interaction (Ke & Wei, 
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2008), has received a great deal of attention from scholars in disciplines of social 
psychology, sociology (Lewis & Weigert, 1985), economics (Williamson, 1991), 
management (Gulati, 1995), marketing (Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Dwyer, Schurr and 
Oh, 1987; Moorman, et al., 1992), and information systems (Hart & Saunders, 1998; 
Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1999; Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 2004). It is developed by the 
continuous exchange of information between partners, which helps to reduce anxiety 
and uncertainty. In this way, trust can help influence the future working relations and 
reduce the likelihood that the other party will act opportunistically (Brandach & Eccles, 
1989; Ganesan, 1994; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Furthermore, trust reduces transaction 
costs since there is no such a need to set up control mechanisms within the 
relationship (Jap & Ganesan, 2000). As a consequence, these lower costs make it 
more likely that the relationship will continue in the future (Van Bruggen, Kacker & 
Nieuwlaat, 2005). 
 
In relationship literature, trust is one of the most widely examined and accepted 
relational dimensions. It is postulated as the main control mechanism for network 
governance (Elg, 2002) and the cornerstone of the strategic partnership (Spekman, 
1988). Schumacher (2006) suggests that well-performing relationships can be 
differentiated from low-performers on the basis of trust. Trust levels are a good 
predictor of successful alliance relationship (Kauser & Shaw, 2004). Trust can 
increase loyalty and can result in a mutually profitable relationship (Wimmer & 
Mandjak, 2002). When the parties have trust in one another, there will be ways by 
which the two parties can work out difficulties (Johnson & Cullen, 2002). The 
presents/absence of trust in the PA relationship can bring about devastating 
consequences as it will be shown below due to the presence of information 
asymmetry. The REAs possess huge informational advantage over both the seller and 
buyer principals. These are the people who delegate responsibilities to the REA to 
perform on their behalf. Moreover, issues of IA, conflict of interests (COI) and 
opportunistic agent behaviour are universal concerns in any delegation situation even 
if specific manifestation may take many forms (Wiseman, Cuevas & Gomez-Mejia, 
2012). Trust has been discussed as the glue that holds any PA relationship that also 
enhances opportunities for future business. However, there are other elements 
inherent in the relationship that has a potential to strain or strengthen it. The two 
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examples are IA and COI. Before delving into these concepts, it would be proper to 
look at how PA relationships work in the REI in SA. 
 
3.3.2: Information asymmetry (IA) in the principal-agent relationship 
 
Buying a house is one of the most important financial decisions faced by any 
household or individual during their lifetime. House purchases are infrequent and the 
time between them is measured in years or decades (Levitt & Syverson, 2008). Real 
estate markets are prone to IA and incomplete contracts (Vosselman & Van Der Meer-
Kooistra, 2006; Greenberg, et al., 2008). Furthermore, Levitt and Syverson (2008) 
demonstrate that it is hard to gain experience and expertise in these transactions. Both 
buyers and sellers are infrequent market participants and they are not informed of the 
demand and supply conditions in the housing market (Arnold, 1992); they make 
housing choices with relatively little experience since they make the choices so 
infrequently (Scott & Lizieri, 2012). Housing information is likely to be provided by 
REAs which also give rise to a potentially serious PA problem (Levitt & Syverson, 
2008; Scott & Lizieri, 2011). When principals seek out agents for expert knowledge, 
the principals are usually one-shooters and agents repeat players. Sometimes 
principals are unexpectedly foisted into a new role with no time or life experience to 
formulate preferences, let alone a contract or monitoring strategy (Heimer & Staffen, 
1998; Shapiro, 2005). For instance, the seller generally has less information than the 
agent and is therefore disadvantaged in price-setting, contract negotiations and faces 
imperfect information about market values and the location of potential buyers 
(Rutherford, Springer & Yavas, 2005). On the other hand, REAs are generally 
experienced and cognisant of the market forces involved (Gonzalez-Navarzo & 
Quintana-Domeque, 2009). They are assumed to have superior search technology to 
locate prospective buyers, superior knowledge of market conditions and in setting 
optimal asking price (Rutherford, et al., 2005). If the agent’s objectives differ from 
those of the principal (as assumed in the AT), the agent may take advantage of the 
situation to pursue his own ends (Molho, 1997). Therefore, IA favours the agent 
(Shapiro, 2005). The principals may try and bridge IA by installing information system 
and monitoring-outcome oriented contract (Levit & Syverson, 2005). As an illustration, 
it has been found in other studies that agents selling their own houses behave 
60 
 
differently (Levit & Syverson, 2005). Rutherford, et al. (2005) found that agent’s 
properties sold for 4.5% higher price than houses owned by clients.  
 
The usual starting point in the path for property sale in SA is to use the REAs to set 
the asking price. In that case the seller is the principal and the broker an agent. The 
agent is supposed to act as the principal would as he/she shared the agent’s superior 
information and expertise (Sappington, 1991). But the buyers also rely greatly on the 
advice and transactional expertise of the same REAs. The REA has privileged access 
to information and that has a potential to impair the efficiency of information markets 
as REAs might withhold it from other participants (Dombalagian, 2011). As shown 
above, the REA or broker has two roles, namely; a seller’s agent and a buyer’s agent. 
The agent knows the extent to which he is more productive of the two tasks (buyer’s 
or seller’s agent) and by what degree while the principals do not have that information. 
This creates IA which can be deployed over other participants in transactions. 
Extensive research in economics suggests that people maximise their payoffs 
(Hamman, Loewenstein & Weber, 2010). Hill and Jones (1992) argue that interests of 
principals and agents differ because these groups have different utility functions.  For 
transactions to be fair, the REA has to be able to see the value of the property through 
the eyes of both the buyer and seller at the same time. Sellers tend to value their 
possessions comparatively higher than buyers (Knetsch & Thaler, 2007). There is 
clearly an IA as to the optimal level on the property value(s) for both the seller and the 
buyer. Also, sellers and buyers are heterogeneous in their patience and bargaining 
abilities (Hendel, Nevo & Ortalo-Magne, 2007). 
Other authors state that IA results in hidden characteristics, hidden knowledge, hidden 
actions and hidden information (Eckardt, 2002; Palazzo & Rethel, 2008).  In addition, 
IA would have negative consequences for any PA relationship and lead to principals 
being poorly served (Ross, Anderson & Barton, 1997; Levit & Syverson, 2005). In the 
REI, IA favours the agent (Gibb & Pryce, 2012). Examples of this have been shown 
by different authors. Gatner, et al. (1991), Anglin and Arnott (1991) and Micelli (1991) 
argue that the agent will expend less than efficient level of effort for the benefit of the 
seller. The high cost of asymmetry of information brings about inefficiency in housing 
markets (Knight, Sirmans & Turnbul, 1998). Agency theory suggests that when the 
principal has more information to verify agent’s behaviour, the agent is more likely to 
behave in the interest of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989). For the general public, it can 
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be argued that the buyer and seller principals do not possess this kind of expertise. 
This leads to asymmetry of power to further shift from the principal to the agent. 
Therefore, it follows that REAs have huge informational advantages over all other 
players (Hiischer & Sisli-Ciamarra, 2013).  
 
McAllister, et al. (2008) give us some problems associated with the PA relationships 
arising out of IA and classify them as moral hazard problem when the agent puts in as 
little effort as possible on behalf of the principal. The chances of this occurring increase 
as the autonomy given to the agent increases; the more information the agent possess 
and the greater the specialised knowledge required to perform (Holmstron, 1979). 
Adverse selection occurs when the information that the agent possess is not being 
used in the principal’s best interest. As a counter to the above discussion, Macleod 
(2003) states that long-term business and social relationships may also be a restraint 
upon opportunistic behaviour by the agent. Walter (2003) argues that the degree of IA 
and competitive conditions is insufficient for COI to be exploited. Also, REAs too do 
have competing interests and the existence of multiple principals and agents increases 
IA and the difficulty of monitoring them but also helps to correct the imbalance of 
information such as when competing agents leak information to principals in an effort 
to gain upper hand over other agents (Waterman & Meier, 1998). The assumption that 
principals specify preferences, create incentives and making contracts that agents 
must follow is also problematic (Heimer & Staffen, 1998; Sharma, 1997). It has been 
suggested as well that PA relationship should analyse the contractual challenges that 
confront sellers/buyers and REAs under conditions of IA (Steinle, Schiele, & Ernst, 
2014). One of the reasons is that IA presents opportunities for opportunistic behaviour 
from anyone who is advantaged thereby. In literature, some authors have defined 
opportunism as self-interest with guile (Williamson, 1979). In addition, opportunism 
also erodes the benefits of trust in a PA relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989; Williamson, 
1979). Some actors in a business relationship have been known to exhibit purely 
selfish behaviour and ignoring the consequences for other actors (Lacet, et al., 2005). 
This is most probably due to personal preferences and benefit maximisation (Steinle, 
et al., 2014). Possible ways of exploiting IA would be through cheating, breach of 
contract, distortion of data, dishonesty, false threats and promises, misrepresentation 
and withholding of information (Wathne & Heide, 2000).  
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However, IA does not only advantage the agent in a property transaction. When a 
contract is negotiated, the buyer, for instance, is less informed about the seller 
expectations and intentions as they are generally kept apart at the early stages (Wilkie, 
Mela & Gundlach, 1998). It has been said that this separation between the buyer and 
seller creates IA in favour of the seller due to goal incongruence between these two 
(Pavlou, Liang & Xue, 2007). Pavlou, et al. (2007) further argue that principals and 
agents are self-interested parties with incongruent goals. Other issues from IA arise 
out of consumer gullibility. Sometimes the behaviour of REAs leads buyers to believe 
that they are acting as their representatives (Hopper, 1992). For instance, brokers can 
place their individual concerns above those of their principal (Murray, 1987). Clearly, 
then both REAs and potential buyers need direction in understanding the precise 
nature of REAs’ duties in any transaction (Hopper, 1992).  The above concepts give 
the context in which the SA REI operates. The major variables that will be covered are 
DMS, IO, CP, COI and OT. 
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3.4: PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP IN THE SA REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY 
 
As it is normally the practice in many business transactions, when a seller decides to 
put his/her property in the market, they first consider their options. In the majority of 
cases, they contract with a REA by entering into a mandate agreement. In the US, for 
instance, sellers use REAs in about 86% of their housing transactions (Barker, 2007). 
A discussion on the way this mandate system works in SA will be further presented 
under DMS in general and DMS as applied to REI in SA below. 
 
3.4.1: Dual mandate system (DMS) in general 
 
The PA relationship finds application in the SA REI via the sole mandate system. The 
REA is usually called upon to be the middleman between the seller and the buyer. 
He/she plays a dual role (Salvador, 2011). As mentioned earlier, the agent signs a 
mandate with the seller and helps with initial valuations and marketing of the property. 
The mandate contract can be structured differently to suit the contracting parties’ 
interests. Parties can use either the open mandate (OM), exclusive agency mandate 
(EA) or the sole mandate (exclusive right to sell) mandate (SM). Under the OM, the 
seller can list the property with multiple brokers and is liable to pay commission only 
to the broker that procures the sale and does not pay the broker if he finds the buyer 
himself (Rutherford, et al., 2001). In the exclusive agency (EA) or sole mandate (SM) 
arrangement, the seller and broker agree that the contracting broker shall be the only 
broker that will be entitled to a commission and that no other brokers will have direct 
contractual relationship with the seller. Other authors refer to this as an exclusive right 
to sell (Marsh & Zumpana, 1988). The exclusivity and signing part of the agreement is 
of utmost importance as evidenced by the way major players in the SA REI describe 
this form of an agreement. For instance, it is defined differently by different authors. 
  
Davis [s.a] defines it as a written agreement between the seller of a property and a 
REA to exclusively market the seller’s property under certain defined terms and 
conditions. Rademeyer (2014) sees it as a contract between an estate agent and a 
principal (seller) whereby the principal agrees, firstly, to appoint that specific estate 
agent to sell his property and, secondly, not to appoint another estate agent to sell his 
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property until the period for which the SM has been given has expired.  In addition, 
SM forms normally used by REAs invariably stipulate that the sole mandate is 
irrevocable for a certain period. Goslett (2013) defines it as a contract that allows the 
REA to market the seller’s house in order to procure the right buyer for the property. 
This has to be reduced to writing (Goslett, 2013; Rademeyer, 2014). It is given to only 
one agent and should specify the price, conditions of the mandate and the commission 
payable upon the successful conclusion of the sale (Spies, 2013; Reynolds, 2011). 
Under the contract type, the seller shall not be permitted to sell the property through 
his/her activities or activities of any other agent (Reynolds, 2011; Spies, 2013; 
Rademeyer, 2014). This is the darling of the REI in SA.  
 
3.4.2: Dual mandate system application to the SA real estate industry 
 
As shown above, the type of the mandate favoured and mostly used in the SA context 
is the SM or exclusive right to sell type (Brown & Yingling, 2007; Kadiyali, et al., 2014). 
In the SM situation, once an agent is appointed by the seller, he/she determines who 
gets to see the property and gets involved in the setting of the listing/asking price. 
Some writers have said that the SM gives the marketer the exclusivity and exactness 
of the asking price (Erasmus, 2006; Spies, 2013). REAs have understandably a bias 
towards the sole mandate due to the advantages it confers on them.  Under this 
mandate, only one agent or firm controls all incoming offers. Some of the advantages 
of this mandate have been given are that a SM links a property to one brand, avoids 
over-exposure of the property and helps avoid double commission (Reynolds, 2011; 
Davis, [s.a]).  
 
On the contrary, in the OM type, there is no necessity for any signing of contractual 
papers and the seller retains the right to sell the property privately. The commission 
structure can lead to the property being marketed at different prices (Spies, 2013). 
Spies (2013) further say that when this type of mandate is given, it is more likely to 
send mixed messages as the same property will be advertised at different prices. The 
other major variable is the ideology of the REA.  
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The problem with the SM system in the SA context is that the REA serves two 
principals, namely; the seller and the buyer. These two principals’ interests are at odds 
with each other. This is referred to as the DMS in the present study. This presents 
possibilities of conflict between the interests of all the role players (Salvador, 2011). 
The REA finds himself/herself in a dual agency situation. REAs have their own 
interests, information, perspectives and they also have access to both principals. 
When looking for potential purchasers, the REA works as a salesperson. One of the 
duties of a salesperson is to earn the prospect’s trust. A natural result is that the 
relationship could take an appearance and often the actuality of REA appearing to be 
looking out for buyer’s interests (Lindeman, 2004). The buyer often assumes that the 
REAs is in fact working for him as  he/she gives them advice and counsel which also 
violates their agency loyalty to the seller (Lindeman, 2004). In one study, it has been 
shown that about 72% of the buyers believed that the REA was representing them and 
not the sellers (Isakson & Spencer, 2000). Under this arrangement, questions such 
as: Whose interests are to be prioritized? Can the agent perform an ethical business 
transaction; and Can the confidentiality of the principals be protected? may arise 
(Doebring, 2009). It is generally known that there are difficulties in reconciling and 
balancing these divergent interests (McGovem & Tenel, 2005). According to Palma, 
Ferreira, Vilana and Assis (2014), it is impossible to serve two masters. Dual mandate 
can create COI (Pancak & Sirmans, 2004). Possibilities of COI on the part of the agent 
and those of multiple principals is a real possibility (De Mott, 2007). In other contexts, 
DMS has been shown to present problems. The seller principal who usually has a 
signed agreement with the REA has difficulty in monitoring and verifying that the agent 
is adhering to proper business practice (James, 2002). Like many other people, REAs 
are self-interested rationalist and utility maximisers (McGovem & Temel, 2005). The 
REA’s access to both the seller and the buyer creates IA, the situation which favours 
the agent who can opportunistically exploit the principals’ trust (James, 2002). 
Therefore, IA is an antecedent of opportunism (Wilkie, et al., 1998). It must also be 
mentioned that people can perform optimally (making unbiased judgment) even when 
playing dual roles that require different perspectives, but only when it is in their interest 
to do so (Moore, Tanlu & Bazerman, 2010).  
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3.5: IDEOLOGICAL OUTLOOK (IO) OF MAJOR ACTORS  
 
Discussion on the ideology of main actors in the REI will be done in the sub-section 
below. 
 
3.5.1: Ideology: General  
 
Ideology has been defined by many authors in slightly different ways. For instance, it 
has been defined as a system of beliefs (Daniela, 2014), general mental 
representations shared by the members of a social group (Van Dijk, 2009) and as 
ideas which arise from a given set of material interests (Daniela, 2014). Still others 
have defined it as one’s philosophy about economic, social and political issues (such 
as free-market system, capability of government institution, virtues of monopolies, the 
value of competition, meaning and importance of property rights, merit et cetera 
(Marina, 2014). It has also been defined as a basis of a social representations shared 
by members of a group that allows members of the group to organise a multitude of 
social beliefs about what is the case, what is good or bad, what is right and what is 
wrong for them and to act accordingly (Van Dijk, 1998). Ideology is never an isolated 
belief, but is always a network of beliefs. Ideological belief will always be a part of a 
wider view of things (Shelby, 2003). One’s ideology reflects one belief about the proper 
goals for society and how to achieve them (Chin, Donald, Hambrick, Linda & Treviño, 
2013; Jost, 2006; Tedin, 1987). Furthermore, Jost (2006) argues that one’s ideology 
is a relative stable and enduring personal attribute. Schlenker (2008) defines it as an 
integrated system of beliefs, values, standards, and self-images that define the 
individual’s orientation toward matters of right and wrong which provides moral 
schemas and scripts for assessing events and behaving in them, and a moral identity 
that describes one’s ethical character. Ideology helps to explain why people do what 
they do. It is in the light of the position REAs and how much influence they have over 
any RE transaction in SA that their ideological outlook becomes crucial. People’s 
ideology reflects their values (Roseberg, 1956; Layman, 1997; Barnea & Swartz, 1998, 
Gore, Frederico & Kittilson, 2009). Values are in turn defined as a broad tendency to 
prefer certain states of affairs over others (Hofstede, 1980). Feldman (2003) contends 
that values are the major source of structure for political attributes. In order to fully 
appreciate the role that these major predictor variables play in the industry, the 
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discussion now turns to major roles played by REAs in the industry. From the above 
discussion, it appears that ideology is one area that would be difficult if not impossible 
to change if one observes it in another person. The big issue with ideology for 
purposes of this study is how that affects the REI in SA. 
 
3.5.2: Applicability of ideological outlook to practices in the SA real estate 
industry 
 
Ideologies are self-serving and a function of the material and symbiotic interests of a 
group (Van Dijk, 1998). Among these interests is power over other groups or 
resistance against domination by other groups (Van Dijk, 1998). People who hold 
strong ideological viewpoints tend to endorse policies and practices that give 
advantages to members of their own groups and exclude others (Unger, 2002). They 
tend to pursue practices that maintain their group’s hegemony (for example; racism 
and meritocracy) (Unger, 2002). For instance, Shelby (2003) indicates that racism is 
an ideology. The other problem arising out of ideology is that it can become 
omnipresent and for that very reason goes unrecognised (Miles, 1995). Other authors 
have described ideology as a menacing force that is capable of having an enormous 
impact on social relations and the prospects of progressive change (Shelby, 2003). 
Ideology can find its way into practices in the REI and hence the special attention in 
the dissertation. 
 
3.6: MAJOR ROLES PLAYED BY REAL ESTATE AGENTS IN THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY  
 
As mentioned above, the major roles that REAs play in the industry are to do valuation 
for initial asking price setting and marketing the property.  Their activities have been 
discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. This subsection takes a critical look at 
these responsibilities in the light of the PA relationships between the REA and the 
consumer.  It is subdivided into major roles which have been broadly classified as 
valuation for pricing and their marketing roles. 
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3.6.1: Valuation and pricing role of real estate agents in the South African real 
estate industry 
 
In the present study, valuation will be assumed to lead to pricing decisions for 
purposes of selling properties. The valuers that get special attention are the REAs who 
are mostly the first people the public turn to when valuation issues arise. 
Valuation of properties in SA is governed by Property Valuers’ Profession Act 47 of 
2000 (Channing, 2014). Valuation is done for different reasons by the different role-
players because of the nature of the RE transactions. It can be done for financing 
purposes, for sale/purchasing purposes and can also be for investment motives 
(Millington, 1994). 
 
3.6.1.1: Valuation defined 
 
Wyatt (2007) defines valuation as the process of forming an opinion of value in 
exchange under certain assumptions. The word valuation carries an accepted aura of 
uncertainty (Crosby, 2000). Appraisal/valuation gives an estimate of the property value 
which is supposed to be the best estimate of the transaction price (Schulz, 2003 and 
Maliene, Daveikis, Kirsten & Malys, 2010). Some writers state that valuation provides 
a reliable proxy for prices (Bowles, McAllister & Tarbert, 2001). Millington (1994) and 
Yang (2000) state that MVs are a result of demand and supply interaction in the market 
and should capture the dynamics of the property market. 
  
3.6.1.2: Why, how and differing views on property valuation 
  
The most important off-shoot of the valuation exercise is arriving at a sale price for a 
house. The outcome of any valuation exercise should accord with market evidence as 
market values (MVs) have an influence on the operations of the market and play an 
important role in the REI industry to ensure economic stability (Isaac, 2002; Yang 
2000; Sayce, 2003). In line with this argument, whatever price that is agreed upon 
when a property is purchased is what a particular purchaser agrees to pay and a 
particular seller agrees to accept under conditions of free market environment (Brown 
& Matysiak, 1999). In virtually every aspect of the REI, market values (MVs) 
considerations are of vital importance (Millington, 1994). Moreover, MVs inform market 
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price which in turn has an influence on the initial asking and reservation price. Valuers 
play an important role in the REI market as assessors and advisors on the MVs at any 
given time (Myers, 2012). MVs play an important role in this industry to ensure 
economic stability (Yang, 2000). Municipalities also hire valuers to appraise and 
determine the MV of all properties as at the date of valuation (Channing, 2010). For 
purposes of this study, valuations will be assumed to be for selling of property and will 
therefore be linked to setting the listing price and getting the ultimate selling price. 
Valuation is done to get a snapshot estimate of exchange price at a particular point in 
time (Maliene, et al. 2010; Wyatt, 2007). 
 
The above information only gives one neat side of valuation. The problem is that the 
arguments assume that in a property transaction you are dealing with a rational man, 
with perfect information and also having profit maximisation in view (Wyman, Seldin & 
Worzala, 2010). Another underlying assumption is that the REA (Valuer) is competent 
to do valuation, serves the best interests of all the principals and that the REI operates 
in a purely free-market environment. The other side paints a different one. There is a 
counter-argument to this approach as it will be shown below. Firstly, competence 
required for compliance with the legislative framework is known to be scarce 
(Channing, 2013).  
 
Even municipalities outsource the preparations and maintenance of the valuation rolls 
for rates purposes to external valuation services providers. It is suggested from certain 
quarters that the 2007 economic meltdown that was triggered by the American 
property market downturn can be attributed to the valuation industry (Delisle & 
Grissom, 2011). Other professional appraisers/valuers have come to different 
conclusions on how MV and prices relate to each other. Ellenberger (1982) argues 
that a realized price might not represent a MV. However, MVs do not necessarily equal 
market prices (Brow, et al., 2000). Others have gone as far as declaring that “Valuation 
is a matter of opinion” (Isaac, 2002). Valuers do not seem to process information in 
identical ways (Bowles, McAllister, & Tarbert, 2001). The methods they normally use 
are inadequate (Sayce, 2003). Also, properties are not static entities. They are bought 
and sold, developed, subdivided and consolidated and all these changes have to be 
tracked and captured. Put an untrained and anti-transformation REA in all this and the 
situation becomes even murkier. Inaccurate valuation can lead to unwarranted value 
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judgement and unsound investment practices to the detriment of the industry as a 
whole (Barret, 1979). The value of some attributes may be difficult to assess as they 
may have to be experienced to be valued (Maclennan & O’Sullivan, 2012). A good 
example is what the neighbours are like. Expected length of stay of the buyer has a 
big effect on how much some of those uncertainties matter for the searching process 
and also lead to more uncertainties (Scott & Lizieri, 2013).  
 
Isaac and Steeley (2010) point out that value is based on an economic concept of 
utility and this certainly differs from one individual to another. For valuations/appraisals 
to be credible, they are supposed to be transparent and objective (Crockett, 2008). 
Baum and Cosby (2008) emphasise that MVs should be accurate and be a close 
predictor of selling price. When supply and demand is in equilibrium, valuation should 
on average be the same as the sale price (Brown, et al. 2000). Accuracy in valuation 
is also important in relation to bank lending, the lowering of financial risks and rates 
collections by municipalities (Bardouis & Mendez, 1996; Channing, 2013). When 
discussing accuracy issues in valuation, it has to be borne in mind that properties are 
atypical products. Asset atypicality measures the difference between a given house 
and appropriately defined typical home as a driving force in explaining the variation in 
the marketing times of housing (Angling & Arnot, 1999). For instance, no two houses 
can share the same exact location (Leishman, 2003). Because of their nature, property 
prices are further influenced by the individual characteristics of the house such as 
structural features, nature and composition of the neighbourhood, location and the 
environmental component (Van Ham & Manley, 2011). 
 
3.6.1.3: From valuation to Pricing 
 
The demand for housing is a function of demographic factors, income, interest rates 
and the housing supply is a function of the price of land, building costs and credit 
conditions (Chen, 1998). Those are some of the factors to be considered when 
deciding on the sale price for any property. According to Giovanni and Flavia (2009), 
real estate investment tends to share three characteristics listed below. Once 
investment is taken, it is partially or completely irreversible (it entails sunk costs). The 
investment decision can be postponed (it is possible to wait for new information to 
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arrive that might affect the desirability or the timing of the expenditure and there is 
great deal of uncertainty (the effects of the decision are uncertain). 
  
The mutual interactions of these issues imply the failure of the net present value (NPV) 
rule for investment decisions in the property industry (Giovanni & Flavia, 2009). As 
mentioned above, valuation is done with the view of setting a listing price and 
ultimately obtaining an optimum sale price for the principal. The general view is that 
prices are an important determinant of housing market activity (Ramazan, Erwing & 
Bahadir, 1993).  Price determines the economic sacrifice a buyer makes to acquire 
the product. The buyer compares the sacrifice with the product’s perceived value and 
price and value are the cornerstones of every transaction (Simmon, 1994). According 
to Cahill (1995), the only truly important question to ask is what will the customer pay? 
Home prices have a huge impact on the country’s GDP (Schatz & Sebastian, 2009). 
Therefore, it follows that determining MVs for pricing purposes have to be approached 
with great caution. 
 
Theoretically, prices are developed within a neo-classical economic structure in which 
the core concepts are supply, demand, market forces and equilibrium prices 
(Boelhouwer, 2005). The variation in housing prices is the result of the disequilibrium 
between demand and supply. Free market economy also assumes that in any property 
transaction, price is set by fully informed and knowledgeable participants acting under 
no duress and that it can be used to estimate MVs (Delisle & Grissom, 2011). But 
anyone who has followed the SA REI development from 1994 might come to different 
conclusion on this one. One of the factors that might undermine part of the argument 
above is the PA relationship which leads to the use of dual mandate system for agents 
in SA REI (as shown above). The assumption that principals specify preferences, 
create incentives and making contracts that agents must follow is also problematic 
and the pricing responsibility will illustrate that (Heimer & Staffen 1998; Sharma, 1997). 
 As mentioned earlier, the REA is involved in setting the listing price when a property 
is put up for sale and knows what the reservation price of the seller is. Listing price 
influences the arrival of offers which ultimately determine the timing of the sale (Merlo 
& Ortalo-Magne, 2002). Asking price for a residential RE is often viewed as a starting 
point for negotiations by the buyer (Baracha & Seile, 2014). It has been observed that 
buyers in residential markets are typically only sporadic players in the market and are 
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frequently unsophisticated in their decision behaviour (Kinnard, 1968). Due to limited 
capacity, buyers often use the asking prices on houses as a shortcut to estimate the 
property MV. Therefore, establishing a listing price that is expected to yield an 
optimum settlement price without prolonging the property’s TOM is vitally important to 
both the buyer and the seller.  On the other hand, making higher value sales results in 
higher commission for the REA (Scott & Lizieri, 2012). 
 
Setting listing prices can lead to the following possible scenarios: The REA can 
persuade the seller to put a high asking price on the property. This in turn can signal 
some unobserved properties of the house or the seller (Albrecht, Gauntier & Vroman, 
2012). Deng, et al. (2009) show that less informed sellers can set a high asking price 
and a higher list price might lead to more likelihood of reducing it and selling at a lower 
price. A higher listing price might lead to an increase in the TOM. Several researchers 
posit that there is a positive relationship between TOM and the ultimate low selling 
price (Haurin, 1988; Lippman & McCall 1996; Miller 1978; Yavas, 1992). In addition, 
list price reductions have been descriptively evidenced by researchers such as Knight 
(2002) and Merlo and Ortalo-Magne (2004). High listing price might lead to a higher 
sale price (Merlo & Ortalo-Magne, 2004) or it may lead to price reduction and 
subsequently to low transaction price (Lazear, 1986). This has been shown to be 
costly to the seller as well. A high list price also determines the rate of viewing by 
potential buyers (De Wit & Van der Klaauw, 2013; Merlo, et al., 2002). Also, when the 
TOM is long, it might lead to the seller becoming impatient. The other problem is that 
the probability of sales decreases with the increase in TOM (Anglin, et al., 2003; De 
Wit, 2010; Huay & Pamquist, 2001; Pryce & Gibb, 2006; Zuehlke, 1987). Prolonged 
time on market could be interpreted by the buyers as a signal of poor quality (Gibb & 
Pryce, 2012). Conversely, the counter argument is that longer TOM can also increase 
the probability of finding a buyer (Herrin, Knight & Sirmans, 2004).  
The other scenario would be for the REA persuading the seller to put a low listing 
price. That would have a different set of outcomes. This might give rise to many people 
coming to view the property. An increase in a number of bidders can have influence 
on the probability of receiving lucrative offers much quicker (Levin & Pryce, 2007). This 
might lead to a faster sale and the REA gaining a more timely commission. In another 
study, it has been shown that REAs sell their own properties at about 4.5% premium 
compared to their customers (Rutherford, et al., 2005). The REAs serve in two 
73 
 
capacities. To the buyer, the advantages and disadvantages are possibly brought 
about by the initial valuation which is only shown to the seller and the reservation price 
is also unknown to the buyer. The presence of asking price information determines the 
ultimate valuation to the potential buyer (Scott & Lizieri, 2012). This creates serious 
issues of price manipulations to suit the agent. Given the IA, REAs have significant 
power to control the information given to home-buyers (Scott & Lizieri, 2012). For 
instance, the seller can be persuaded to put down a much higher price offer for the 
property than the seller’s reservation price. Making sales for a higher value result in 
higher commission (Scott & Lizieri, 2012). The dual mandate system seems to imply 
that one principal/all of them would most probably be disadvantaged, which is one of 
the most important issues in the present study. In the case of the REA-owner 
properties, the buyer is likely to pay a high premium for the transaction. 
 
3.6.2: The Marketing role of real estate agents 
 
The marketing function in the REI is a creative activity involving the planning and 
execution of the conception, pricing, promotion and distribution of ideas, properties 
and services to satisfy customers’ present and future needs and to anticipate and 
create their future needs at a profit (Rassmann, 2000). It further involves analysing, 
shaping and forming the market and maintaining its attractiveness in order to bring 
about an exchange process to satisfy individuals’ goals (Von & Knirsch, 2000).  
Furthermore, Rassmann (2000) posits that real estate marketing is a long process as 
one is dealing with a durable product. Some of the marketing activities done by REAs 
(as shown in Chapter 2) are pricing, organising viewings by customers, having 
showhouses, advertising, organizing road-shows, attending open hours, bond 
arrangements, assisting with choices for conveyancers and giving transaction updates 
to their principals. The REA’s role in valuation and negotiation processes indicates 
that the REA occupies a position of power and control (Baressi, 1968). This role can 
further be exploited to the disadvantage of either one or both principals. The 
subsequent discussion will attempt to show how these activities can bring about 
favourable/unfavourable consequences to principals. The discussion will be simplified 
by highlighting such issues as the effect of ideological persuasion of REAs and IA, 
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asymmetric benefits of REA’s marketing activities, COI in the marketing role of REAs 
and the outcomes to the two principals. 
 
After the mandate to sell has been agreed upon, REAs decide how to go about 
marketing the property either to new potentials or their existing potentials. Therefore, 
the REAs have access to both sides of the potential participants in the transactions, 
access to available housing units either in their books or through MLS and they can 
decide which units to show to existing potential customers (Ondrich, Ross & Yinger, 
2002). The choice of media for advertisements is also determined by them. It has also 
been shown that possibilities of COI are rampant in the PA relationships. One way of 
handling the DMS situation would be for REA to see themselves as the agent for the 
seller and treat the buyer as a customer (Isakson & Spencer, 2000).                         
 
Sellers and REAs possess more information about the property than the buyer as 
properties possess experience attributes (Nelson, 1970). The value of some attributes 
may be difficult to assess as they may have to be experienced to be valued (Gibb & 
Pryce, 2012). Also, buyers might have the inability to evaluate quality accurately prior 
to purchase which in turn represents exposure to two different forms of opportunism: 
misrepresentation of the characteristics and quality cheating (Mishra, Heide & Gort, 
1998). Elsewhere, it has been shown that brokers can also determine how and where 
specific people buy properties, rendering location choices to be not completely a 
volitional process (Baressi, 1968). There is compelling evidence about many factors 
that influence buying and settlement patterns. Those factors were found to be 
personal, and socio-economic in nature. REAs also limited and determined the areas 
into which one may or may not locate and thus in turn contributed to the establishment 
of community attitudes and values regarding residential location. Therefore, it was 
concluded that the REAs role in the housing market places them in a position not only 
to interpret those attitudes and values but also to substantially contribute to their 
establishment and perpetuation (Baressi, 1968). These considerations would neatly 
fall under the non-financial conflict of interests (NFCOI) as shown above. 
 
In the same study, it was further established that REAs acted as gatekeepers who 
channel and control the activities of individuals who sell and buy houses (Baressi, 
1968). They exercised control function in the selection of clients, selection of housing 
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to be shown to prospective buyers, prices at which properties are offered for sale 
prices at which they are sold, and the source and type of mortgage loan the buyer 
secures. Various types of techniques were used in exercising control in the attempt to 
match social class level of the buyer and the social level of the area. They justified 
their practices on the basis of social pressure exerted by neighbourhood residents, 
other brokers and mortgage financers (Baressi, 1968). This renders their practices to 
look discriminatory. One of the methods REAs were found to use is steering behaviour 
that differentially direct clients toward particular neighbourhoods and away from others 
on the basis of race and ethnicity (Galster & Godfrey, 2005).This was found to distort 
spatial patterns of housing demands by whites and minority home buyers in such a 
way that racial segregation was perpetuated and stable integration discouraged 
(Galster & Godfrey, 2005). Forms of steering were information, segregation, class and 
editorialising. Steering was used when doing house inspection and when 
recommending properties. Editorialising seemed to be the most prevalent sort of 
white/black steering mechanism (Galster & Godfrey, 2005). 
  
There are other ways that exclusion in property markets manifested in other countries. 
Some identified methods are differential treatment which occurs when people are 
treated unequally because of their race. The second form is disparate impact which 
occurs when individuals are treated equally according to a given set of rules and 
procedures which favour members of one group over the other (Pager & Shepherd, 
2008). Another prevalent practice in the Johannesburg suburbs (which is suspected 
to be ideological in origin) is the use of gated communities. Stated objectives for this 
neighbourhood arrangements have been found to generally be lifestyle (leisure and 
amenities), elite communities (gates symbolises distinction and prestige to protect and 
secure on the social ladder-enclaves for the rich and famous), physical security and 
social security are enhanced by both sameness and controlled access), security zones 
informed by fear of crime and outsiders (is the motivation for defensive fortifications) 
and social values. Other reasons for gated communities have been homogeneity of 
members and stability of property values (Carrasquillo, 2011).  It is suspected that 
exclusionary intentions might take a marketing angle and be seen as another way of 
targeting specific submarket with an inclusion of a significant recreational feature like 
a golf course, tennis court or a lake (Pager & Shepherd, 2008; Strahilevitz, 2006). The 
chosen club goods were meant to deter members of undesirable groups from joining 
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the community in question without violating anti-discriminatory laws.  Another form of 
exclusion in the study was barring any potential buyers from making use of bank 
finance to buy in the particular community. SA has many gated communities and the 
question that can be asked is: Is their formation also informed by similar concerns?  
 
The other question that directly ties in with the present study is the possibility of the 
political ideology of the REAs, whether that also plays a role in the settlement patterns 
of the new buyers. In one study conducted in the USA, it was found that political 
ideology matters in consumer behaviour (Crockett & Wallendorf, 2004). Indeed, some 
authors have shown that agents discriminate because of their own prejudice and in 
order to protect their potential business (Becker, 1971). In other areas, REAs are 
known to have discriminated against some potential clients by treating people in 
different groups differently because they believe that it is profitable to base treatment 
on some unobserved characteristics (Ondrich,  et al., 2002). It is proper to test this in 
the SA REI context and the areas of interest are the mandate type, possible use of 
valuation information to advantage one principal at the expense of the other and use 
of the marketing activities of REAs to determine who can join which neighbourhood. 
The study also investigated whether the ideological concerns of REAs do have an 
impact on the composition of households in suburbs. The project would like to check 
whether these concerns are founded or not in order to either put to rest the lingering 
suspicion or confirm them so that something can be initiated to address the issues. 
 
3.6.2.3: Information asymmetry and the marketing role of real estate agents 
 
The marketing function of the REA involves feedback sessions with either of their 
principals. As shown above, the SA context is such that the REA acts as both the 
seller’s and buyer’s agent. Also, buyers might have the inability to evaluate quality 
accurately prior to purchase which in turn represent exposure to two different forms of 
opportunism, namely; misrepresentation of the characteristics and quality cheating 
(Mishra, et al., 1998). As buyers are imperfectly informed about current and future 
neighbourhood attributes and dynamics, they are more likely to make suboptimal 
location choices and less likely to make choices that accurately reflect their 
preferences (Gibb & Pryce, 2012). Also, due to limited capacity, buyers often use the 
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asking prices on houses as a shortcut to estimate the property MV, which further 
exposes them to possible abuse by unscrupulous REAs. Prices also have a direct 
impact on the marketing approaches used by the REAs. They might negotiate 
higher/lower prices and favourable/unfavourable terms to desirable/undesirable 
principals depending on whom they are dealing with in order to give effect to their 
prejudiced outlook. The question is: Are such practices prevalent in the SA REI? If so, 
how prevalent are those practices, especially in the light of the mushrooming of gated 
communities?  The issues that run through this discussion on who stands to benefit 
are informational, pricing, locational, outcomes and time on market (TOM). On 
informational grounds, the seller and REA seem to have an upper hand. The same 
can also be assumed on the pricing of properties. Commission levels seem to favour 
the REA more than all the principals as he/she can decide whether the low sales price 
can bring more desirable outcome. The TOM is one that suggests that the seller 
principal stand to lose. This present study is about how the mandate type and REAs’ 
ideological standpoint affect the ultimate outcome in any property transaction. Both 
these issues have an influence on the valuation, pricing and marketing activities of 
REAs. 
 
3.6.1.1: Information asymmetry, trust and conflict of interests issues in real 
estate agents’ valuation responsibility  
 
Property market is imperfect with a high degree of heterogeneity (Mcgreal & Talta vuls 
de la Paz, 2012).  Also, issues of IA come to the fore when valuation has to be done. 
The value of some attributes may be difficult to assess as they may have to be 
experienced to be valued (Bardouis & Mendez, 1996; Nelson, 1970). But properties 
are atypical products. For instance, no two houses can share the same exact location 
(Leishman, 2003). Because of this nature, property prices are further influenced by the 
individual characteristics of the house such as structural features, nature and 
composition of the neighbourhood, location and the environmental component (Ham, 
2011:4). Asset atypicality measures the difference between a given houses and 
appropriately defined typical home as a driving force in explaining the variation in the 
marketing times of housing (Angling, 1999). Municipalities have a responsibility to 
deliver accurate MVs within their valuation rolls but there is a growing tendency to 
undervalue properties by as much as 70% in Johannesburg (Channing, 2013). 
78 
 
 
REAs’ involvement in the initial valuation stage can lead to asking and reservation 
prices that have an effect both on the seller and the agent. The presence of asking 
price information determines the ultimate valuation by buyers (Scott & Lizieri, 2012). 
Given the IA, REAs have significant power to control the information given to home-
buyers. To avoid COI, the municipal valuers are supposed to disclose any personal, 
or private business interest that they or any spouse, parent child partner or business 
associate of theirs may have in any property in the municipality. Also, they may not 
use their position as valuers for private gain to improperly benefit any person 
(Channing, 2012). In Spain, valuations are undertaken by  relevant companies which 
are bound by legislation and are not allowed to have any agency involvement 
(Bardouis & Mendez, 1996). Also, valuation is made using three different methods with 
the least estimate value selected (Mcgreal, et al., 2012). REAs do property valuations 
daily in SA REI and seemingly there is nothing in place that governs their role in this 
part of their work. 
 
3.7: POSSIBLE IMPACT OF THE DUAL MANDATE SYSTEM AND IDEOLOGY  
 
The preceding sections in this chapter have dwelt on AT, PA relationships, the DMS, 
IO and the duties of REAs in the REI. The remainder of the chapter will concentrate 
on possible explanation as to how all these concepts are related to COI and CP. 
Towards the end, a relationship between COI and OT and CP and OT will be 
proposed. 
 
3.7.1: Conflict of interests (COI) in the principal-agent (PA) relationship 
 
Conflict of interests (COI) is one of mediator variables for this study.  The section will 
first look at how different people define and describe it. 
 
 
 
 
79 
 
3.7.1.1: Definitions and description of conflict of interests 
 
Different authors give different definitions of COI. Precisely, COI is a clash between 
public interest and the private pecuniary beneficial interest of the individual concerned 
and occurs when a duty of a fiduciary to a client is compromised by a commitment to 
another client (Luebke, 1986).  Similarly, COI is a situation in which a personal or 
institutional interest interferes with the ability of an individual or institution to act in the 
interest of another party when the individual or institution has an ethical or legal 
obligation to act in that other party’s interests (Palazzo & Rethel, 2008). In addition, 
COI occurs when circumstances create a risk that a person’s professional judgement 
or actions regarding a primary interest will unduly be influenced by a secondary 
interest (Callif, 2013). Furthermore, COI happens when an individual’s objectivity is 
potentially compromised by a desire for financial gain, prominence, professional 
advancement or a successful outcome (Authorship and conflict of interest statement, 
2013). 
 
Gleaning from the above definitions, one can further attempt to simplify what it means 
by stating that COI is a situation in which a party’s responsibility to a second party 
limits its ability to discharge its responsibility to a third party; a situation with a potential 
to undermine the impartiality of a person because of the possibility of a clash between 
the person’s self-interest and professional interests of public interests. This includes 
when an individual’s personal interests or concerns are inconsistent with the best 
interests for the customer. It can also be defined as a situation in which a person has 
a duty to more than one person or organisation but cannot do justice to the actual or 
potentially adverse interest of both parties. When COI is present, it might lead to 
biased advice, lowered effort to act or protect the principal’s interests and other results 
contrary to the purpose of the relationship (Luebke, 1986). Also, efficiency (important 
goal of delegation) and fairness suffer as it might create incentives to act in such a 
way as to misuse or conceal information (Yusuf, 2011). COI causes problems and 
losses to the parties involved (Varian, 1989). COI is one of the major variables of this 
study and will further be elaborated on in the following chapter. 
 
The above discussion reveal that the possibilities of COI exist even in the REI, which 
is in turn compounded by the fact that REAs in SA serve more than one principal. 
80 
 
Possible results of any COI are numerous. The duty of care and loyalties are 
compromised for personal benefits. Moreover, COI might lead to unethical activities to 
take place. Unfair costs can be incurred by the principals when the REA is conflicted. 
The situation can also lead to personal gains by agents. On the downside, future 
business opportunities for REAs can be compromised (Esser, 2010). 
 
In order to mitigate COI, PA contracts are used by specifying expectations, incentive 
systems, monitoring plans and sanctions. The incentive scheme for both principal and 
agent has to be positively correlated in order for the PA arrangement to function 
properly. However, contracts are imperfect (Greenberg, Greenberg, Lederer & 
Antonucci, 2008) and perceived dissimilarity of goals can be associated with conflict 
(Ross, et al., 1997). For a REA, making sales for higher value leads to higher 
commission (Scott & Lizieri, 2012). The other side has to be mentioned as well to also 
demonstrate counter-arguments to the assumptions of opportunistic behaviour of 
agents.  In addition to agents’ wealth maximisation, others are known to be concerned 
with values of trust in relationships, stability of long-term business relationship, and 
issues of morality (Callison, 2012). In the light of the above discussion on how the PA 
relationship functions, attention is now turned to how the agents perform and or are 
supposed to function. Their major roles are the valuation role and the marketing role. 
How the PA relationships manifests in the REI (DMS), the REAs’ approach to life (IO), 
how the principals are treated (CP) the conflict the differing interests (COI) and the 
ultimate outcomes (OT) are the subject of this study.  
 
3.7.1.2: Conflict of interests as applied to the real estate industry in general 
 
The most critical issue in today’s real estate transaction is the inherent possibilities of 
COI created by dual representation by the real estate broker (Kroll, 2010). COI 
continues to be a significant, a widespread issue and a major challenge despite 
legislation and extensive institutional policies (De Gara & Rennick, 2013). It is always 
a possibility between principals and agents because these parties may hold 
contrasting views about desired objectives and means-end relations, potentially 
leading to actions on the part of the agent that are inconsistent with the principal’s 
desires (Mitnick, 1975). REAs are called upon to what some scholars call playing dual 
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roles that require different perspectives (Moore, et al., 2010). These differing roles 
demand that they pursue conflicting objectives (Moore, et al., 2010).  Brokers have 
been alleged to be influenced by incentives which are capable of generating COI 
(Maynard & McAuliffe, 2008; Yusuf, 2011). One of the central contentions of the AT is 
that if left unmonitored, agents are likely to pursue private objectives that deviate and 
even conflict with the goals of the principal (Wiseman, et al., 2012). The AT postulates 
that people are self-interested and they will have COI over at least some issues at any 
time they engage in some cooperative endeavour (Varian, 1989). Another strong 
assumption of the AT is that agents are self-interested individuals who seek to 
maximize personal economic wealth while minimising personal effort (Bruce, Buck & 
Main, 2005; Lubatkin, Lane, Collin & Very, 2007; Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 
1997). Clearly, from the above comments, COI is not only limited to the conflicting 
interests of principals. Both client conflicts and own interest conflict can arise (Davis & 
Lead, 1982). It should also be mentioned that COI does not equal bias but may 
promotes it (De Gara, Rennick & Hanson, 2013). Also, COI does not have to involve 
money. According to Callif (2013), there are financial conflict of interests (FCOI) which 
is the one in which monetary or material benefits induce/ influence (or are perceived 
to have) the actions of the agent. The other type is the non-financial conflict of interest 
(NFCOI).  
 
3.7.1.3: How conflict of interests can influence the real estate industry 
 
REAs can influence the industry by making use of the DMS, which is hypothesised to 
be closely linked to COI in many different ways. DMS might lead REAs Inflating 
property prices to advantage the seller principal and gain more commission. In one 
study in France, REAs were shown to inflate property prices by about 1.3% (Violand 
& Simon, 2007). Possibilities are there for the agent to assist the buyer to get the best 
price out of the seller (Lindeman, 2004); convey privileged information to either of the 
parties to a deal (Lindeman, 2004); misrepresent information in order to facilitate a 
deal (Villanova, 1987) and generally exploit the informational advantage over either of 
the parties. It is precisely for these possibilities that in other countries, agents are 
prohibited from acting for both buyers and sellers of the same asset where 
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negotiations are required on price and other key terms of the contract (Davis & Snead, 
1982). 
 
3.7.2: Compromising of the principal’s interests (CP) 
 
From the above discussion on DMS which is treated as a subset of the PA relationship 
and the IO of the main actors in the REI, opportunities abound for either of the 
principals’ interests to be compromised. This can come about as a result of IA, and 
the roles of the REA. Some examples are given below as to how the principal’s 
interests can be compromised: The interests can be compromised in many ways. 
Information asymmetry (IA) can give rise to non-disclosure of useful information to the 
buyer, like the minimum acceptable price to the seller in order to get higher 
commission (Scott & Lizzieri, 2012); disclosure of information to either of the principal 
in breach of fiduciary responsibilities (Lindeman, 2004); misrepresentation of the 
property features to prospective purchasers (Villanova, 1987); limiting of prospective 
buyers to only those who come through the listing agent.  
 
Compromising of the interests of either of the principal can arise from the REA’s 
marketing activities when the agent   either manipulates viewing patterns in order to 
prolong the property’s TOM so that the price can be lowered (Lee, 2012) or through 
the agent’s manipulation of viewing patterns in order to exclude other people due to 
ideological persuasion of the REA (Hendel, Nevo & Ortalo-Magne, 2007). The REA 
can for instance, steer potential purchasers to certain properties which have only been 
listed by the agent (Galster & Godfrey, 2005), reserve the property for certain type of 
prospects or friends and by advertising of the property in channels that are only 
accessible to some and not to others. 
 
In their valuation role, REAs can undermine the interests of their principals by: 
undervaluing of properties to speed up the sale (Garmaise, Moskowitz, Palmon & 
Sopranzetti, 2008), non-disclosure of valuation prices to prospects to advantage the 
seller due to goals incompatibility (Izzo, 2000), reluctance to present offers lower than 
what the agent wants to maximize commission because of the difference in goals of 
REAs and their seller principals (Garmaise & Moskowitz, 2004); and by presenting 
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wrong valuation figures to facilitate a quick sale at the expense of the seller (Lee, 
2002). The above examples serve to illustrate possibilities of how the principals can 
be disadvantaged by COI from the REAs. Whatever way and reasons for COI and CP, 
they lead to some kind of outcomes. It is proposed in this study that both COI and CP 
lead to sub-optimal outcomes. The development of the model for this study is 
presented in Chapter 4.  
 
3.7: OUTCOMES 
 
Under ideal conditions both the seller and buyer need to obtain optimal outcomes out 
of a property deal. A good price, short TOM and quick turnaround in transaction 
administration stage is the best outcome for the seller. The buyer needs to get a 
property at bargain in the appropriate time with no hassles during the transaction 
process by everybody involved. The REA wants to get the highest commission in the 
shortest possible time (Garmaise & Moskowitz, 2004). In order to make a reasonable 
judgment about how the industry practices are viewed, one therefore needs to check 
the perceptions of customers and REAs on the outcomes.   
 
Neves (2015) argues that performance can be measured by assessing whether the 
service provider rendered an acceptable level of service quality or not. Acceptable 
outcomes might mean customer satisfaction, loyalty to the service supplier and the 
quality of the service rendered (Wisniewski & Donnelly, 1996). Many other scholars 
from various fields have suggested different ways to measure outcomes. For some, 
service outcomes are represented by effectiveness and efficiency of creation and 
delivery of the service (Handler, Koebel, Relis & Schratzeustallers, 2004). Others 
emphasise that one can only judge the outcomes by looking at the inputs and the 
process (MIHAIU, 2015). A broad measurement which states that measuring 
outcomes should consider both financial and non-financial issues has also been 
advanced (Martin & Patterson 2009; McAdam & Saulters, 2000; Ross, Anderson & 
Weitz, 1997). Still others have added timelines as another important factor. MIHAU 
(2015) suggests that outcomes should be measured in terms of efficiency, 
effectiveness and the cost of service. Some people view outcomes in terms of the 
quality of the service, the efficiency of the process and the results (Koopman, 
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Bernnard, Hildebrandt & Van der Beek, 2014). In addition, Marita (2015) believes that 
output should be measured in terms of satisfaction it gives to the consumer. The one 
that appears to be more appropriate for the REI is the method proposed by Stank, 
Keller and Closs (2002) which points out that the outcomes should be judged on how 
it synchronises capabilities of all participants to all who render the final service 
package. This is more relevant as the overall consumer experience in a housing 
transaction is not only affected by the actions of the REA. There are other people 
involved in taking the deal from marketing to final registration. The general themes 
going through output measurement are the following: quality of service or asset; 
financial costs and benefits; perception of service quality; loyalty and possibilities of 
repeat business and satisfaction with how the service was delivered. Consequently, 
the research instrument used in this study combined all these aspects in order to find 
out how all the participants in a housing transaction evaluate the service rendered. 
REAs are rendering a service to sellers and buyers because most of the time they do 
not own the properties they valuate and market.  
 
3.8: GAPS IN THE LITERATURE   
 
The fact that REAs represent two principals presents opportunities for abuse. Some 
possible questions that should be asked are: Whose interests come first, the buyer 
principal, the seller principal or the REA’s? Both IO and COI might lead to a situation 
in which personal interests of REAs interfere with their ability to act in the interest of 
sellers/buyers when they have an ethical or legal obligation to do so (Palazzo & Rethel, 
2008). COI does not equal bias but may promote it (De Gara, Rennick & Hanson et 
al., 2013).  Furthermore, in the light of the information advantage that agents generally 
possess, are there grounds to suspect that the DMS leads to one principal’s interests 
getting compromised in favour of the REA and/the other principal? IA is an antecedent 
of opportunism (Wilkie, et al., 1998). Considering the outcomes of transactions one 
can also ask whether they are optimal outcomes for the principals. Opportunities exist 
for the REA to use blockbusting (Van Hoffman, 1998), to steer potential buyers to other 
houses (Galster & Godfrey, 2005), to selectively use information to maximize their 
utility and to manipulate the marketing mix in order to favour one side of the deal. 
Property buyers are generally unrepresented at the time that the selling agent is 
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initially contacted and are therefore disadvantaged in their starting point for price 
negotiations (Wiley, et al., 2013; Baracha & Seile, 2014).   
In the light of the inherent IA and COI possibilities in the PA relationships, it would 
appear that what one party gains in the PA relationship might lead to someone else 
losing out as opposed to a win-win situation in a real estate transaction. Also, when 
anyone looks for information on the REI in SA, there is a huge information gap. There 
has not been an interest in researching the operation of this important part of the SA 
economy especially with regards to how the DMS, the ideology of major players and 
their impact on the performance of the industry. Looking at the roles played by the 
REAs at onset of the contract with seller principals leads one to ask: are they 
competent to do valuations for clients? The above issues will get further attention in 
Chapter 4 where the research model for this study will be developed. The chapter will 
also show how the different issues in this chapter lead to the proposed hypotheses. 
Therefore, this study has identified a gap and set out to fill it. Firstly, the DMS and the 
IO of REAs have been shown to have a potential to disrupt the working of the industry. 
For instance, REAs are known to be self-interested individuals (Varian, 1989), who 
can manipulate the marketing mix for possible gains (see Villanova, 1987; Lindeman, 
2004; Lee, 2012). The present study attempted to investigate how the mandate system 
and the ideology of agents influence the final outcomes for sellers and buyers in the 
SA residential real estate. The link between the DMS the IO with COI and CP and how 
COI and CP influence the final outcomes have not been investigated in South Africa 
and elsewhere in the world. A model for the industry that can be the framework for 
future studies of the real estate business is also proposed. 
       
3.9: CHAPTER 3 SUMMARY  
 
The introduction to Chapter 3 set up to discuss pertinent issues to this study, especially 
the general theoretical basis to the REI in SA. The important concepts are the 
following: PA relationships, Pricing of properties, IA, COI and how these concepts 
relate to the DMS and to major roles of REAs which are valuations and marketing 
responsibilities. The interconnections have been highlighted together with the gap(s) 
for the present study. In order to lay a firm foundation for Chapter 4, possible impacts 
of DMS and IO to the SA REI were highlighted in the light of the valuation and 
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marketing responsibilities placed on the shoulders of REAs.  The following chapter will 
dwell on developing the research model as given in the first chapter. Specific attention 
will be focused on the interactions between the variables: DMS, REA’s ideological 
persuasion, COI, CP and the type of results that come out of a real estate deal. 
Specifically, proposals will be made on how the DMS and the REA’s ideological 
persuasion independent variables) influence the ultimate outcomes (dependent 
variable) via COI and compromising (intermediary variables) one of the parties to the 
transaction.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1: INTRODUCTION:  
 
A model can be defined as a statement about a relationship between variables (Gois 
& Ehrlich, 2014). Literature review on the principal-agent (PA) relationships and on the 
ideological outlook of parties involved in any business transaction highlighted 
important issues of information asymmetry (IA) and trust. It also highlighted 
opportunities of abuse that a PA relationship presents. Different ways by which PA 
relationships can be undermined by COI and by sacrificing principals’ interests were 
also hinted. The present chapter aims to show possible ways by which this can happen 
in the SA REI in particular. This will be done by proposing some hypotheses that relate 
our predictor, mediator and outcomes variables. This will be achieved by showing how 
the research model shown in Chapter 1 was developed. The model that summarises 
the overall relationships networks in the present study is given in Figure 4.1 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The conceptual model 
 
The development of the hypotheses and the conceptual model will be done under 
variables and their classifications and linkages between the variables. 
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Each of these linkages (except the last two) will be discussed under the following sub-
headlines: the importance of the relationship; examples to illustrate the importance of 
the relationship; hypothesis development; and the hypothesis statement. 
 
4.2: CLASSIFICATION OF VARIABLES 
 
Taking from the model, the major variables can be classified under predictor variables, 
mediator variables and outcome variables. A detailed discussion on each of them has 
been given in Chapter 3 of this study. A brief description of each is given followed by 
a proposal on how they relate to each other. 
 
Predictor variables 
  
From the discussion in earlier chapters, it has been shown that our predictor variables 
are the dual mandate system (DMS) and IO. The DMS is the type of a mandate in a 
property transaction wherein both the buyer and the seller are represented by the 
same REA. It is usually a sole mandate (SM) and the one favoured and mostly used 
in the SA context (Brown & Yingling, 2007; Kadiyali,  et al., 2014).  
 
Ideological outlook (IO) can be defined as a system of beliefs and ideas which arise 
from a given set of material interests (Daniela, 2014); a general mental representations 
shared by the members of a social group (Van Dijk, 2009); one’s philosophy about 
economic, social and political issues (such as free-market system, capability of 
government institution, virtues of monopolies, the value of competition, meaning and 
importance of property rights, merit et cetera) (Marina, 2014). 
 
Mediator variables are 
 
Two mediator variables were shown to be COI and CP.  
Conflict of interests (COI) occurs when an individual’s personal interests diverge from 
their professional and moral responsibility to others (Cain, Loewenstein & More, 2010), 
and if those for whom an individual is to act in a fiduciary capacity have conflicting 
interest in the asset or project to which the fiduciary duties attach (Clark & Van Buren,  
2013).   
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A principal’s interests are compromised when somebody other than the principal wins 
any value due to that principal (CP). He/she is compromised when the benefits which 
should have accrued to that principal are obtained by the other party to a transaction. 
This may result out of lack of understanding of processes involved (for example, of 
property valuation figures) (Stelling, 2014), lack of information when making decisions 
(Kinnard, 1968) and when that principal is not represented at the initial stages of 
selling/buying of the property (Wiley & Zumpano, 2013). 
 
Outcome variable  
 
Only one outcome will be studied in the present project. Outcomes can be judged on 
financial performance (Bell & Simon, 2008), the requirements of the original 
instructions and on key types of performance/outcomes measures associated with 
results (competitiveness, quality, flexibility, resource use and innovation) (Fitzgerald, 
Johnston, Brignall, Silverstro & Vos, 1991). The relationships as depicted in the model 
are explored in the following order, namely; DMS and COI in the SA REI, DMS and 
CP, IO and COI, IO and CP, COI and sub-OT and lastly, CP and sub-OT. 
  
4.3: DUAL MANDATE SYSTEM AND CONFLICT OF INTERESTS IN THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY  
 
The responsibilities that a REA assume when a dual mandate is signed are mainly 
valuation and marketing roles. The valuation role informs the initial listing price for the 
property. In order to start the valuation and marketing functions, the seller and the REA 
normally have an agreement/mandate signed which can be structured differently to 
suit the contracting parties’ interests. Hendel, Nevo and Ortalo-Magne (2007) 
summarise the duties of a REA as helping with setting listing price; preparing the 
house; checking potential buyers’ qualifications to purchase; showing the house; 
bargaining the terms of the deal; and handling the paperwork. The benefits that the 
seller need to get from a broker are shorter expected time on the market; a higher 
probability that house will be sold; a higher selling price; advertising and showing the 
house to possible buyers; and assistance with financial and legal arrangements (Carol, 
90 
 
1989). Also, the REA has to represent the buyer in showing them available properties, 
assist the buyer with making reasonable offers, assisting with taking offers to the 
buyers, assist the buyer with mortgage applications and the general administration of 
the deal. Therefore, the REA gets a mandate from the seller and from the buyer. This 
is the reason why it is called a dual mandate system. Clearly, with this arrangement, 
the interests of the parties are bound to collide somewhat in some areas. The differing 
and conflicting interests have special implications for the REI and warrants special 
academic attention. The creation of agency relationship by the mandate contract 
places fiduciary responsibilities on the agent to act in the interest of the principals and 
to reduce the risks endemic to the PA relationships (Clark & Van Buren, 2013). Bryant 
and Epley (1992) emphasise that the agency relationship requires undivided loyalty to 
the principal. COI is at the heart of many of the scandals that have shaken the US 
economy (Rousy, 2014).  
 
4.3.1: The importance of the relationship between the dual mandate system 
and conflict of interests 
 
The mandate that is entered into with the principal can be structured differently to suit 
the contracting parties. The most used mandate in the SA context is the SM type 
(Brown & Yingling, 2007; Kadiyali, et al., 2014). The REA represents a significant 
obligation to care for the interests of the seller without gaining any material benefits 
except with the consent of that seller (Boatright, 2001). However, as shown above, in 
the SA REI, the REA represents two opposing sides whose interests are directly in 
conflict with each other. The REA serves two principals, the seller and the buyer. What 
is excellent service to the seller principal might be the worst possible outcomes to the 
buyer principal as it will be shown below. Also, the REA faces a clear COI situation 
due to the zero-sum nature of price negotiation. 
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4.3.2: Examples to illustrate the dangers of dual mandate system and conflict of 
interests  
  
COI also find expression in the business world when mergers and acquisitions deals 
are negotiated and concluded. Massa and Simonov (2008) and Matvos and Ostrovsky 
(2008) give example of COI in mergers and acquisitions when institutional investors 
hold shares in both bidding and target companies (Masulis & Nahata, 2011:396). 
These situations have an effect on profitability of such deals as the venture capitalists 
(VCs) have dual objectives due to their positions (Masulis & Nahata, 2011). In addition, 
Boatright (2009) suggests that giving one-sided view due to the presence of conflicting 
loyalties and resultant abdication of fiduciary duties is inherent in the proxy advisory 
services as well. Dual agency and COI situations are also found everywhere in the 
USA where medicine is practiced (Carr, 2005). Doctors are faced with whether to 
prescribe the medicine best for the patient, insurance or as requested by the patient 
(Carr, 2005). In legal circles, COI also find expression especially in matters when 
lawyers represent their clients. In order to mitigate COI, lawyers owe their clients the 
following duties, namely; duty to avoid COI and duty of commitment to the client’s and 
duty of candour (Rousy, 2014). For instance, in Canada under the Bright line rule, a 
lawyer or a law firm cannot legally act in a matter that is directly adverse to the 
immediate legal (not commercial or strategic) interests of their other client. Otherwise, 
only when there is no substantial risk of harm or impaired representation (Rousy, 
2014).  
 
In 1984, the State of Hawaii legislature enacted a law making it compulsory for REAs 
engaged in dual agency or mandate relationship to disclose the fact to both parties in 
writing. The legislation specifically prohibits REAs to act as undisclosed dual agents 
(Gardiner, Heisler, Kalberg & Liu, 2007). The second example is the California case 
law. This law has held that a broker who does not properly disclose a DM may be 
deprived of her commission even if the transaction is consummated. The REA may be 
exposed to liability for damages if a party repudiates a transaction based on an 
undisclosed dual agency relationship (Mersel, 1996). The REA has to disclose all the 
facts which would reasonably affect the judgment of each party in permitting dual 
representation.  Disclosure also involves explaining to the parties that a broker acting 
as a DA owes fiduciary duties to both parties and that the broker might not be able to 
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disclose information received from one side to the other. The broker becomes more of 
a facilitator to the transaction than an advocate for one side. In the USA, New York 
dual agency with disclosure is the preferred approach (Kadiyali, et al., 2014), Colorado 
and Maryland allow for within office and within agency but not DA.  In Florida, it is not 
allowed for buyer and seller agents to be from the same agency but allows a separate 
entity, a transaction brokerage (Kadiyali, et al., 2014). 
 
4.3.3: Hypothesis development 
 
Marcoux (2003) states that a fiduciary has a COI if those to whom he is to act in a 
fiduciary capacity have conflicting interest in the asset or project to which the fiduciary 
duties attach (Clark & Stark, 2013). Real estate transactions provide an unusually 
attractive setting to test the impact of information distortion by experts and therefore 
COI (Levitt & Syverson, 2008). Conflicting interests of principals give rise to COI to the 
agent (Walter, 2003). In the interest of home sellers, the performance of REA is 
typically assessed by two interrelated measures, namely; TOM and selling price. Best 
performing REAs will sell properties faster and at a higher price (Rutherford, Springer 
and Yavas, 2005) as TOM is largely dependent on the performance of the REA 
(McGreal, Adair, Brown & Webb, 2009). Their valuation role leads to setting of the list 
price (Green & Vandel, 1995; Yavas & Yang 1995; Arnold 1999). This one usually 
happens between the seller and the REA and the buyer is unrepresented. Their 
marketing role can lead to other consequences. In one study, it has been shown that 
DM transactions exhibit lower selling price and is associated with significant reduction 
in marketing time (Wiley, Walter & Bradshaw, 2013). This can be a very good outcome 
for the REA as minimum resources will have been used. In the SA context, the REA 
answers to two principals and the two have significantly contrasting goals (Carr, 2005). 
Both principals’ interests may be damaged by the actions of the REA (Izzo, Scott & 
Vitell, 2003). 
 
The REA has an influence on many aspects of any housing transaction. They can 
determine the contract structure (Geltner, Kluger & Miller, 1991; Micelli, 1991). It has 
been shown that arrangement than in SM arrangement. Studies have shown that SMs 
result in longer marketing times and that open mandates to produce more effort from 
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REAs and that houses sell faster but at a marginally lower price in an open mandate 
(Rutherford, Springer & Yavas, 2005). In addition, REAs can determine the terms of 
listing contract (Micelli, 1989). REAs have been known to behave differently when the 
contract period is either long or short.  
Most mandate contracts have standard listing contract duration which is treated as a 
given to seller principals. The usual contract period in the industry is three or six 
months. Geltner, et al. (1991) examined broker effort and found that the duration of 
listing contract motivates broker-effort.  
 
Studies in other countries have found that the presence of buyer brokers in the 
transaction (Black & Nourse, 1995; Yavas & Colwell, 1999; Elder, Zampano & Barlya, 
2000) reduces TOM relative to for sale by owner cases (Evans, & Kolbe, 2005). In the 
SA REI, there are no buyer agents. The SA situation is further complicated by the 
market segment in which REAs operate and this has different motivational values. 
REAs operating in lower priced market segments in the USA were found not to be 
motivated towards getting the best price for the seller (Geltner, et al., 1991). Sellers of 
high priced properties pay larger commission and thereby elicit more services from 
their brokers (Carol, 1989). Furthermore, Carol (1989) points out that those differences 
in commissions can give REAs incentives to allocate different levels of selling effort to 
different clients.  
The main issues that come out of DMS are on IA, zero-sum conditions of DMS, 
personal interests, insider information, the motivation of the agent and possibilities of 
REAs over-representing a property or underrepresenting it. Moreover, IA results from 
REAs’ equal access to both seller and buyer principals. It has been observed that 
buyers in residential markets are typically only sporadic players in the market and are 
frequently unsophisticated in their decision behaviour (Kinnard, 1968). The zero sum 
conditions under which REAs function can manifest when they determine the best 
price during negotiations. The REA may pressure or lean on either the seller (to accept 
a lower price) or the buyer (to accept a higher price) to hasten the sale (Kadiyali, et 
al., 2014). This may result from dissimilarity of goals which again can be associated 
with COI (Ross, et al., 1997).   
REAs are human who also like to maximise utility. A REA can speed up and earn their 
commission sooner and reduce time, effort to be spent on researching, marketing and 
showing the house to clients.  
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As a dual representative of the two opposite sides, a REA has access to inside 
information. The REAs can exploit this inside knowledge about pricing of the property 
to yield higher sale price and/or faster sale. According to Clauritie and Daneshvary 
(2008), REA obtaining contracts may subject them to PA conflicts in two separate 
dimensions, namely; possibility of the agent extending less than the seller's optimal 
level of effort in searching for buyers and the possibility to encourage the seller to 
lower his/her reservation price so as to effect a quick sale due to goal-differences 
between the seller and the agent (Clauritie & Daneshvary, 2008). 
  
With the access to both sides, REAs are ideally positioned to disclose confidential 
information of their clients or helping them in either the search or negotiation phase of 
the purchase process. Anglin (1997) contends that the listing agent can be informed 
of both the buyers and sellers reservation price and other proprietary information such 
as urgency, motivation and constraints. Having the above issues in it appears that 
there is a real possibility of REAs under/over representing the value of the house in 
order for the principal to adopt a reservation price that is too low/high, depending on 
the commission structure. That might lead to suboptimal outcome for the seller. It can 
either bring in low prices or lead to a very long TOM. The REA’s motivation can be 
decisive in determining who will be advantaged or disadvantaged.  
The above discussion reveals the following scenarios in the DMS and COI: REAs get 
mandates from two principals; the REA has all the information on pricing; reservation 
prices and motivation to contract; the interests of the two principals are usually in 
conflict; the REA has his own utility function and interests; the REA normally has 
information advantage and price negotiations are usually a zero-sum game in which 
what one party loses is gain to the other.  Drawing from the above, the following 
hypothesis with respects to the SA REI can be posited:  
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between dual mandate system and conflict 
of interests in the South African real estate industry 
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4.4: DUAL MANDATE SYSTEM AND COMPROMISING ONE PRINCIPAL TO 
BENEFIT THE OTHER 
 
The discussion on the relationship of DMS and COI has also shown real possibilities 
of the REA’s interests also conflicting with those of their principals. It can be extended 
to also imply that when a DMS is used, one party will necessarily be disadvantaged. 
These possibilities also deserve special attention in this study. 
 
4.4.1: The importance of the relationship between the dual mandate system 
and compromising of principals 
 
It has been shown that IA is inherent in all real estate transactions and that REA enjoys 
huge information advantage compared to any of their principals in Chapter 3. As far 
as the two principals are concerned, IA brings about issues of hidden actions, hidden 
knowledge and hidden information (Palazzo & Rethel, 2008). All else equal, faster 
sales benefit both buyer and seller. Therefore, establishing a listing price that is 
expected to yield an optimum settlement price without prolonging the property’s TOM 
is vitally important to both the buyer and the seller. However, lower equilibrium sale 
price is not in the seller’s interests and similarly faster time to sale might not benefit 
buyers (despite lower prices) if their preferences are compromised to hasten sale. 
REAs are involved in the valuation and setting the listing price, have access to both 
principals and determine how marketing activities unfold. In the interest of fairness and 
openness, valuation figures are supposed to be understood and checked by everyone 
(Stelling, 2014). One of the basic features of the DMS is that buyers must generally 
be unrepresented at the time that the selling agent is initially contacted (Wiley, et al., 
2013). Due to buyers’ limited capacity and knowledge, asking prices for a residential 
real estate are often viewed as a starting point for negotiations (Baracha & Seile, 
2014). Due to the huge information advantage REAs enjoy, buyers are exposed to 
many different practices that may not necessarily be ethical. Examples of situations 
that have arisen elsewhere are given below. 
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4.4.2: Examples to illustrate how the dual mandate system can compromise 
either of the principals 
 
Literature is replete with examples of situations wherein service providers may not 
actually act in the best interest of their customers. Examples can be found in financial 
services (Dejong, Forsythe & Lundholm, 1985), franchising (Brickley & Dark, 1987) 
and in healthcare services (Swedlow, Johnson & Milstein, 1992). In the REI, here are 
some of the examples of how it has been done elsewhere in the world.   
  
Agents have used Blockbusting (BB). This situation arose when white homeowners 
were persuaded to sell their properties faster and usually at below market price under 
the impression that minority were moving into the area and as a result, their property 
would soon lose value (Van Hoffman, 1982). The same properties would soon be 
resold to minorities at inflated prices. They would hire blacks to take a walk in white 
neighbourhoods in order to terrify their residents (Van Hoffman, 1982). Blockbusting 
then generally leads to all principals losing out. The REA is the only winner.  REAs 
have also been known to steer potential buyers to other properties and away from 
others. According to Galster and Godfrey (2005), wherever steering is practiced, 
whites were found to be likely to learn about more available houses and inspect them, 
receiving more favourable financial assistance and terms, being directed to white-
neighbourhoods, inspect and get different recommendations and editorialising about 
properties. Another tool that REAs can deploy can be selective use of information to 
maximise the REA’s utility. REAs are generally cognisant of the market forces involved 
in the REI (Gonzalez-Navarzo & Quintana-Domeque, 2009). As experts of marketing 
properties, REAs can also manipulate the marketing mix in order to favour one side of 
the deal. 
  
4.4.3: Hypothesis development 
 
The agent is generally involved in the determination of the initial pricing (Green & 
Vandel, 1995; Yavas & Yang 1995; Arnold 1999). Knights, Sirmans and Turnbul 
(1998) state that the listing price is in effect a target price that is normally in excess of 
the vendors ‘real reserve price’. Possibilities of overpricing and the buyer paying more 
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than what the property is worth are present. On the other hand, initially overpriced 
houses are most likely to change their asking price (Henrin, Knight & Sirmans, 2004). 
This would result in the seller losing potential income.  Disclosure of information to one 
of the principals is another possibility. The actions of the REAs can give rise to 
situations benefiting the buyer at the expense of the seller or vice versa. Here are 
examples of actions that might result in those outcomes: The agent can ignore his 
fiduciary responsibility to the seller by telling potential buyers to make low offer on a 
real estate parcel by mentioning that the seller (principal) is motivated to sell due to a 
pending bankruptcy. He/she can offer reduced effort levels by matching buyers and 
sellers at a lower price and in a shorter time frame than otherwise (Gardiner, et al., 
2007). REAs properties were found to sell for 4.5% more (Gardiner, et al., 2007). 
Micelli (1989) has shown that brokers will increase effort to sell the house if the length 
of the listing period is reduced.  
 
As shown above, REAs can steer customers for different reasons. They can, for 
instance, steer sellers to their own buyers rather than steering them to those giving 
the best offers. For example, it has been shown that in the USA, minorities have 
access to fewer units than whites, blacks are shown 30% fewer houses than whites 
and this is an important quantitative measure of home seekers access to housing 
(Zhao, 2004). Due to the nature of the real estate business, incentives exist for REAs 
to get involved in creating a sub-optimal match between buyers and sellers by 
restricting the pool of buyers. This has negative effects as the sellers’ optimal asking 
price would decrease when potential buyers bidding heterogeneity decreases (Zheng, 
Deng, Gabriel & Nishimura, 2008). The REA’s involvement in the valuation of the 
property may lead to the setting of the asking price. Due to limited capacity, buyers 
often use the asking prices on houses as a shortcut to estimate the property MV. 
Asking price for a residential housing is often viewed as a starting point for negotiations 
by the buyer (Baracha & Seile, 2014). It would appear that REAs do not reveal the 
valuation figures to the potential buyers. Information asymmetry (IA) exists between 
this principal and the agent. The salient points contained in the discussion above can 
be summarised as follows: The REA determines the listing prices of the properties; 
the marketing effort of the property is determined by the REA; the REA knows the 
motivation of the potential purchaser to buy and the seller’s; the REA has access to 
relevant suburb and industry information; the REA can use the information at his/her 
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disposal to lean on either of the parties to the transaction to effect sale terms 
favourable to  himself or herself; and REAs enjoy information advantage over buyers 
and sellers. Information asymmetry arises as buyers and sellers acquiring REA 
services are often required to divulge personal and sometimes sensitive information 
such as income, divorce and even bankruptcy about themselves as they often have 
less knowledge of the exchange process than does the agent/sales person (Staelin, 
1986).   The valuation role of REAs leads to listing price which can be used to 
disadvantage either of the principals. Drawing from literature review above, it is 
hypothesised for the SA REI that: 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between dual mandate system and 
compromised principal in the South African real estate industry 
 
4.5: IDEOLOGICAL OUTLOOK OF REAs AND CONFLICT OF INTERESTS 
 
The relationship between IO and COI will follow the same pattern as those already 
covered above. The importance of this relationship will be explored first followed by 
examples that illustrate outcomes that are likely to occur if indeed the relationship is 
shown to hold. The final sub-headings will be hypothesis development and statement. 
 
4.5.1: The importance of the ideological outlook and conflict of interests 
 
It can be argued that people normally act out their ideology as people’s ideological 
outlook will enter their actions (Barnard 1938; Selznick, 1957; Andrew, 1971); people 
in control of organisations inject them with their personal ideology (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Eisenhardt, 1989) and this is likely to happen both consciously and 
unconsciously (Chin, Hambrick & Trevino, 2013). Ideological outlook (IO) can enter 
REAs’ actions through two conduits, namely; direct entry, wherein they have direct 
influence on choices after weighing available alternatives, facts, possibilities and 
eventualities and then choose a cause of action that suits his/her values. The second 
conduit would be by what England (1967) calls “Perceptual filtering” which happens 
when he/she selectively searches information that suits his/her values and then 
perceives and interpret the information in value-congruent way. This is also called 
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“motivated cognition” (Higgin & Molden, 2002). In other words, the REA sees what 
he/she wants to see and hears what he/she wants to hear.  Long-tenure REAs seem 
to see great instrumental merit in the status quo of the industry (Hambrick, 
Geletkanycz & Frederickson, 1993). They like the status quo of the profession and the 
industry. This can be translated into the way they serve in their professions. REAs are 
involved in one of the key industries in the SA economy. 
 
4.5.2: Examples illustrating the relationship between ideological outlook and 
conflict of interests  
 
In society like SA which is characterised by unequal relations of power, ideology can 
be a means by which the dominant group maintains and legitimate their power over 
other groups (Paek & Shah, 2003). Gated communities (GCs) present an ideal 
environment for REAs’ ideological persuasion to bring about COI between REAs’ 
responsibilities to their profession and to their principals. They (GCs) come about for 
different reasons like homogeneity of members and stability of property values 
(Carrasquillo, 2011). Other stated objectives are given as lifestyle (leisure and 
amenities), elite communities (gates symbolises distinction and prestige to protect and 
secure on the social ladder-enclaves for the rich and famous), physical security and 
social security are enhanced by both sameness and controlled access), security zones 
informed by fear of crime and outsiders (is the motivation for defensive fortifications) 
and social values. It is also said that GCs should be seen as a way of targeting a 
specific submarket. This is normally done with an inclusion of a significant recreational 
feature like a golf course, tennis court or a lake (Pager, et al., 2008;  Strahilevitz, 2006). 
But the chosen club goods seem to be meant to deter members of undesirable groups 
from joining the community in question without violating anti-discriminatory laws. As 
shown below, it can also be argued that their formation and marketing by REAs might 
have ideological basis to determine settlement patterns. In the USA, it has been shown 
that brokers can determine how and where specific people buy properties (Baressi, 
1968). REAs are usually members of the communities they serve and are exposed to 
all IO in those communities. They do not only interpret those attitudes and values but 
also substantially contribute to their establishment and perpetuation (Baressi, 1968). 
It has also been shown that REAs have strong opinions concerning their duties to 
protect neighbourhoods by placing buyers in environments based on racial and 
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ethnical characteristics (Baressi, 1968). GCs are also prevalent in Johannesburg 
suburbs (which are suspected to be ideological in origin). Another form of exclusion in 
the same study by Baressi (1968) was barring any potential buyers from making use 
of bank finance to buy in the particular community. 
 
Other anecdotal evidence has led to suspicions that REA’s socio-political ideology 
becomes another factor in real estate transactions, especially in determining where 
new entrants can/cannot buy.  A typical example is the Bassonia case (Mkhondo, 
2013) in the Star newspaper. On the 22/03/2013, the country woke up to newspaper 
article reporting on how in an estate in Bassonia, South of JHB a seller refused to sell 
to a customer of a specific race. It was established that it was an official standpoint of 
the estate management (Mkhondo, 2013). In the USA context, Ondrich, Stricker and 
Yinger (1998) state that REAs believe that minority customers, for instance, prefer 
housing in integrated or largely minority neighbourhoods which may be based on 
inaccurate stereotypes which maybe ideological in origin. 
  
4.5.3: Hypothesis development 
  
Segregation can be seen as another form of an ideology (Gotham, 2000). Real estate 
elites promulgated a segregationist ideology that identified the residential presence of 
blacks with neighbourhoods’ instability and declining property values (Gotham, 2000). 
Gotham (2000) further states that perceived connection between race, place and 
behaviour became an important impetus and justification for maintaining the 
residential separation of races, disinvestments in racially mixed and non-white areas 
and directing investment resources into racially homogeneous all white 
neighbourhoods. Consequently, maintenance of racial homogeneity was meant to 
protect property values. This was found to distort spatial patterns of housing demands 
by whites and minority home buyers in such a way that racial segregation was 
perpetuated and stable integration discouraged (Galster & Erin, 2005). In other 
studies, it was found that REAs actually used other means to perpetuate settlement 
patterns in suburbs. One of the methods REAs were found to use is steering behaviour 
that differentially directed clients toward particular neighbourhoods and away from 
others on the basis of race and ethnicity (Galster & Erin, 2005). Forms of steering were 
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information, segregation, class and editorialising. Steering was used when doing 
house inspection and when recommending properties. Editorialising seemed to be the 
most prevalent sort of white/black steering mechanism (Galster & Erin, 2005).  
 
There are other ways that exclusion in property markets manifested in other countries. 
Some identified methods are differential treatment which occurs when people are 
treated unequally because of their race and disparate impact which occurs when 
individuals are treated equally according to a given set of rules and procedures which 
favour members of one group over the other (Pager & Shepherd, 2008). Individual’s 
ethical ideology influences their ethical judgements (Davis, Andersen & Curtis, 2001). 
Also, ideology has ability to link attitude with action (Goll & Zeitz, 1991). Measuring 
ideological orientation is critical for numerous theoretical propositions in the study of 
behaviour (Davis, et al., 2001). Therefore, the presence of any ideological outlook on 
the REA will be ascertained from their actions. Therefore, the research instrument will 
be based on those behaviours that more likely represent this variable. 
 
Ideological outlook (IO) of any individual find expression in different forms like 
communications with potential buyers, targeting customers for different areas and the 
service levels to these potentials. Discrimination can also be expressed in language 
and tone of the e-mails when communicating with different potential clients (Hanson, 
Hawley & Tylor, 2011; Daniela, 2014). Also, Baressi (1968) states that REAs exercise 
control function in the selection of clients, selection of housing to be shown to 
prospective buyers, prices at which properties are offered for sale, prices at which they 
are sold, and the source and type of mortgage loan the buyer secures.  Their service 
level was found to be correlated to the buyer’s socio-economic status. 
 
REAs have also been known to use target stereotyping which reduces customers to a 
few, simple, essential characteristics which are represented as fixed by nature (Paek 
& Shah, 2003). This would probably lead to COI as the REA might not like selling 
properties to other groups of people. As a practical example, upper market properties 
are normally not advertised in the townships in SA. This clearly conflicts with the best 
interests of the sellers and the potential buyers.  
From the above discussion, the following points can be gleaned:  
 REAs have their own ideological outlook which enters their actions;  
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 REAs help with pricing;  
 REAs decide on the marketing media and who can view which properties;  
 Different languages can be used to market properties; 
 There are possibilities of differential treatment, disparate impact, ethical 
judgements and editorialising; and  
 Some practices can lead to actions that are in conflict with REAs’ professional 
conduct. 
 
Drawing from this discussion, the following hypothesis for the SA REI is posited: 
 
H3: There is a positive relationship between ideological outlook and conflict of 
interests in the South African real estate industry  
 
4.6: IDEOLOGY OF REA AND COMPROMISED PRINCIPAL 
 
The ideology that one holds might lead to certain behaviours, desirable to some and 
undesirable to others. In the process of linking sellers and prospective buyers, REAs 
bring about specialised knowledge which they can structure and use to direct and 
determine the nature and pace of search by potential buyers (Palm, 1985).  Anecdotal 
evidence in the USA suggests that REAs do not always strictly adhere to fair housing 
laws (Toy, 2007). 
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4.6.1: Why this relationship matters 
 
In one study conducted in the USA, it was found that political ideology matters in 
consumer behaviour (Crockett & Wallendorf, 2004). REAs may even decide on the 
people who get to view the property in the market. This would result in a property being 
in the market for a long time. Also, it might lead to delayed deracialization of the SA 
society. In another study, it has been established that REAs sometimes act as 
gatekeepers who channel and control the activities of individuals who sell and buy 
houses (Baressi, 1968). They justified their practices on the basis of social pressure 
exerted by neighbourhood residents, other brokers and mortgage financers (Baressi, 
1968). This was found to distort spatial patterns of housing demands by whites and 
minority home buyers in such a way that racial segregation was perpetuated and 
stable integration discouraged (Galster & Godfrey, 2005). This renders their practices 
to look discriminatory. 
 
4.6.2: Examples to illustrate the importance of the relationship 
 
Evidence exists to prove that blacks pay more for housing than whites in America 
(Wilson, 1979; Palm, 1985). Possibilities exist that brokers may for instance show 
different number of units to potential based upon the client’s race or ethnicity. REAs 
may even decide on the people who get to view the property in the market. This can 
lead to longer TMT or TOM. Longer TOM might lower the degree of optimism on the 
REA’s side as he or she revises his/her assessment of core output (Giat, Hackman & 
Subramanian, 2010). Also, the practices of some REAs can result in eligible black SAs 
settling in less than ideal housing units and neighbourhoods. Clearly, the interests of 
the buyers and sellers are compromised due to the ideological stance of their REAs. 
 
4.6.3: Hypothesis development 
 
As it has been shown above, the IO of the REA can lead to many forms of practices. 
It can for instance lead to white and black customers being shown properties in 
different neighbourhoods to maintain racial segregation (Galster & Godfrey, 2005). 
The ideology of the agent can also lead to information being withheld about availability 
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of units from other races but not from the other groups (Ondrich,  et al., 1998). REAs 
can make gratuitous comments about neighbours in a manner that dissuades or 
encourages home-seekers (Kwate, Goodman, Jackson & Harris, 2013). In anticipation 
of discriminatory treatment, black REAs have been known to concentrate on a niche 
market of black clientele in segregated contexts (Silverman & Patterson, 2011). The 
major problem areas arising out of the REA’s ideological persuasion can thus be 
summarised as follows:  
REAs can decide to not show some customers available properties and thus limiting 
the number of potential buyers (Galster & Godfrey, 2005). Sellers’ optimal asking price 
would decrease when potential buyers bidding heterogeneity decreases (Zheng, 
Deng, Gabriel & Nishimura, 2008). This can also reduce the pool of REAs as black 
REAs choose to work in black neighbourhoods (Silverman & Patterson, 2011). 
Information about certain properties in the market can be withheld. This may lead to 
uninformed decision by buyers and loss of opportunity to sell by owners (Ondrich, et 
al., 1998). The valuation role of REAs can also lead to unintended consequences like 
increasing the TOM of properties by setting high listing prices. As the arrival rate of 
potential buyers decreases, the probability of a listing price reduction increases (Merlo 
& Ortalo-Magne, 2002). Clearly, from the above discussion, it can be seen that REAs 
determine the listing price; the listing price can determine the arrival rate of potential 
buyers; the listing price can also determine the pool of potential buyers; the pool of 
potential buyers can lead to revised asking price; TOM can also be influenced by the 
price and choice of language; and comments and the REAs ideology can influence all 
of the above. 
In the light of the above discussion, the following hypothesis for the SA REI can be 
posited: 
 
H4: There is a positive relationship between ideological outlook and 
compromised principal in the South African real estate industry 
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4.7: CONFLICT OF INTERESTS AND SUBOPTIMAL OUTCOMES 
 
When a seller and a buyer contracts with a REA, they expect certain performance 
standards and outcomes. However, the possibilities of the presence of COI distort the 
link between the contractual expectations and the outcomes. Possible difficulties that 
might arise because of the link between COI and outcomes are given to illustrate the 
importance of this relationship. 
 
4.7.1: Why the relationship between conflict of interests and suboptimal 
outcomes matters 
 
Psychologists tell us that when professional responsibilities clash with self-interests, 
self-interest exert a more automatic influence than do professional responsibilities, 
which are more likely to be involved through controlled processing (Moore & 
Loewenstein, 2004). In addition, Moore, and Loewenstein (2004) conclude that in COI 
situations, self-interest often prevails. Also, extensive research in economics suggests 
that people maximise their payoffs (Hamman, Loewenstein & Weber, 2010). In the 
REI, only one principal (seller principal) pays the commission (Gardiner, et al., 2007). 
This suggests that the buyer principal will generally get less than optimal outcomes. It 
has also been observed that REAs are more willing than owners to accept lower price 
offers in order to reduce TOM (Levit & Syverson, 2008; Rutherford, et al. 2005, Hendel, 
et al. 2008; Zorn & Larsen, 1986). Other studies show that sellers lower their 
reservation price in order to reduce the COI in the effort dimension (Patron & Roskelly, 
2008). Seller principals would end up losing potential income (Patron & Roskelly, 
2008). Similarly, the REA can directly affect the property’s TOM by steering behaviour, 
by exerting less than optimal performance because of hidden action, hidden 
knowledge and motivation. Lastly, the involvement of the REA in the valuation and 
pricing can produce different consequences. It might bring in lower prices which would 
make a loss for the seller. It could also push the price higher resulting in the buyer 
paying premium price for lower valued property. The scenarios given above show the 
importance of any relationship between COI and suboptimal outcomes to both 
principals. 
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4.7.2: Hypothesis development 
 
As shown above, COI occurs when an individual’s personal interests diverge from their 
professional and moral responsibility to others (Cain, et al., 2010). When COI is 
present, it can be argued that it is likely to lead to suboptimal outcomes for one of the 
participants. Based on the discussion on DMS and IO and their influence on COI, the 
following issues can be identified:  
Professional responsibilities are likely to be sacrificed when COI is present. Pricing of 
properties would also be guided by the interests of the REA. Information asymmetry 
(IA) is a big factor and is likely to be perceived by those against whom it is used. 
Information about the progress of both the marketing and registration process will not 
be equally shared between the REA and principals. That is also likely to lead to a 
feeling being unfairly treated when the deal is concluded. Due to both DMS and the 
ideology of the REA, the treatment meted out to the principals will sometimes be 
biased in favour of one party to the deal and the quality of service to one of the 
principals would be compromised. Service quality can be defined as adjustment 
according to the specifications of the customer, how well the service meets and 
exceeds the customer’s expectations on reliability, responsiveness, assurance, 
empathy, and tangibles (Crosby, 1979; McDaniel & Louagand, 1994).   Providing 
customers with excellent levels of service quality is on the minds of those in Real 
Estate Brokerage Industry (Seiler & Reisenwitz, 2010). 
 
The level of perceived service quality rendered would lead to negative post-sale 
feelings. According to McDaniel and Louagand (1994), customers look at service 
process (professionalism and guidance), service outcomes (quick sale of a house), 
quality of service and customer satisfaction evaluation. In the present study, COI will 
be assessed by looking at the presence of dual representations and the interests of 
the two principals (Palma, et al., 2014), information disclosure to principals (Palma, 
Ferreira, Vilaca & Assis, 2014), convergence of the interests of the REA, buyer and 
seller principals and TOM (Rutherford, Anaza & Phillips, 2012). Outcomes from the 
agency mandate can be judged on the requirements of the original instructions. For 
the seller principal, income can be used as a measure of sales success/performance 
(Hunt & Chonko, 1984; Coolsby & Hunt, 1992). Service outcomes can be measured 
in both financial and non-financial outcomes and that financial ones are influenced by 
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non-financial outcomes (Bell & Simon, 2008). According to Fitzgerald, Johnston, 
Brignall, Silverstro and Vos (1991), there are two key types of performance/outcomes 
measures which are those associated with results (competitiveness and financial 
performance) and those associated with determinants of results (quality, flexibility, 
resource use and innovation). Recommended outcomes measures for purposes of 
this study are TOM, transaction lead times, costs of service, conveyancing services 
delivery, and conformance to requirements (Hult, Ketchen, Cavusgil & Calantonel, 
2006; Narasimhan & Das, 2001).  
As mentioned earlier, the main activities for the REA can broadly be given as 
valuations and marketing properties. On the valuation role, known problems include 
REAs who are generally not trained to do valuations and that valuations would yield 
different results for long-term investors from short-term ones (Edelstein & Qian, 2011). 
Ideal outcomes of a transaction to the REA are faster sale and high revenue, satisfied 
principal, shortest possible TOM (less costly on their marketing budgets), repeat 
business possibilities and a good market reputation. 
  
In the light of the discussion on the relationship between COI and outcomes, the 
following hypothesis for the SA REI is posited: 
 
H5: There is a positive relationship between conflict of interests and sub-optimal 
outcomes in the South African real estate industry 
 
4.8: COMPROMISED PRINCIPAL AND SUBOPTIMAL OUTCOMES 
 
The relationships between all the combinations discussed so far have actually implied 
this one. As a result, the present relationship will be much briefer compared to all the 
others. However, the discussion will follow similar format as before. 
 
4.8.1: Why the relationship matters 
 
Whenever any party to a deal has been compromised, the outcomes are more likely 
to be unfavourable to that party. Whenever a buyer principal’s interests are 
compromised, it might involve a loss of huge amounts of money as he is likely to be 
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saddled with a huge bond for many years. He would be disadvantaged on potential 
savings if the REA’s valuation and setting of list price results in overpricing. Also, he 
may end up staying for the rest of his life in a suburb not very suitable to his conditions. 
In the case of a compromised seller principal, they might end up with a transaction 
price lower than what the property is worth and thus lose out on potential income. 
Suboptimal outcomes are not only limited to the buyer principal.  
To fully appreciate the role of the REA and how it affects the industry, it is imperative 
to revisit how PA relationships affect each principal’s interests. The REA has basically 
three main responsibilities to the seller, namely; valuation role, marketing role and 
concluding the transaction. To the buyer, the responsibilities are to assist with finding 
available properties in the market at the best price, assisting with price negotiations, 
mortgage applications and concluding the deal. He/she plays a central role in the real 
estate market both as an agent providing the principals (seller or buyer) with 
information about the prevailing market conditions and as a middleman matching the 
sellers with buyers. Challenges come about as a result of the different expectations 
and approaches of buyers and sellers to the transaction. Generally, both buyers and 
sellers are infrequent market participants and they are not informed of the demand 
and supply conditions in the housing market (Arnold, 1992). Therefore, ample 
opportunities exist for practices that might lead to suboptimal outcomes for all the 
principals in a property deal.  
 
4.8.2: Hypothesis development 
 
It is generally accepted that REI is a repeat contract and referral industry. A customer 
coming back as a seller is very important and the buyer is more likely to be the repeat 
customer and sellers often leave the area (Seiler & Reisenwitz, 2010). Satisfied 
customers give referrals and repeat business. Residential buyer is a part of the agent’s 
community. 
 
H6: There is a positive relationship between compromised principal and 
suboptimal outcomes 
 
The above hypotheses can be summarised as shown below.  
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4.9: HYPOTHESES SUMMARY 
 
The hypotheses developed above for the SA REI can be summarised as follows: 
 H1: There is a positive relationship between dual mandate system and conflict 
of interests in the South African real estate industry; 
 H2: There is a positive relationship between dual mandate system and 
compromised principal in the South African real estate industry; 
 H3: There is a positive relationship between ideological outlook and conflict of 
interests in the South African real estate industry; 
 H4: There is a positive relationship between ideological outlook and 
compromised principal in the South African real estate industry; 
 H5: There is a positive relationship between conflict of interests and sub-optimal 
outcomes in the South African real estate industry; and 
 H6: There is a positive relationship between compromised principal and 
suboptimal outcomes. 
 
4.10: CHAPTER 4 SUMMARY  
 
In this chapter, model development was achieved by first dividing the variables into 
predictor, mediator and outcome variables and briefly discussing them. After the 
discussion, the linkages and pathways for the different proposed relationships were 
also suggested. The chapter closed with a summary of all the hypotheses proposed 
in the study. The above model would need to be checked and tested using rigorous 
scientific procedures in order to make informed conclusions and suggestions to 
stakeholders in the property industry. It is also very important for possible curriculum 
development for future participants in the industry. The next chapter will concentrate 
on the methodology of the research to be followed to test the hypotheses given in this 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND DESIGN 
  
5.1: INTRODUCTION 
 
At this stage of the study, it would be prudent to restate the main objectives of the 
dissertation. They are as follows:  
 To investigate whether DMS positively/negatively influence COI  
 To investigate whether DMS positively/negatively influence CP,  
 To investigate whether IO positively/negatively influence COI,  
 To investigate whether IO positively/negatively influence CP,  
 To investigate whether COI positively/negatively influence OT and finally 
 To investigate whether CP positively/negatively influence OT. 
  
Leedy and Omrod (2005) describe research as the systematic process of collecting 
and analysing information to increase our understanding of the phenomenon being 
studied. Knowledge of research methodology is essential for both conducting research 
as well as determining the sound value of the findings from published studies (Turner, 
Balmer & Coverdale, 2013). The direct link between the objectives and the research 
methodology will be highlighted in this chapter. The chapter also includes highlighting 
the differences between the two main philosophies of research and developing a 
research design. Research design (RD) is described as a master plan specifying the 
methods and procedures for collecting and analysing the needed information 
(Zikmund, 1997). The main issues to be covered in this subsection can be summarised 
as per the diagram below in Figure 5.1.   
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Figure 5.1: Main concepts in research (Own sources) 
 
The discussion on the main concepts will be followed by the application of these 
concepts to the present study. This is aimed at clarifying exactly how the research 
proceeded from this chapter. Properly following a research method should ensure that 
the research findings are correct or the probability of the findings being incorrect is 
sufficiently low (Venable & Boskerville, 2012). 
 
5.2: RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
   
Research philosophy is sometimes referred to as research paradigm (Shah & Gorley, 
2006). All research methods are designed to create new and truthful knowledge but 
they may differ in their fitness for purpose (Venkatesh, Brown & Bala, 2013). Decisions 
on which one to follow should be based on the research question, purpose of the study 
and the context of the study (Ventakesh, et al., 2013). The maxim of a pragmatic 
theoretical perspective is that the methodology and methods should be selected based 
on their ability to answer the research questions and fulfil the aims of the study 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Cornish & Gillepsie, 2009). There are two major 
philosophies of research approaches, namely; qualitative and quantitative approaches 
Research 
methodology
Research 
philosophy
Quantitative Qualitative
Research 
design
Sampling 
design
Scope
Target 
popuplation
Sampling frame
Sampling 
method
Sample size
Quesitionnare 
design
Data collection 
technique
Data coding
Data analysis 
approach
SEM
CFA PM
HT
MF
112 
 
(Bauma, Ling & Wilkinson 2012:105). These two philosophies have two distinct 
epistemologies, namely; positivism and interpretative. In order to give the rationale of 
the choice of approach, a brief description of each is given below. 
 
5.2.1: Quantitative approach 
 
Quantitative research falls within the philosophical underpinning of positivism 
(Easterly-Smith, 1997). Positivist researchers have as a goal the identification of 
regularities which have law-like causal effects on the actions of individuals (Fischer, 
1990). Positivists adopt a clear quantitative approach to investigating phenomena 
(Easterly-Smith, 1997). A positivist holds that human action is determined by the 
situation in which people find themselves (Donaldson, 1997). Their methods focus on 
measuring a limited set of objective variables and changes across time (Donaldson, 
1997). They believe in concepts of objective reality (Jirojwong, Johnson & Welch, 
2014), the possibility to focus on objective reality within the world (Burns, 2014; Sharp, 
McDonald, Sim, Knamiller, Sefton & Wong, 2011). Furthermore, in a positivist 
approach, a scientific explanation is expressed in formal propositions so that the rules 
of formal logic can be applied (Lee, 1991). Quantitative research attempts to establish 
statistically significant relationships, addresses questions by measuring and 
describing, is based on objective measurements and observation, is concerned with 
correlations and causations (Hamer & Collinson, 2014). This approach is based on the 
use of numbers and uses surveys and other numeric data and is a means for testing 
objective theories by examining the relationships among variables (Simpson, Dickson 
& Greenblatt, 2005; Polit & Hungler, 2013; Moxham, 2012). In addition, Gay, Mills and 
Airasian (2006) emphasise that quantitative research uses methods to collect 
numerical data in order to explain, predict or test statistical hypotheses. Under this 
approach, quantitative and measurable data are obtained through methods like 
survey, observation, experiment and simulations. Measurement and scaling are the 
two main concepts used in defining and analysing the data (Luigi, Oana, Mihai & 
Simona, 2012). Quantitative research involves the collection and quantification of data 
(Babbie, 1998; Burns & Grove 2009; De Villiers & Van der Walt 2009); and cause and 
effect in relationships can be identified using this approach (Bell, 2003). The 
researcher decides in advance what factors (variables) might cause certain results 
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and then carries out a test to either support or reject the null hypothesis (Bell, 2003). 
A variable is a factor that can be changed or controlled in an experiment (Wong, 2014). 
A dependent variable is a variable which is hypothesised to depend on or be caused 
by another. A hypothesis is a statement or a predicted relationship between variables 
under study (Polit & Hungler, 2013). Null hypothesis predict no relationship between 
the variables (White & Miller, 2014, Wright-St Clair, et al., 2014). In the present study, 
all the hypotheses will be tested using this approach. 
 
5.2.2: Qualitative approach 
 
Qualitative research approach is underpinned by the following theoretical perspective, 
namely; the constructivist-interpretive perspective. Researchers who fall under this 
general classification rely on participants’ views to understand human’s world 
experience (hermeneutics) (Liamputtong, 2013). Qualitative researchers use the 
critical approach to issues. Those who operate under this paradigm see themselves 
as agents of change interested in social construction of experiences (Borbasi & 
Jackson, 2012). In addition, qualitative researchers operate in what is usually referred 
to as Post-structural/Postmodern paradigm. This paradigm came about as a reaction 
to the radical objectives of the quantitative type. A researcher seeks to understand 
people through their lived experiences and is concerned with issues like culture, 
gender, power and oppression (Borbasi, et al., 2012). Qualitative research also 
concerns itself with issues of feminism which is interest in women issues. Qualitative 
research can be said to fall within five main designs, namely; phenomenology, 
ethnography, grounded theory, historical methods and case study (Ingham-
Broomsfield, 2014). Leedy (1993) describes this approach as the one that is field-
focused. Hoffman and Bennett (2013) describe it as being based on people’s 
experiences and is not oversimplified and subsumed into a number or statistic. The 
basis of qualitative research is inductive reasoning wherein a researcher moves from 
specific to general to end up with general conclusions or theories (Jirojwong, Johnson 
& Welch, 2011; Burns & Grove, 2009). Open-ended questions can be used if the 
researcher is not certain on how the respondents will answer questions. Participative 
observation tends to be the mainstay of this method (Bell, 2003). A qualitative 
researcher may use self-reporting tools and observations (Polit & Hungler, 2013). 
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Qualitative research data is unstructured data collected through methods and 
techniques like focus groups interviews, in-depth interviews and projective techniques 
(Luigi, Oana, Mihai & Simona, 2012). In addition, Gay, et al. (2006) state that 
qualitative research is the collection, analysis and interpretation of narrative data in 
order to gain insight into a particular phenomenon of interest. It is mostly used to verify 
and validate assumptions (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). A typical product of a qualitative 
research is rich description (Turner, Balmer & Coverdale, 2013). Given below are 
some research methods used under qualitative research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Methods used by qualitative researchers (Ingham-Broomsfield, 2014). 
 
Justifications for choosing quantitative over qualitative approach for the present study 
follow. 
 
5.2.3: Rationale for choosing Quantitative over Qualitative approach  
 
Bell (2003) argues that the two methods can complement each other. In some 
instances, one can do an exploratory study when the study is expected to yield a 
continual evolution of the methodology as and when issues arise to necessitate a new 
study (Bell, 2003). However, certain considerations were taken into account to come 
to a decision to use a quantitative approach. Fischer (1990) states that positivist 
inquiry has considerably more to offer than interpretive inquiry when regularities occur 
which are unintended consequences of human action or inaction. This study is aimed 
at supporting policy-making in government and academic institutions through 
predicting practices within the industry (Sharp, McDonald, Sim, Knamiller, Sefton & 
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Wong, 2011). It is hoped that scientific knowledge boundaries in the REI will be 
extended as a result of this study (Easterly-Smith, 1997). Another consideration is that 
causal relationships between variables identified can be verified or disputed (Easterly-
Smith, 1997). Due to limited resources and time, only the quantitative approach is 
deemed feasible. The outcomes will lead to a report that can be statistically analysed 
objectively. Also, quantitative research can be used to discover the cause and effect 
relationships; it is a value-free research, allows situation/performance to reveal itself 
and the researcher remain objective (De Villiers & Van der Walt, 2009). Qualitative 
research is also time consuming and less scientific when compared with its 
quantitative counterpart (Mukhopadhyay & Gupta, 2014). 
 
5.3: RESEARCH DESIGN (RD)  
 
Research is characterised by a systematic approach to information gathering to 
answer questions which is contrary to those approaches which employ intuition, expert 
advice or follow tradition. As highlighted in Figure 5.1, RD forms an integral part of any 
research. Clarity in the RD allows the reader to determine the methodological 
soundness (Bordage, 2001). Different authors have defined research design in 
different ways, which helps enriching our understanding of this concept. 
 
Van Wyk (2012) refers to research design as the overall plan for connecting the 
conceptual research problems to the pertinent (and achievable) empirical research. 
He further states that the research design articulates what data are required, what 
methods are going to be used to collect and analyse this data, and how all of this is 
going to answer the research question.  In addition, Macnee and McCabe (2008:195) 
define research design as being the overall plan for acquiring new knowledge or 
confirming existing knowledge. Kerlinger (1996) describes RD as a plan and structure 
of investigating so conceived to get answers to research questions. Hoffman and 
Bennett (2005) define RD as the master plan for the research study. Gall and Borg 
(1999) have defined research design as the details showing how the research will be 
conducted. Pellissier (2010) describes RD as referring to different frameworks such 
as experiments, survey, cohort studies, case studies or comparative studies designed 
to collect and analyse the data. Polit and Beck (2012:58) and Burns and Grove 
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(2011:251) describe research design as the overall plan for obtaining answers to the 
research question, and a blueprint for conducting a study.  
  
RD also takes care of such issues as sampling design, questionnaire design, data 
collection techniques and data analysis approaches. The sampling design stage is 
concerned with what the target population will be the sampling frame, the scope of the 
research, sample sizes and the sampling methods (De Vos, 2002:137). RD will be 
composed of sampling design, questionnaire design, data collection techniques and 
data analysis approach as discussed below. Also, survey method of research was 
used in the study. According to De Vos (2011), Burns and Grove (2009), De Villiers 
and Van der Walt (2009), the approach offers a number of advantages.   
 
Quantitative research approach helps researchers to get complete and accurate 
information about a phenomenon through observation, description and classification. 
It also provides a picture of situations as they naturally happen as the designs   
examine variables in a natural environment. However, this approach does not include 
researcher-designed treatments and interventions. It may also be used to identify 
problems with current practice and level of the problem, justify current practice, make 
judgments or determine what others in similar situations are doing. It is easier and less 
expensive to conduct; and offers short testing period and minimal drop out 
possibilities.  
 
Under the quantitative approach, decisions are made with the coldness of a steel ruler. 
The researcher decides in advance what factors (variables) might cause certain 
results and then carries out a test to either support or reject the null hypothesis (Bell, 
2003). Bell (2003) further emphasises the same fact that cause and effect relationship 
can be identified using this approach. Creswell (2013) indicates that the inquirer also 
decides on a type of study within quantitative selected approach that provides specific 
direction for procedures in a research design. Creswell (2013) further states that 
survey research includes cross-sectional and longitudinal studies using 
questionnaires or interviews for data collection. Structured questionnaires were used 
in this study. 
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5.3.1: Research method for the study 
 
Research method refers to design techniques, and it includes survey, experiment, 
observation and secondary data study. Zikmund (1997) indicates that the objectives 
of the study, the available data sources, the urgency of the decision and cost of 
obtaining the data will determine design technique to be used. Zikmund (1997) further 
states that the most common method of generating primary data is through surveys. 
Therefore, survey technique was used for this research.  
  
The information required was gathered from a sample of people by use of 
questionnaires.  Zikmund (1997) further states that determining the list of questions, 
and designing the exact format of written questionnaire is crucial in this regard. A 
researcher could choose to contact respondents by telephone, mail, or contact them 
in person. All but one of the respondents in the study was contacted personally. 
Turner, et al. (2013) contend that the quality of any survey research is dependent on 
the quality of the survey instrument, representativeness of the sample and the 
response rate. The respondents were selected as per sampling approach given below. 
Like any human construct, the survey method has advantages and disadvantages. 
So, a researcher’s task is to find the most appropriate way to collect the information 
needed. 
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5.3.2: Sampling design 
 
Figure 5.3 below summarizes the relationship between population and sampling and 
also gives important issues in sampling. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Important sampling issues (Levit & Rubin; Creswell, 2011; Kenkel, 1996). 
  
Before discussing sampling, it is proper to introduce the superset which is the 
population. Population can be defined as all the individuals who possess the 
information one needs and who make responses meaningful (Alreck, 1985); source 
from which the data are to be collected (Zikmund, 1997); all items that have been 
chosen for a study (Levin & Rubin, 1991); the entire group of persons or objects that 
is of interest to the researcher or meets the criteria that the researcher is studying 
(Brink, 1996) and as a set or collection of all possible observations of some specific 
characteristic (Kenkel, 1996). 
 
Sampling is concerned with selecting individuals (from the population) who are 
available and can be studied (Creswell, 2011; Mathew & Ross, 2010). Therefore, a 
sample can be seen as a portion of a population (Kenkel, 1996); a subset of the 
population selected so as to be representative of the entire population in order to 
reduce costs, time and manpower required when conducting a study (Achaya, 
Prakash, Jaxena & Nigam, 2013). In addition, a sample refers to the number of 
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elements to be included in the study that meets the criteria of representativeness and 
adequacy (Singh, 1998).  A sample also refers to the fewer cases that will best enable 
the researcher to explore the research questions and theoretical ideas (Creswell, 
2011). It has to be mentioned as well that by using samples, the precision of the 
measurement is decreased (Galanis, 2012) and that a sample ‘representativeness’ 
depends on the sampling method, sample size and the response rate (Achaya, et al., 
2013). 
 
Sampling defined/described 
 
According to Zikmund (1997:414), sampling is done to enable researchers to estimate 
some unknown characteristics of the population. In addition, Kadame (2012) suggests 
that sampling permits the concentration of resources on a few items and doing a more 
adequate job of examining those items. When doing sampling, one has to consider 
what is sampled, where is it located, how are the cases are selected and why they are 
selected (Uprichard, 2013). Sampling has been defined in many different ways. It has 
been defined as the technique of examining a few items from a large group of items 
with the purpose of inferring something about the group (Kadame, 2012). Furthermore, 
sampling also defined as the systematic approach of selecting a few elements from 
an entire collection of data in order to make some inferences about the total collection 
and a portion chosen from the population (Levin, et al., 1991). Similarly, it is the 
process of using a small number of items or parts of a larger population to make 
conclusions about the whole population (Zikmund, 1997: 413), a selection of some 
cases, a subset or some part (sample) from a larger group of potential cases 
(population-finite or universe infinite) (Ross & Mathew, 2010) and as a selection of the 
elements of the population so that the researcher can draw conclusions about that 
population (Berndt & Petzer, 2011). Grafstrom (2010) gives further information on how 
a sample should be.  It should be efficient, easy to implement and have large entropy 
to be generalisable. The main issues under sampling are sampling approaches, 
sampling strategy, sampling frame, sample size and sample error in survey research 
(Bryman, 2009; Gilbert, 2008; Seale, 2004). 
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Sampling frame 
 
Sampling frame (also called working population) is concerned with the list of all 
possible units to be sampled which is in turn influenced by what is known (or not 
known) about them (Uprichard, 2013). It is the list of elements from which the sample 
may be drawn, the subjects of study and the research environment (Zikmund, 1997; 
Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991; Young, Wang & SU 2006). In addition, Kadame (2013) 
defines it as the population to be sampled from and that about which inferences are to 
be drawn. For the present study, the sampling frame was all the REAs, buyers and 
sellers of the properties that have been registered at the deeds offices in the City of 
Johannesburg. 
 
Sample size for the study  
  
The sample size is the number of subjects from whom data will be collected and drawn 
from the population (Kumar, 2005). It is all the elements that will be included in the 
study. When deciding on sample size, trade-offs have to be made on such concerns 
as cost of time and finance, the potential for sample bias and analytical objectives 
(DiGaetano & Waksberg, 2002). The sample size influences the accuracy of 
estimation and a large sample can help minimise sampling errors and improve 
generalisability of research findings (Young, Wang & SU, 2006). Because conclusions 
for the research will be extrapolated from the sample results, it is important to ensure 
that the sample size is representative of the population (Galpin, 2013). According to 
Kumar, Aaker and Day (2002), four factors determine the sample size: the number of 
groups within the sample, the value of the information and the accuracy required of 
the results, the cost of the sample, and the variability of the population. Having 
considered Kumar, et al.’s (2002) suggestions, this study randomly selected a sample 
for the study made up of 75 REAs from at least 20 REFs, 75 buyers and 75 sellers. 
This can be justified by the number of companies actively advertising in the targeted 
areas. There are about 30 major REFs and few smaller ones. It estimated that the 
major firms employ about 20 REAs. Therefore, the sample size caters for about 65% 
of the population. 
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Sampling technique 
 
There are different approaches to sampling. For purposes of this study, a brief 
discussion for the different approaches will be given before the researcher’s choice is 
given and justified. Sampling techniques are further subdivided into two categories. 
They are probability and non-probability sampling (Blaxter, Hughes & Tight, 2008; 
Zikmund 1997). In both techniques, some knowledge of the population is required from 
the onset and these approaches do not differ in where they commence but on where 
they end (Uprichard, 2013). One of the major differences between these techniques 
is that in probability sampling, knowledge of the sample can be used to extend the 
knowledge about the population and in the non-probability sampling cases are 
sampled not necessarily to know more about the population, but to extend and deepen 
existing knowledge about the sample itself (Uprichard, 2013). Probability sampling as 
developed by Neyman (1934) has a very specific framework for making inferences 
about a population (Brick, 2011). It assumes that a frame of all units in the population 
can be constructed and that every unit in the frame has a positive probability of being 
selected into the sample (Brick, 2011). Zikmund (1997) indicates that under probability 
sampling, every member of the population has a non-zero probability of being selected 
for a study. Probability sampling can further be subdivided into differing categories 
which are as follows:  
 Simple random sampling in which all elements have an equal probability of 
being selected (Levin, et al., 1991; Galanis, 2012); and 
 Systematic sampling in wherein elements are selected from a population at a 
uniform interval that can be measured in time, order, space et cetera (Levin, et 
al., 1991). Minimal knowledge of the population is required and normally result 
in high costs, sampling errors, internal and external validity (Achaya, et al., 
2013);  
 Stratified sampling wherein the population is divided into relative homogeneous 
subgroups (each group has a small variations within the strata and wide 
variation between them) called strata (Levin, et al., 1991). Strata are supposed 
to have different heterogeneity (Kadame, 2013); and  
 Cluster sampling wherein the population is divided into groups called clusters 
and the sample selection is done randomly from each clusters (Levin, et al., 
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1991). Examples of clusters would be geography, wards and blocks (Achaya, 
et al., 2013). 
 
In non-probability sampling, the chances of any particular member of the population 
to be chosen are unknown and depend on the personal judgment of the researcher 
(Zikmund, 1997). This can be based on the experience of the researcher or the 
purpose of the study. For this study, a stratified random sampling, which is a subset 
of probability sampling, was used for the following reasons and rationale is provided 
below. The study sought to gain insight into three distinct groups when a property 
transaction is completed. It also sought to check how the two predictor variables affect 
buyers and sellers and how the outcomes of the intervening variables influence the 
perception of buyers, sellers and REAs. The final results needed to be analysed 
having those clusters in mind. The questionnaires had to be filled in at respondents’ 
offices, homes, shopping malls, restaurants and at car washes. In order to minimise 
selection bias, every person approached, who was willing to participate, was invited. 
 
5.3.3: Data collection approach and methods 
 
In research, data should be seen as pieces to a jigsaw puzzle and the resultant data 
analysis as the strategy to putting the pieces together (Salkind, 1997). Data collection 
refers to the collection of useful information to answer the pertinent question and 
where to find it. In order to effectively select the data, one needs to appreciate the fact 
that the data exist within a population. The variables that are measured are the 
determining factors for the choice of measurement methodology (Kumar, et al., 2002). 
Data collection and the integrity of the data were treated as non-negotiable. This was 
done to restrict the findings to those who meet the standard (Fink, 2013). Data 
collection techniques are to a large extent determined by the research philosophy 
adopted for a study. Examples of techniques for a qualitative study as given by Allen-
Meares and Lane (1990) are interviews, direct structured observations, direct non-
structured observations, routine records, field notes, ecological descriptions, et cetera. 
All these techniques have advantages and disadvantages. In the present study, the 
quantitative approach was followed. Allen-Meares and Lane (1990) further give the 
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following as examples of techniques that can be used. Their advantages and 
disadvantages are also given in Table 5.1 below. 
Under observations, the data collector operationally defines and categorises critical 
variables in person-environment relationships. Use of observation codes and checklist 
and rating scales to check presence/absence of certain variables can be used. One 
can also make use of performance records when using observation data collection 
techniques. A researcher can also use the questionnaire method. Under broad 
category, the data collector can also use check-lists, rating scales and can also use 
open-ended questions and respondents can provide variety of information about 
personal feelings attitudes and interests. 
 
Another research instrument is by use of tests. Under this technique, a formal test is 
used to obtain systematic standardised data related to intelligence, achievements, 
personality, interests and values. Researchers are also allowed to make use of routine 
records. Under this approach, written material that is made regularly to describe 
specific aspects of on-going operations is used as a source of information. Systematic 
quantitative data can thus be obtained from these records by using content analysis. 
Given in Table 5.3 are the advantages and disadvantages of the different data 
collection techniques as given by Allan-Meares and Lane (1990), followed by the 
justification for the choice taken for the present study.  
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Data collection 
technique 
Advantages Disadvantages 
   
Observation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Identifies conduct that can 
otherwise be overlooked 
  
 Yields authentic data through 
direct cognition 
 
 
 Loss of perspective by the 
researcher may result due to too 
much involvement  
 Limitation of data due to 
predefined categories in order to 
understand the environment 
understudy 
 
Questionnaires  Can be administered quickly and 
without difficulty  
 Facilitates the simple acquisition of 
data from a large number of 
respondents in geographically 
dissimilar locations 
 
 
 May have vague and poorly 
worded questions which may be 
problematic;  
 Return rates can be low, thus 
having negative effects on the 
representativeness of the sample. 
Tests  Can be conducted online and 
cheaply. Results are easy to 
compare between different 
respondents  
 
 
 Only ideal for people who can 
follow instructions to generate 
responses.  
 Can easily miss other valuable 
information about respondents 
Routine records  It is an objective way of data 
gathering. Information is easily 
available 
 
 
 Records can be falsified  
 It can also be difficult to gain 
access to certain sensitive 
information 
   
  
Figure 5.4: Advantages and disadvantages of different data capturing approaches 
 
As mentioned earlier, the technique that was used to collect data in this study was the 
questionnaire. The reasons for the choice are ease of administration, low cost 
associated with the approach, easy access and availability of statistical packages for 
data analysis after data have been captured in the questionnaire format and record 
keeping after the data have been captured and analysed. The questionnaire was 
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composed of mostly original questions based on the variables identified in studies that 
deal with constructs used in the research model. 
  
5.3.4: Characteristics of the data collection instrument 
 
Almost all researchers use some form of questionnaires as a data collection 
mechanism. Planning of a questionnaire is perhaps the most important stage in a 
survey development (Edwards, 2010; Webb, 2000). Initial consideration when 
designing the questionnaire are the type of information required, the nature of 
respondents who are to be surveyed, the type of method by which the survey is to be 
administered and the questionnaire must fully answer all the data requirements that 
has been stipulated in the research objectives (Webb, 1998). Questionnaire design 
induces the process of translating the broad objectives of the survey into questions 
that can obtain the required information (Morisky, Ang & Krousel-wood, 2008; Morisky, 
Green & Levine, 1986). According to Miller and Read (1998), a good questionnaire 
should meet research objectives, obtain valid and reliable data from the respondents, 
facilitate the interviewing task and subsequent data processing and achieve and 
maintain the involvement of respondents (Webb, 2000: 198). Zikmund (1997) states 
that relevance (information to resolve the research problem) and accuracy (information 
is reliable and valid) of questionnaire is critical for research objectives to be achieved. 
Therefore, attention was given to validity and reliability of the instrument.  
 
Both reliability and validity relate to the logic and accuracy of a test (Wilckens, 2010). 
In particular, reliability refers to the extent to which an instrument or procedure 
produces similar results under constant conditions (Bell, 2003). It is the degree to 
which instrument measures are free from error. This also emphasises the issue of 
repeatability (Bell, 2003). A questionnaire is reliable when it provides consistent 
measures in all comparable situations and over time and it achieves validity when it is 
capable of measuring what it purports to observe or measure (Remenyi, Williams, 
Money, & Swartz, 1998). Reliability requires better comparable experiments, while 
validity asks the question as to whether the instrument is tailored to appropriately 
answer the questions being asked; that is, if the experiment is valid in logical terms 
(Wilckens, 2010).      
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Validity refers to whether the instrument measures what it is supposed to measure 
and it includes convergent correlation with other measures, agreement with other 
researchers, and the degree to which the measure confirms a network of hypotheses 
(Zikmund, 1997). The reliable and valid measurement of a construct is the main goal 
of measurement model development (Krizman, 2011). This is to ensure that the study 
is on a sound scientific basis. Bauma, Ling and Wilkinson (2012) define external 
validity as to how closely the variables produce scores or observations that are 
consistent with what is observed in real life. As per Brassington and Pettitt (2005)’s 
recommendations, the following issues shown below were taken considered. 
Questions were simplified due to the assumed education level of respondents; 
questions were in line with the research method and objectives; research questions 
were phrased as to aid analysis and minimize errors; and lastly the number and 
wording of the questions were geared to encourage accurate and full responses. 
 
5.3.5: Measuring reliability 
 
Three methods of measuring reliability were used in this study, namely; Cronbach’s 
Alpha test (Cronbach α), Composite Reliability test (CR) and Average Value Extracted 
(AVE) test. Composite reliability measures internal coherence of all indicators related 
to the construct (Krizman, 2011). The cut-off point for the Cronbach’s Alpha will be 0.7 
(Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). All values from 0.7 upwards will 
have proven reliability. The internal reliability of each construct was evaluated using 
the Composite Reliability (CR) index test. Composite Reliability index value that is 
greater than 0.7 depicts an adequate internal consistency of the construct (Nunnally, 
1978; Hair & Clarke, 2006). The overall amount of variances in the indicators is 
supposed to be accounted for by the latent construct (Fraering & Minor, 2006). The 
following formulae were used to calculate reliability values: 
 CRη= (Σλyi)2/[(Σλyi)2+(Σεi)](square of the summation of the factor 
loadings)/{(square of the summation of the factor loadings)+(summation of error 
variances)} the resultant coefficient is similar to that of Cronbach's α. 
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5.3.6: Measuring validity 
 
If there are validity issues, it implies that the variables do not correlate well with each 
other within their parent factor. Therefore, the latent factor is not well explained by its 
observed variables. If there is no discriminate validity, it means that variables correlate 
more highly with variables outside of the parent factor than with variables within their 
parent factors. That implies that the latent factor is better explained by some other 
variables. Two types of validity, namely; the convergent and discriminant validity were 
ensured. Convergent validity is the extent to which the scale correlates with other 
measures in the same construct (Krizman, 2011). Convergent validity was assessed 
by checking if individual item loadings for each corresponding research construct was 
above the recommended value of 0.5 (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). On the contrary, 
the evaluation of whether the correlations among latent constructs are less than 1.0 
was conducted to check on the discriminant validity of the research constructs. The 
recommended cut-off point is 0.7 (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). 
This can also be confirmed by checking if the AVE value was greater than the highest 
shared variance (S.V.) value (Fornell & Larcker 1981). The third method that will be 
used to confirm the existence of discriminant validity is the Chi-square difference in all 
two-factor (that is, any paired latent constructs). CFA tests which restricted the factor 
inter-correlations to unity were also used (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). In addition, 
SPSS 21.0 and AMOS 21.0 software were utilised as our analytic tools. The following 
formulae will be used to calculate for validity: Vη=Σλyi2/(Σλyi2+Σεi) {(summation of 
the squared of factor loadings)/{(summation of the squared of factor loadings) + 
(summation of error variances)}. 
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5.3.7: Development of the data collection instrument 
 
In the present study, a new research instrument based on the variables studied by 
other researchers and where applicable, an existing instrument was modified and 
additional questions to answer industry specific issues were included. The scale of 
choice will be a seven point Likert scale. The structure of the questionnaires was as 
per Annexure E. All items in the questionnaire were original and the framing thereof 
was done in accordance with the main concepts associated with the variables under 
study in literature. Those concepts and their sources are also given in Table 5.2 below. 
 
 
Source Concept Variable Item  Questions/Statement 
  1.Dual mandate 
system 
  
Pam Goldings 
Rawson 
properties 
Chas Everitt 
 
Sole mandate, 
 
 
 
 
Exclusivity, 
Representation 
 
Multilisting 
service 
 
Industry 
practices 
 
One agent is 
the go-
between 
 
 
 
Lack of outside 
assistance 
Commission 
sharing/lack 
Written sole mandate 
(SM) 
Views on sole mandate 
 
 
Involvement of REAs in 
initial valuations 
 
Check on whether 
others were involved in 
the deal 
 
Exclusive 
representation of the 
buyer 
 
Exclusive 
representation for both 
parties 
 
Confirmation question 
for DMS 
DMS1  
 
DMS2 
 
 
DMS3  
 
 
DMS4 
 
 
 
DMS5 
 
 
 
DMS6 
 
 
 
DMS7 
 
 
 
DMS8 
 
Instruction to market the property was 
given to one real estate agent 
Giving instruction to one agent is the best 
way to sell a property 
 
Initial valuation of the property was done 
by the agent/agent’s firm 
 
More than one real estate agent was used 
to sell in this transaction 
 
 
The instructed agent/firm acted for the 
buyer in the present transaction 
 
 
Offers for the sale of this property were 
presented by the listing agent 
 
 
None of the transacting parties received 
any other assistance for this sale 
 
 
Only the instructed agent received 
commission for the deal 
 
  2.Ideological 
outlook  
  
     
Marina, 2014;Goll 
& Zeitz, 1992 
 Carrero, Negri, 
Castelli & 
Pastore, 2014 
Chin, Hambrinck 
& Trevino, 2013  
Sense of 
responsibility 
 
Convictions, 
beliefs and 
values,    
 
. 
Actions 
  
Sense of responsibility 
 
 
Association of people 
with certain features 
 
 
 
Ideology is related to 
actions 
IO1 
 
IO2 
 
 
It is important for the agent to fulfil his/her 
responsibility to the principal 
 
 
The agent who sold this property can 
accurately predict a client ‘s preferences 
in a housing deal    
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Daniela, 2014. 
 
 
Jost, 
2006;Roseberg, 
1956 
Chin et al, 2013 
 
Daniela, 2014 
 
Marina, 2014 
 
 
 
Source of 
ideology 
 
 
Manifestation 
 
 
 
Unmoveability 
 
 
Commitment 
 
 
Economic 
system choice 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideology reflected in 
values 
 
Strong values reflects 
ideology 
 
 
Persistence of 
commitment 
 
 
Ideology reflected in 
values 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic model choice 
can be motivated by 
ideology 
IO3 
 
IO4 
 
IO5 
 
IO6 
 
IO7 
 
IO8 
 
 
 
 
This agent can determine where people 
choose to sell/purchase properties 
 
I was flexible when negotiating this 
housing transaction 
 
 
 
I hold very strong personal values 
 
 
 
My principles will not be compromised 
regardless of possible gain 
 
 
Personal values should influence the way 
I do business 
 
Free-market economy is the best 
economic system 
 
 
  3. Conflict of 
interest 
  
     
Wiseman, RM, 
Cuevas-
Rodriguez & 
Gomez-Mejia, 
2012 
 
Walking & Long, 
1984 
 
Wiseman, RM, 
Cuevas-
Rodriguez & 
Gomez-Mejia, 
2012 
 
Moore & 
Loewenstein, 
2004. 
 
Involvement 
with one party 
 
Pricing  
 
 
Interests of the 
buyer and 
seller 
Interests of 
REA, buyer 
and sellers 
 
Self-interest 
versus 
professional 
responsibilities 
Information 
asymmetry 
 
 
 
 
 
Use of 
minimum effort 
and resources 
Differing interests 
between principals 
 
Differences in 
knowledge 
 
Differences of interests 
between principals 
 
Differing interests 
between principals and 
REA 
 
Directions of benefits 
for longer TOM 
 
Conflicting expectations 
between principals and 
REAs 
 
Giving one side 
advantage to conclude 
the deal 
 
Effort level and 
resources deployment 
 
 
CO1  
 
 
 
CO2 
 
CO3 
 
 
CO4 
 
 
 
CO5 
 
 
CO6 
 
 
 
CO7 
 
 
 
CO8 
 
The real estate agent was involved in  
setting the initial asking price 
 
The lowest possible transaction price was 
disclosed   
 
The interests of both buyer and seller are 
similar in a property transaction  
 
The interests of the buyer, seller and the 
real estate agent are similar in a property 
transaction 
 
It is beneficial to me when the property is 
in the market for a long time 
 
I wanted to get the highest price for this 
property transaction 
 
 
Other parties to the transaction assisted 
me in achieving my target price 
 
 
Huge amount of marketing effort  
and other resources were used to do this 
deal 
 
  4. Compromising 
principal 
  
     
Wiseman, RM, 
Cuevas-
Rodriguez & 
Principals 
interests 
 
 
Contrast in interests 
between parties 
 
Information asymmetry 
CP1 
 
 
CP2 
Reasons for the sale/buying the property 
were disclosed for purposes of this deal 
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Gomez-Mejia, 
2012 
Henrin, Knight & 
Sirmans, 2004; 
Mishra, Heide & 
Gort, 1998. 
Wiseman, RM, 
Cuevas-
Rodriguez & 
Gomez-Mejia, 
2012 
Wiseman, RM, 
Cuevas-
Rodriguez & 
Gomez-Mejia, 
2012 
 
 
 
 
 
Contrast in 
interests 
between 
parties 
 
Contrast 
between 
parties 
Transaction 
experience 
 
 
Prior valuation 
knowledge 
 
Price 
experience 
 
Principals’ 
knowledge 
 
 
 
 
Contrast in interests 
between parties on 
TOM 
 
 
Contrast in interests 
between parties 
Information asymmetry 
 
Who benefits/loses 
 
 
Information asymmetry 
 
 
Who benefits/loses 
 
 
Information asymmetry 
 
 
 
CP3 
 
 
 
 
CP4  
 
 
 
CP5 
 
 
CP6 
 
 
CP7 
 
 
CP8 
I knew how to do property valuation 
before this transaction 
 
 
There were no winners or losers in this 
transaction 
 
 
 
I am satisfied with the time on market 
(TOM) of the property 
 
 
The duration of the transaction process 
was too long 
 
Valuation and pricing information was 
disclosed to me 
 
I received maximum benefit with regards 
to pricing 
 
My knowledge of property transactions is 
close to the level of the other parties in 
this deal 
  5. Outcomes   
Hannachi, 2015 
 
Hannachi, 2015; 
Carol, 1989 
Lee & Lee, 2013 
 
McDaniel &  
Louargand, 1994 
 
Milost, 2013 
Hannachi, 2015 
 
 
Milost, 2013  
 
Customer 
satisfaction 
 
 
Financial 
performance 
 
Customer 
satisfaction 
 
 
Customer 
loyalty 
 
 
Non-financial 
measures 
 
Service quality 
 
 
Financial and 
non-financial 
outcomes 
Relationship 
management 
After sale evaluation of 
both product and 
service 
 
Satisfaction with price 
charged/paid 
 
 
Perception of fairness 
 
 
Possibilities of repeat 
business 
 
 
Trust in the service 
provider 
 
Possibilities of repeat 
business 
 
Client satisfaction 
 
 
Client satisfaction 
 
OT1 
 
 
 
OT2 
 
 
OT3 
 
 
 
OT4 
 
 
 
OT5 
 
 
OT6 
 
 
OT7 
 
 
OT8 
 
I bought a property in an ideal 
neighbourhood 
 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, I should have 
transacted for a lower price 
 
I received a fair treatment from all parties 
involved in this transaction 
 
 
I would use the same REA for my next 
property deal if I decide to buy/sell in the 
same suburb 
 
I have confidence in the REA who 
handled the present transaction 
 
I will continue buying/selling my property 
(ies) through this REA  
 
The quality of service I got for this in this 
transaction was excellent 
 
After this transaction, I am very satisfied 
with the relationship with this REA 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Research variables, concepts, questionnaire items and sources 
 
Key: DMS-Dual mandate system, IO-Ideological outlook, CO-Conflict of interests, CP-
Compromised principal, OT-Outcomes 
 
The instrument that was used is given as an attachment in addendum Annexure E. 
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5.3.8: Ethical issues relating to sampling and data collection 
  
As Bell (1999) says, the respondents who took part in this study were doing the 
researcher a favour. Therefore, the respondents deserve to be treated with the utmost 
respect. Just because consumers are willing to provide data does not mean that its 
use is free from privacy implications (Boyd, 2011). At the data collections stage, care 
was taken not to interfere with the institutional programmes (Walls, Parahoo, Fleming 
& McCaughan 2010: 27). The privacy of the respondents was respected at all times 
(Walls et al, 2010). Before recording respondents’ information, an informed consent 
was obtained by first explaining the purpose of the project (Hegney & Wai Chan, 2010). 
Moreover, protecting the integrity of the university was also of paramount importance 
(Bell, 1999). Anonymity of respondents via coding of responses, informing the 
participants of their right to refuse to answer certain questions and to break off the 
interview at any stage was also communicated to them in advance.   The consent for 
the use of the responses was only signed for at the end of the data capturing exercise 
(Nunan & DiDomenico, 2013). Also, all respondents were assured that the information 
was not going to be used for political purposes (Zikmund, 1997). Lastly, respondents’ 
human rights which included rights to protection; right to self-determination (voluntary 
participation including people with diminished autonomy); right to privacy, 
confidentiality and right to a fair treatment were upheld and respected (Brink, Van der 
Walt & Van Rensburg, 2006). 
 
Approach to address ethical concerns  
 
The following steps were taken to address some of these concerns: 
The purpose of the study was honestly communicated to the respondents in order to 
allay any concerns they might have (Bell 1999: 46; Nunan & DiDomenico, 2013; 
Zikmund, 1997). Participants’ information sheet was discussed with them. The 
respondents were assured of the strict ethical issues that the university and this 
researcher have to adhere to (Bell, 1999). Questions such as: who stands to benefit 
and who can be harmed by the research were given attention and adequately 
addressed. Moreover, the respondents were assured that the researcher would 
ensure that there would be an honest analysis of the data and there would not be 
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dissemination of faulty conclusions for ulterior motives (Zikmund, 1997). Therefore, 
protection of respondents’ privacy was prioritised at all times. 
 
5.4: DATA ANALYSIS APPROACH 
 
The core of decision making is information which is mainly the result of data analysis 
and data interpretation (Luigi, Oana, Mihai & Simona, 2012). Luigi, et al. (2012) further 
state that data analysis is adding value out of gathered raw data. Before conducting 
data analysis, the researcher needs to generate operational definitions of the exposure 
variables, outcome variables and cofounding variable (Cheng & Phillips, 2014).  
Following data collection, the data screening process suggested by Malhotra (1999) 
and Churchill (1999) were implemented to ensure data are cleaned before performing 
further statistical analysis. Screening the data was the first step towards obtaining 
some insights into the characteristics of the data. It is important to ensure the accuracy 
of data entry and assessment of outliers before proceeding to analyse summary 
statistics for the survey responses. The major analytical tasks in the data screening 
process include questionnaire checking, editing, coding, and tabulation. Also, data 
analysis was aided by the choice of instrument, scales and coding of the responses. 
The statistics to be reported will be in the following order:  
 Descriptive statistics which numerically describe the results of the research in 
terms of how many, how much and how often (percentages);  
 Measures of central tendency (an attempt to describe the research result as a 
single number which tells the researcher how close the data are grouped 
towards the mean.) which included the mean, modes and median for the scores 
together with measure of central tendency; and  
 Measure of variability-SD to show how far from the mean each score is from 
the mean and lastly it will be Inferential statistics-so that the information can be 
used to infer meaning and use of a significance (Simpson, Dick & Greenblatt , 
2005). 
  
Data analysis was accordingly done in the following stages:   
 Stage 1: Descriptive-describing the nominal data by use of frequency tables, 
graphs and box plots.  
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 Stage 2: Exploratory stage-analysis of correlation patterns, exploratory factor 
analysis. SEM techniques were employed for this stage.   
 Stage 3: Hypothesis testing phase-non-parametric tests, Spearman rank 
correlation, Mann-Whitney U tests.  
 Stage 4: Output (Srnka & Koeszegi, 2007). 
Before giving the specifics of how the stages were performed, a brief description of 
SEM will be given as it forms the backbone of the analysis that was used. 
 
5.4.1: Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) defined 
 
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) has been heralded as a unified model that joins 
methods from Econometrics, Psychometrics, Sociometrics and Multivatriate statistics 
(Bentler, 1994). It is a general approach to analyse multivariate data for theory testing 
(Bagozi, 1980). Other authors have described SEM as a collection of statistical 
techniques that allow a set of relationships between one or more independent 
variables and one or more dependent variables to be examined (Ullman, 2006). Gois 
and Ehrich, 2014) argue that SEM is used to evaluate the extent to which the 
hypothesised causal structure was able to explain the observed association between 
variables and to estimate magnitude of the postulated effects. The purpose of SEM is 
to determine if the causal inferences of the researcher are consistent with the data 
collected (Grace & Pugesek, 1998). This statistical technique is also referred to as 
Causal modelling, Causal analysis, Simultaneous equation modelling, Analysis of 
covariance structures et cetera (Ullman, 2006). 
 
5.4.2: SEM advantages 
 
Many statistical techniques can be considered as special cases of SEM as it includes 
regression analysis, canonical correlation analysis, Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
and path analysis (PM) (Bagozi, Farnell & Larcker, 1981; Bentler, 1992; Joreskog & 
Sorbom, 1989). A central issue addressed by SEM is how to assess the fit between 
observed data and the hypothesised model (Mueller & Hancock, 2007). Researchers 
use SEM for finding the relationship among variables and for quantification (Vinodh & 
Joy, 2012). In addition, SEM lends itself well to using empirical data for testing 
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theoretical models (Crowley & Fan, 1997). It describes relationships between variables 
which can either be observed and latent variables (Bacon, 2011). SEM links 
regression analysis to factor analysis (Byrne, 2012). SEM also offers researchers 
many possibilities for model fit testing. 
 
The techniques allows for causality tests using path analysis.  The purpose of SEM is 
to determine if the causal inferences of a researcher are consistent with the data and 
if the path model does not fit the data, one or more of the model assumptions are in 
error (Grace & Pugesek, 1998). A central issue addressed by SEM is how to assess 
the fit between observed data and the hypothetical model (Mueller & Hannock, 2007). 
Actually, path analysis is the causal modelling and forms the structural model part in 
SEM. It can provide evidence of causality among variables (Violato & Hecker, 2007). 
If the path model is consistent with the data, it shows that our assumptions are not 
contradicted by the data and may be valid but it does not prove causation (Grace & 
Pugesek, 1998). In order to prove causation, three conditions for causality must be 
present, namely; there must be observed and measured relationship between variable 
x and y (should be correlated: association), variable x should precede y in time 
(temporal order: direction of influence), and variable x and y should have a non-
spurious relationship (the observed, measured and temporal relationship will not 
disappear when other variables on this relationship are controlled (isolation). 
Furthermore, the measurement model relates observed variables to latent variables 
and observed variables are called indicators and latent variables are called factors 
(Mornecke & Leish, 2012). In accordance with the two-step procedure suggested by 
Anderson and Gerbing (1988), prior to testing the hypotheses, confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) was performed to examine scale accuracy (including reliability, 
convergent validity, and discriminant validity) of the multiple-item construct measures 
using AMOS 7. SEM also makes use of fit indices to evaluate the overall acceptability 
of the model (Grace, & Pugesek, 1998). There are two sets of fit indices. They are the 
absolute fit indices and relative fit indices. Absolute fit indices indicate how well the 
priori model fits or reproduces the data.  Acceptable model fit will be indicated by Chi-
square value over degree of freedom (χ2/df) of value between 1 and 3, the values of 
Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Incremental Fit Index (IFI), 
and Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) equal to or greater than 0.90, and the Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation (RMSEA) value to be equal to or less than 0.08. Once an 
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acceptable CFA measurement model fit is obtained, the study will proceed to 
hypothesis testing stage using SEM with AMOS 7 software programme (Larwin & 
Harvey, 2012). 
 
5.4.3: Application to the study 
 
Model specifications involve formulating statements about a set of variables and 
forming a pictorial representation of the model (Violato & Hecker, 2007). The pictorial 
model is transformed into a set of equations, which are simultaneously solved to test 
model fit. Assessing whether a specified model fits the data is one of the most 
important steps in SEM (Yuan, 2005). In addition, model fit is how the model that best 
represents the data reflects underlying theory (Hooper, Coughlan & Mullen, 2008). 
Most importantly, model selection should be guided by principles of parsimony which 
states that if several models fit the data, the simplest should be selected (Violato & 
Hecker, 2007). Absolute fit indices measure how well the model fits in comparison to 
no model at all (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993). Model fit indicators such as Chi-
square/degrees of freedom, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), Augmented Goodness of Fit 
Index (AGFI), Normed Fit Index (NFI), Incremental Fit Index (IFI), Tucker-Lewis Index 
(TLI), Composite Fit Index (CFI) and RMSEA were used to assess the model fit. 
RMSEA 0-1, smaller values indicate better model fit. The cut-off value of 0.06 or less 
is generally accepted. RMSEA demonstrates optimal fit with a value below 0.05 and 
reasonable fit with a value below 0.08. CFI indicates a good fit with p-values greater 
that 0.95 (Larwin & Harvey, 2012). 
 
 
5.4.4: Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA): model fitness, reliability and validity 
 
Confirmatory factor analysis is an analytical tool that allows the investigator to explore 
hypotheses about what constructs the test in question is measuring and provides an 
empirical basis for clinical interpretation (Bradley, Ryan, Axelrod, Schellenberger & 
Richards, 2003). It involves the separation of a large number of variables into a smaller 
number of factors within which all variables are related to each other. The purpose of 
factor analysis is to investigate the underlying variance structure of a set of correlation 
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coefficients. A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed to obtain the 
standard regression weights. 
 
5.4.5: Path Modelling (PM): model fitness and Hypothesis testing 
 
Once the model fit has been assessed using confirmatory factor analysis, the 
researcher proceeded to perform Path Modelling using AMOS 21.0 software package. 
Path modelling describes the relationships between observed or measured variables 
and theoretical constructs (Roche, Duffield & White, 2003) and tests the structural 
paths of the conceptualised research model. SEM technique demonstrates and tests 
the theoretical underpinnings of a proposed study and the significance of the 
relationships between models constructs. SEM stipulates a technique where separate 
relationships are allowed for each set of dependent variables and provides an 
estimation technique for a series of separate multi-regression equations to be 
estimated concurrently. It further contains two mechanisms, namely; the structural 
model, which is the path where independent, and dependent variables are being linked 
and the measurement model enables this study to use several indicators for a single 
independent variable. In this study, several attributes were identified as having an 
effect on performance. The multi-item scales for each construct were developed. This 
was done by assessing each relationship simultaneously rather than separate by 
incorporating all the multi scale items to account for measurement errors with each 
scale. The University of the Witwatersrand Statistics Department assisted in the 
analysis of the results and the interpretation outcomes was done thereafter.  
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The steps mentioned in the discussion above can best be represented by Figure 5.6 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure5.6: Statistical analysis procedures used (Chinomona, 2011)    
 
 
5.4.6: Ethical issues related to data analysis 
 
Improper data analysis is an ethical issue because it can result in publishing false or 
misleading conclusions (Wasserman, 2013). The principles that were followed as 
suggested in Psychology literature are integrity which involves accuracy, honesty and 
truthfulness; fidelity and responsibility as one is in a position of trust and have 
professional responsibility to their community; principle of beneficence and non-
malfeasance-striving to benefit those with whom they work and undertaking to do no 
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138 
 
harm; and lastly discovering and disseminating truth (Simmons, Nelson & Simonsohn, 
2011). 
 
5.5: CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY  
 
Van Wyk (2012) refers research design to be the overall plan for connecting the 
conceptual research problems to the pertinent (and achievable) empirical research. 
He further states that the research design articulates what data are required, what 
methods are going to be used to collect and analyse these data, and how all of this is 
going to answer the research question. In the present chapter, the stated objectives 
as shown in Figure 5.1 were to discuss research philosophy, design and methods, 
sampling, data collection and data analysis. This has effectively been done under the 
subheadings for these concepts in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
DATA MEASUREMENT RESULTS 
 
6.1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The preceding chapters have given information on the overview of the study, how the 
real estate industry (REI) operates in SA, literature review, conceptual model 
development and research methodology. The present chapter deals with fieldwork 
report based on the guidelines gleaned from some of the theories discussed. The 
chapter will accordingly, give a brief description of the sample and how sampling was 
done to collect the data for this study, give a brief description of scale development, 
scale type and questionnaire design, give the characteristics of the sample, give 
descriptive statistical results and show how data analysis was performed. Data 
analysis will in turn be done in the order Goodness of fit of the model; reliability of the 
scale; validity of the scale; and hypothesis testing. 
This will then be followed by findings summary. 
 
6.2: METHOD 
 
Under this broad classification, the report on sample location, scale development, 
sampling and data collection will be reported and discussed. 
 
6.2.1: Sample location 
 
The study was conducted in the following areas: Roodepoort and Mogale City and 
included the following suburbs: Ruimsig, Roodekrans, Florida, Helderkruin, 
Weltevredenpark, Randparkridge, Floracliffe, Northcliff, Wilgeheuwel, Krugersdorp, 
Witpoortjie, Lindhaven and other neighbouring suburbs. Real estate agents (REAs) 
firms which are active in these areas and people who have either bought or sold 
properties in the areas formed the population for this study. Some of the real estate 
firms (REFs) that participated in the study are Chas Everitt, Pam Golding, Rawson 
properties, Fine and Country, Silver trees, Reimax, Property finder, Seeff, Sothebys 
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and Geffen, Reality concepts, Huizenmark, Harcourts, Xenan properties, Jawitz, 
Knights properties, Property.co.za and Tapp properties. Real estate agents (REAs) 
and franchisees from these firms were sampled together with the consumers who are 
buyers and sellers. 
 
6.2.2: Scale development 
 
As shown under research model development, the following variables were shown to 
be crucial for the present study. They are: dual mandate system (DMS), ideological 
outlook (IO), conflict of interests (COI), compromised principal (CP) and sub-optimal 
outcomes (OT). All research scale items were scored on a 7-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 to 7, with 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=somewhat disagree, 4=no 
comment, 5=somewhat agree. 6=agree and 7=strongly agree. The factors assessed 
on each of the variables are shown in the research instrument attached herewith in 
Annexure E. The questionnaire was composed of mostly original questions compiled 
after a thorough literature search on the variables identified. On DMS, the questions 
were taken from mandate forms of Rawson properties, Chas Everitt and Pam Golding. 
On IO, questions were framed based on different authors who describe people who 
hold strong ideological positions. Figure 5.4 gives the sources of the items.   
     
6.2.3: Sampling and data collection method 
 
Stratified random sampling was used for information gathering. The purpose of the 
study was explained to any potential participant before the responses were captured. 
The participants were all offered a participant information pamphlet, a copy of which 
is also supplied herewith in Annexure A. Responses were recorded in the 
questionnaires in the presence of the participants. All participants were requested to 
sign a research consent form which also gave contact details of the researcher only 
after the interview. The participants were requested to put their contact details in the 
consent form in case a need for a follow-up arises. A copy of the research’s consent 
form is also attached herewith under Annexure B. Almost all the REAs who 
participated were interviewed in their offices. Buyers and sellers were interviewed 
either at their places of residence, offices, restaurants or when waiting for their cars to 
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be washed. All responses were recorded in the presence of the participants and they 
were only asked to fill in the research consent forms after the interview. Response rate 
can only be estimated by way of estimating the rejection to participate rate. Close to 
20% of the people approached did not want to take part in the study, including one 
gated community where the researcher was only allowed to interview only one 
resident. The results from the fieldwork will be discussed under respondents’ analysis 
and responses analysis. 
 
6.3: RESPONDENTS’ ANALYSIS 
 
Sample description will be done under general classification of the participants. 
 
6.3.1: General classification of participants 
 
The participants were broadly classified in terms of their roles, age, positions in their 
organizations, gender and their racial classification. The outcomes are shown in the 
Tables 6.1 and the discussion of the results follows thereafter. 
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 Participants % of total 
Role                   Seller 
                           Buyer 
                           REA 
Total 
58 
88 
58 
204 
28.4 
43.1 
28.4 
100.0 
Age              18 - 24 Years Age Group 
               25 - 34 Years Age Group 
               35 - 39 Years Age Group 
               40 - 44 Years Age Group 
               45 - 49 Years Age Group 
               Above 49 Years Age Group 
Total 
1 
32 
36 
29 
25 
81 
204 
.5 
15.7 
17.6 
14.2 
12.3 
39.7 
100.0 
Position             Owner/Franchisee 
               Manager 
               Fieldwork 
               Admin & Support 
Total 
10 
2 
191 
1 
204 
4.9 
1.0 
93.6 
.5 
100.0 
Experience  Less than 1 Year Work  Experience 
                1 to 4 Years Work Experience 
                5 to 8 Years Work Experience 
                9 to 12 Years Work Experience 
                Above13 Years Work Experience 
Total 
4 
104 
59 
12 
25 
204 
2.0 
51.0 
28.9 
5.9 
12.3 
100.0 
Gender               Male 
                Female 
Total 
110 
94 
204 
53.9 
46.1 
100 
Race                     African 
                             White 
                             Asian 
                             Coloured 
Total 
79 
108 
14 
3 
204 
38.7 
52.9 
6.9 
1.5 
100.0 
 
 
Table 6.1: Classification of participants 
 
Figure 6.1: Role of Participants 
 
28.43%
43.14%
28.43%
Real Estate Agent
Buyer
Seller
Role
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The general classification will be briefly discussed in the same order as they appear 
in the table above. From Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 above, it is clear that buyers 
represent the largest group as indicated by 43.1% (88 out of 204) of the total sample. 
Sellers and REAs are the same size both being 28.4% (58 out of 204). This can be 
explained by the ease of access by the researcher to buyers in their own homes as 
compared to finding someone who has sold a house.  
 
The table also gives us the distribution of respondents’ ages. For ease of comparisons 
the age groups for REAs, buyers and sellers have further been classified as those 
from 40 years old upwards and those below 40 years.  This is demonstrated in Table 
6.3 below. Using that classification, it is clear that the participants were mostly the 
elderly. About 66% of all the participants were aged 40 years and above. From the 
REAs participants, most of them were fieldworkers (REAs who actively go out to look 
for business and interact with clients directly) as indicated by 93.6% share of the total 
number of REAs and they were followed by owners/franchisees, managers and lastly, 
administration employees and support staff. This information is significant as it shows 
that the people contacted are those who are active in the business and directly interact 
to all other players in the industry. 
 
In terms of the experience of participants, the questions were framed in such a way 
as to include all major stakeholders and to find out whether they have participated in 
other housing transactions before or not. From the table, participants with 1 to 4 years 
work experience represent the largest group. They are followed by 5 to 8 years work 
experience group, above 13 years work experience group, 9 to 12 years work 
experience group and finally, less than 1 year work experience group. The age 
rankings were found to be 1-4 years=51% years, 5-8 years=29%, above 13 
years=12%, 9-12 years=5.9% and less than 1 year=2%. This information also 
indicates how skewed property ownership in the SA REI is. People seemed to wait 
until they are very old to enter the industry. Gender distribution also reveals an 
interesting trend. In addition, 53.9% of the participants were male and 46.1% were 
female. The industry is clearly male-dominated. Of particular interest are the race 
classifications of our participants. This is due to the sensitive nature of the issue and 
the present transformation agenda in SA. The results shown in the table also indicate 
that white participants represented the largest racial group as evidenced by 53% (108 
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out of 204) of the total sample. The second largest racial group is that of Africans with 
39% (79 out of 204) share and together these two groups accounted for more than 
90% of the total sample. These figures are an anomaly when one compares the 
demographic information on the ratio of white/black population groups in SA. In order 
to gain further insight, the two groups were classified according to their roles, 
percentage representation in the roles sample and their age groups in the roles 
sample. The results are shown in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 below. 
 
Role Black participants 
% 
White participants 
% 
   
REAs 14 83 
Sellers 26 50 
Buyers 58 28 
 
Table 6.2: Racial classification of participants 
 
Table 6.2 gives a clearer picture in terms of the racial classifications of our sample. 
Race is an idea with remarkable social force and material effect (Anderson, 1987). 
The REAs sampled were overwhelmingly white with 83% share of the total and only 
14% were black. Also, the majority of sellers are white with a 50% share of all the 
deals covered in the study. This should be compared to the share of black sellers 
which is 26% of the total. On the other hand, more than half of the buyers were black. 
One explanation for the majority of buyers being black can be the move of the black 
middle-class citizens to Johannesburg suburbs after the demise of the apartheid 
system in SA. As they moved into these suburbs, they were served by majority white 
REAs. This situation is fraught with all sorts of potential abuse due to the DMS and the 
IO of REAs as will be shown after the predictor variables results in the responses 
analysis stage below. Another issue worth taking note of is the age distribution of all 
the respondents who participated in the study. The classification is shown in Figure 
6.3 below. 
 
Role Age classification of participants 
 Below 40 years old % 40 years and above % 
REAs 21 79 
Sellers 38 62 
Buyers 50 50 
 
Table 6.3: Age classification of participants 
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The information from Table 6.3 gives a clearer picture of the fact that the majority of 
our REAs are elderly people. Read together with information from Table 6.2, it is clear 
that the industry is being served by majority aged white REAs. Also, the people selling 
their properties are mostly from the elderly white population group. Possible 
explanation for that would be that the aging white middle-class are downsizing or 
moving to better areas. Again from the tables, there appears to be a 50-50 split 
between the 40 years and above buyers and the younger ones. As shown above, the 
majority of this group is made up of blacks in SA REI. Clearly then, among the black 
population, it is not only the young people who are moving into previously white areas. 
One possible explanation is that many black people are using the opportunity to buy 
properties in areas from which they were previously excluded.    
 
6.4: RESPONSES ANALYSIS 
 
This section analyses the responses of participants to questions directly addressing 
the variables in this study. The analysis will be given under two sections which are 
recorded outcomes followed by accuracy checks. 
 
6.4.1: Recorded outcomes 
 
There were eight factors for each of the variables as shown in Figure 6.2, page 129 
and on Annexure E. The survey outcomes are summarised in Table 6.3 below. Some 
factors have been highlighted in order to differentiate them from the rest. The reason 
for doing that is that these measurement factors had more significant loadings on our 
variables of interest and thus determined the final model for the study (Figure 6.3). 
Only those highlighted factors will form the basis for the discussion that follows.  
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Variable Item number Aspect measured 
DMS   
 1 Whether mandate was given to one REA or not 
2 Whether sole mandate is the best way or not  
3 Who did the initial valuation for the property 
4 Involvement of any other REA in the deal 
5 Who presented the offer to the seller 
6 Whether the REA also acted for the buyer 
7 Whether any outside assistance received or not  
8 Whether commission was shared or not 
  
IO 1 Feeling about a sense of responsibility 
 2 Influence over settlement patterns 
3 Influence on purchase/sale decisions 
4 Flexibility when involved in a transaction 
5 Strong sense of value or lack thereof 
6 Possibilities of compromising one’s values 
7 Influence of personal values on business practices 
8 Preference of economic system type 
  
COI 1 Whether REA assisted the seller with valuation or not 
 2 Reservation price information disclosure  
3 Convergence of interests between principals 
4 Convergence of interests of all the parties 
5 Who benefits from long TOM 
6 Who benefits when the transaction price is high 
7 Who benefits the transaction  price is low  
8 View on marketing and amount of resources used 
  
CP 1 Whether information was disclosed or not 
 2 Checking valuation knowledge by participants  
3 Whether the transaction led to a win-win 
4 Satisfaction or lack thereof about time on market 
5 Satisfaction or lack thereof on transaction process 
6 Checking for disclosure of valuation information 
7 Feeling about price benefits beneficiary 
8 Level of knowledge of property transactions 
  
OT 1 Satisfaction with location of property 
 2 Price satisfaction after transaction conclusion 
3 Fairness of treatment received 
4 Confidence in the REA who assisted 
5 Use of the same REA for future property deals 
6 Possibility of repeat business 
7 Quality of service 
8 Service satisfaction 
 
Figure 6.2: Aspects measured in variable items  
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Variables Item number Responses in % 
  SD D SOD NT SMA A SAG 
DMS 1 14.7 5.9 .98 5.4 2.5 12.8 57.8 
 2 21.6 14.7 4.9 4.9 4.9 10.3 37.7 
 3 1.5 1.5 2.5 13.2 3.4 10.8 67.2 
 4 44.3 23.7 5.4 8.9 2.9 0.9 13.8 
 5 0.9 0.9 1.5 0.5 7.4 21.6 67.2 
 6 2.5 0.9 3.9 5.9 7.8 28.4 50.5 
 7 3.4 5.4 1.9 0.5 4.9 14.7 69.1 
 8 2.9 1.9 0.0 6.4 1.5 16.7 70.6 
         
IO 1 1.5 7.8 3.4 6.4 4.4 28.9 47.6 
 2 1.9 7.8 7.4 13.2 12.3 34.8 22.6 
 3 5.9 12.3 8.8 13.7 13.2 21.6 24.5 
 4 3.4 8.3 3.4 1.5 9.3 25.5 48.5 
 5 1.5 2.5 2.5 4.4 2.9 32.4 53.9 
 6 1.9 1.9 7.8 2.5 4.9 10.3 70.6 
 7 1.9 4.4 2.5 0.9 4.9 13.7 71.6 
 8 0.9 7.4 3.9 14.2 8.8 11.3 53.4 
         
COI 1 2.5 12.3 5.9 3.9 3.4 10.8 61.3 
 2 60.8 18.6 4.9 7.4 0.5 1.9 5.9 
 3 33.3 25.5 11.8 6.4 9.3 6.4 7.4 
 4 44.6 21.1 7.4 4.4 7.8 6.9 7.8 
 5 42.2 20.1 3.4 3.4 2.9 13.7 13.7 
 6 28.9 11.8 2.9 2.5 0.5 7.4 46.1 
 7 31.9 14.2 4.4 7.8 4.4 10.3 26.9 
 8 25.9 23.0 10.8 9.8 4.4 12.8 13.2 
         
CP 1 18.8 5.4 2.9 8.3 4.4 24.5 42.6 
 2 22.6 15.2 6.4 1.5 9.3 9.8 35.3 
 3 10.8 19.6 10.3 2.5 8.3 16.2 32.4 
 4 1.5 10.8 8.8 14.2 9.8 27.5 27.5 
 5 21.3 30.2 5.5 5.5 6.4 7.9 23.3 
 6 25.5 12.3 1.5 1.9 2.5 5.4 50.9 
 7 8.8 14.7 15.7 5.4 7.4 13.2 34.8 
 8 56.3 19.6 4.4 4.9 2.9 4.9 6.9 
         
OT 1 3.4 5.4 4.9 8.8 9.3 22.1 46.1 
 2 46.1 25.0 4.4 1.9 2.9 8.3 11.3 
 3 7.4 10.1 4.9 3.43 11.3 31.9 30.4 
 4 10.8 9.8 6.9 1.9 6.9 15.7 48.0 
 5 14.2 12.8 3.4 4.4 2.9 19.1 43.1 
 6 13.2 11.8 3.9 4.4 3.9 21.6 41.2 
 7 8.8 2.9 3.4 12.3 11.8 30.4 30.4 
 8 14.2 5.9 4.4 5.4 4.9 16.7 48.5 
 
Key: SD-Strongly disagree, D-Disagree, SOD-Somewhat disagree, NT-Neutral, SMA-
Somewhat agree, A-Agree and SAG-Strongly agree 
Table 6.4: Responses table with significant variables results highlighted 
 
NB: Percentages in Table 6.3 were calculated from the total number of participants 
and subsequent tables for the different variables and role players were calculated from 
REAs, sellers and buyers’ responses separately. 
148 
 
This subsection will briefly interpret the results before the analysis is done. Table 6.4 
below has been derived from table 6.3 and from the originally recorded respondents’ 
classifications and roles. The percentages given are only for those indicator variables 
that have a significant impact on each of the variables of interest which are DMS, IO, 
COI, CP and OT. They have been calculated as a percentage of the total number of 
REAs, sellers and buyers separately by using the number of responses on each 
measurement item.  The factor loadings are taken from the final model in Figure 6.3. 
From here on, only these factors shown in the tables and their impact on the 
hypotheses will be discussed. The results will be discussed using information from 
these two tables. 
 
 
Variable Measurement 
item 
Factor 
loadings 
REAs 
responses % 
Sellers 
response % 
Buyer 
responses % 
DMS      
      
 1 0.512 86 71 63 
 2 0.801 97 36 35 
 3 0.683 97 86 67 
 5 0.519 97 95 98 
IO      
 1 0.893 100  71 77 
 2 0.903 91 55 61 
 3 0.809 78 50 48 
      
COI      
 1 0.647 91 91 49 
 3 0.801 40 22 10 
 4 0.823 41 19 10 
 6 0.666 93 81 2 
CP      
 2 0.717 72 52 37 
 3 0.842 66 55 50 
 6 0.740 78 76 40 
 7 0.680 60 52 45 
OT      
 3 0.825 79 55 65 
 4 0.956 72 50 57 
 5 0.950 71 47 50 
 6 0.954 71 47 51 
 7 0.746 69 64 67 
 8 0.943 71 55 53 
  
Table 6.5: Variables, measurement factors, factor loadings and responses 
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6.4.1.1: Dual mandate system 
 
Only items 1, 2, 3 and 5 were used for this variable as explained above. 
 
Instruction to market the property 
 
As observed in Table 6.3 above, most of the respondents said that only one REA was 
given permission to market the property. This is indicated by 57.8% of the total sample 
who strongly agreed with statement. Upon further classification of the factors (as 
shown in table 6.4), one also finds out that REAs are in the majority for those who 
affirmed that only one agent was mandated. In total, 86% of the 58 REAs were on the 
agree side of the continuum. As to be expected, they were followed by sellers at 71% 
of the 58 sellers who participated in the survey. The buyer is generally unrepresented 
at the mandate giving stage (Green & Vandel, 1995; Arnold, 1999; Yavas & Yang, 
1995). This is in line with the general practice in the SA REI (Spies, 2013). 
 
Sole mandate best form of mandate 
 
Figure 6.3 also gives responses to the statement “Giving instruction to one agent is 
the best way to sell a property”. The largest group of participants were those that 
strongly agreed with the statement indicated by 38.73% of the total. A total of 54% 
believe that giving instruction to one agent is the best way to sell a property as 
compared to 41% who believe the opposite. Further break-down of responses as 
shown in Table 6.4 also reveal that 97% of REAs accept that sole mandate is the best 
way to do a property deal as compared to less than 40% of both sellers and buyers. 
This is again in line with sole mandate system being deeply entrenched as a normal 
practice in the industry among REAs in SA (Rademeyer, 2014; Reynolds, 2011). 
  
Initial valuation of the property 
 
About 81% of the respondents once again say that the initial valuation was done by 
the mandated agent. On this factor, there was a bigger number (13.24%) who were 
neutral. This should be expected as buyers, for instance, might not know whether the 
agent who assisted them also did the initial valuation for pricing purposes. The rest of 
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the participants are on the disagree side of the scale and they only make up about 
5.4% of 204 participants. Again, further analysis of REAs, sellers and buyers’ 
responses gives a clearer picture that more than 67% of participants were aware that 
the REA was involved in the initial valuation before the sale was concluded. This is in 
line with normal practice in the SA REI as the agent is normally contacted to do 
valuation before the buyer comes into the picture.    
 
Presentation of offers for the sale of the property 
 
More than 95% stated that the offers to purchase were presented by the mandated 
agent. The agent who was mandated by the seller also acted for the buyer. This is 
another sign of DMS as one agent acted for both the seller and buyer. About 98% of 
buyers knew that the REA presented their offers and they did not seem to have had a 
problem with that. It has been shown in other studies that buyers mistakenly believe 
that the broker represents them in the negotiation process (Johnson, Zhenguo & Jia, 
2015). It has been mentioned that brokers do not owe any duty to the buyer (Wolf & 
Jennings, 1991). The above discussion on DMS confirms what is known from other 
industries and in other countries where this issue has been investigated. REAs believe 
that DMS is the best way to do a housing deal and they both do the initial valuation 
and presentation of offers to the seller.  
 
6.4.1.2: Ideological outlook of participants 
 
Only three indicator variables 1, 2 and 3 are shown in Table 6.4. 
  
Feeling of having a sense of responsibility 
 
The largest group of participants strongly agreed with the statement that wanted to 
establish how responsible the REA who handled the deal was as indicated by 47.55% 
of the total sample. In contrast, the smallest group of participants were those that 
strongly disagreed with this statement as indicated by 1.47% of the total sample. The 
majority seemed to strongly feel that agents responsibly did what they were employed 
to do. When respondents were further divided into those who were on the agree side 
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and on the disagree sides, it was again revealed that all REAs believe that they did 
their work responsibly. Other participants had other impressions. This has a strong 
resemblance to people who hold strong views about issues as literature has shown 
above. 
 
Having the ability to predict what buyers and sellers need 
 
Responses to the statement “The agent who sold this property can accurately predict 
a client’s preferences in a housing deal” revealed that 69.6% of the participants believe 
the REA can actually do that. Again, more than 90% of REAs believe that they can 
accurately predict what clients’ requirements are upon meeting them for the first time. 
In contrast, only between 51% and 61% of buyers and sellers believe that. This is 
consistent with the idea that strongly ideological people believe that they can 
determine where people chose to stay. Strong ideologically inclination is a predictor of 
residential integration or segregation (Bobo, 1996). 
 
The attitude towards clients 
 
When asked whether the REA can decide where people chooses to sell/purchase 
properties, the largest group of participants was those that strongly agreed with this 
as indicated by the 24.51% of the total sample. The total percentage of those who 
agreed was about 59.3%. Some interviewees actually stated that this question bring 
some racial issues into the picture. Dividing the responses into those different role 
players who agreed and those who disagreed, it was revealed that 78% of REAs 
believe that they can determine settlement patterns in the areas sampled. From the 
other group of participants, only about 50% believed that REAs can actually determine 
where people buy properties. With the majority of REA being white and buyers being 
black, this item is a cause for concern.  
 
These factors, when considered together, give us the thinking among REAs, sellers 
and buyers. It appears to the researcher that REAs believe that they do their work very 
responsibly, they can accurately determine clients’ needs and that they can also 
determine where people choose to sell/buy properties. Firstly, this shows how 
ideologically inclined REAs are and the influence they have on the workings of the 
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whole industry. As will be shown below, this has serious implications for the 
performance of the REI in general. Strong IO has been shown to influence both COI 
and CP which in turn have huge impact on the results for other participants. It is well 
known that inter-ethnic attitudes play a part in residential segregation (Violand & 
Simon, 2007).               
 
6.4.1.3: Conflict of interests 
 
The results will also be discussed as they appear in Table 6.3 with the aspects being 
measured as the headline. Important responses by different participants to the COI 
section of the questionnaire are also summarised in Table 6.4 above.  
 
Whether the particular agent helped in setting the price 
 
Table 6.3 also summarises responses to the statement “The real estate agent was 
involved in setting the initial asking price”. The largest group of participants was those 
that strongly agreed with this statement indicated by 61.27% of the total sample. The 
total number of those who knew that the REA was involved in setting the asking price 
is about 75%. In addition, 91% REAs and sellers affirmed that the REA did the initial 
valuation and price setting right from the onset of the deal. In contrast, only 49% of 
buyers knew that information. Again, REAs were shown to know more than their buyer 
principals. Information asymmetry (IA) seems to be a factor in this case.   This result 
is in line with findings from other studies on IA (Johnson, Zhenguo, Jia, 2013).  
  
How the respondents see their interests and those of other participants 
 
Responses to the statement “The interests of both buyer and seller are similar in a 
property transaction” were meant to check whether the participants genuinely believed 
that they were having similar interests to those of the other transacting parties. Most 
of the participants stated that they strongly disagreed with the statement and were 
represented by 33.33% of the total sample. In total, about 71% disagreed with the 
statement. This shows that the interests of buyers and sellers are different, which in 
turn suggests that there is a conflict of interests between the two principals. On the 
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other hand, there is about 25% who believe there are no conflicting interests. When 
the respondents are further divided into REAs, sellers and buyers, it can be seen that 
about 40% of REAs believe that the interests of buyers and sellers are similar. Only 
22% of sellers and 10% buyers believe that. Again, this shows how the interests of the 
different players conflict. Again this is supported by findings from other studies 
(Brastow, Springer & Walker, 2013). 
 
How the respondents see their interests and those of other participants 
 
This item served as a follow-up to the last question, but also included the interests of 
the REA involved in deal. A pattern also emerged as shown in the responses to the 
statement “The interests of the buyer, seller and the real estate agent are similar in a 
property transaction”. The pattern coming out of the responses is very similar to that 
for the interests of buyers and sellers. Even on this one, the majority of those who 
believe that the interests of all the participants are congruent come from REAs. It is 
known that even brokers’ interests are not necessarily aligned with those of their seller 
principals (Kacker & Niewlaat 2005; Tanata & Sanette, 2014). While possibly in the 
best interests of brokers, brokers’ interests are not in the consumer’s interest (Nanda 
& Pancak, 2010). 
  
Who benefits when the price is high 
 
Responses to “I want to get the highest price for this property transaction” were meant 
to identify who benefits from any given sale price. The agreed side was made of about 
54% of the total number and those who disagreed were about 44%. The results of 
disintegrating responses into those from different role players give us a clearer picture. 
An overwhelming 93% of REAs said that they benefit from high sale price. This was 
followed by 81% of all sellers and buyers came last with only 2%. This shows that the 
interests of the sampled participants are not the same. The ranking of the responses 
suggests that the interests of REAs and sellers are much more closely aligned than 
those of REAs and their buyer principals. However, it is known the interests of the 
agent and the seller principal are not necessarily aligned and hence the difference 
(Brastow, Springer & Walker, 2013).  
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The combined effects of REAs doing valuations for pricing and different participants 
pursuing different and sometimes conflicting interests give rise to COI in many housing 
transactions with devastating consequences for consumers. 
 
6.4.1.4: Compromising principals’ interests 
 
Discussion of the results on CP will follow the same pattern as done for the other 
variables. The information used is the same as the one appearing in Tables 6.3 and 
6.4 above. Only four measurement items 2,3,6 and 7 are shown in Table 6.4. 
 
To check for the presence/absence of information asymmetry 
 
The item checked whether the participants had knowledge of property appraisal before 
the deal was concluded. The largest group of participants was those that agreed that 
they had knowledge of property valuation before the deal was done as indicated by 
54.4% of the total sample. On the other hand, there were 44% of respondents who did 
not know how to do appraisals which is a significant number. Responses by REAs 
show that 72% stated that they knew how to do property appraisals. In addition, 52% 
of all sellers knew how to do the same and only 37% of buyers confirmed knowing 
how to value a property.  PA relationships are fraught with problems of cheating and 
limited information (Perrow, 1986). Again, IA appears to be prevalent and the people 
who are disadvantaged are buyers. 
 
The feeling of the participants on whether there were winners and losers 
 
This factor evaluated responses to the statement “The treatment received in this 
transaction lead to a win-win outcome for us”. In total, 56% of our sample believes that 
there was no winner or loser in the transaction. About 41% of all the respondents 
believed that someone did gain the benefits and someone lost out.  Comparing REAs 
and other role players, one gets a much clearer picture. For instance, 66% of REAs 
believe that the transaction led to a win-win outcome to everybody involved. 
Furthermore, 55% of sellers believe that everybody won and only 50% of buyers 
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believe the same. Clearly, many sellers and buyers believe that someone’s interests 
have been compromised in the transaction. 
 
Checking how information asymmetry gets used 
 
On whether valuation information was disclosed to all, about 59% stated that they were 
either given or knew that information. This figure should be read together with about 
39% who stated that they neither knew nor were they told the valuation price of the 
properties under consideration. For comparison purposes, 78% of REAs stated that 
valuation information was disclosed to other parties. About 76% of all sellers believed 
the same as compared to only 40% buyers who said that the information was not 
disclosed to them. Information asymmetry (IA) seems to be a huge factor in this case 
as well. This clearly has a bearing on how different participants felt about the price 
benefits and whom they accrued to as shown by their responses in point below. Buyers 
are normally not represented when the contract is initiated (Green & Vandel, 1995).   
  
Checking how the participants feel about the price 
  
On how participants felt about having obtained/not having obtained maximum benefits 
in terms of price, responses to “I received maximum benefit with regards to pricing” 
show that about 56% felt that they did and 39% felt that they did not. On this one as 
well, REAs felt differently from the other participants with 60% who felt that they 
received all they wanted from the deal under consideration. It is understandable when 
one takes into consideration the fact that REAs have an effect on the price of 
properties (Zietz & Newsome, 2002).  This was followed by 52% of sellers and buyers 
again came last with 45%. Buyers seem to bear the most brunt in the majority of 
instances on property prices. This can be explained by the way the contract is done. 
Only the seller principal is involved at the beginning of the contract negotiations.  High 
prices mean that buyers will be paying an expensive bond for many years.  Clearly, 
the patterns in all the factors considered under CP indicate that both sellers and 
buyers’ interests are compromised in many transactions. 
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6.4.1.5: Outcomes 
 
Table 6.4 above also gives different loadings for all the indicator variables under OT 
which will be used in the discussion. They are 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
Outcomes are about what all the participants want to get out of the deal. They will be 
briefly shown in the same pattern that the other variables were given. Outcomes were 
generally measured on location satisfaction, feeling about the price after the 
transaction was concluded and about the whole transaction chain experience. 
 
Checking the fairness of the service rendered 
 
The results in the table shows that participants’ responses pattern to the statement “I 
received a fair treatment from all parties involved in this transaction” are worth noting. 
About 73% stated that they received a fair treatment from all parties to the transaction 
as compared to about 23% who stated that they did not. Breaking the results down 
into responses from different role-players reveals a much neater picture. REAs led at 
79% on judging the treatment received as having been fair. Things look slightly 
different on this issue because it is buyers who follow after REAs on 65% positive 
feeling about the fairness of the treatment received. This may be due to the majority 
of them not knowing any other treatment as new entrants into the industry. REAs 
believe that the service they give their principals is fair. But helping two principals may 
create COI (Nanda & Pancak, 2010).  
  
Checking confidence in the REA 
  
The outcomes show that many people do have confidence in the REAs who handled 
their deals. About 74% of all respondents have shown their confidence through their 
responses. In contrast, 22% of the respondents stated that they did not have 
confidence in the agents who handled their deal. When the results are split, again 
most REAs believed that all other role players did in fact have confidence in them. This 
is evidenced by 72% of REAs giving a final positive appraisal of the whole service 
chain. This is clearly different from 50% from sellers and 57% from buyers. 
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Possibilities of repeat business 
 
Confidence in REAs should most probably lead to opportunities for repeat business. 
This item was therefore aimed at finding out whether prospects of future business were 
enhanced or not after the deal was concluded. This was ascertained by checking 
responses to “I would use the same real estate agent for my next property deal if I 
decide to buy/sell in the same suburb”. Again, the results showed that close to 71% of 
all REAs believe their chances of repeat business were enhanced. This should be 
contrasted with 47% of sellers who felt the same and 50% of buyers. 
  
Checking satisfaction level  
   
The inclusion of this item was meant to find out whether the principals were satisfied 
with the outcomes in such a way that they were definitely going to give their REAs 
repeat business as opposed to the last item which only gave possibilities. The results 
are very close to the last item with 71% REAs believing that their clients were going to 
come back to them with repeat business. Again, they were followed by buyers with 
51% and sellers were last with 47%. The picture emerging is that buyers, the majority 
of whom are black, are not as demanding on service levels from REAs when compared 
to sellers, the majority of whom are white. The following factor emphasizes the same 
point. It was meant to check on all participants’ perceptions on the quality of service 
rendered in the whole transaction. 
 
Checking the service level perception 
 
Under this item, respondents were required to respond to the statement “The quality 
of service I got for this transaction was excellent” in order to measure their perceptions 
on the quality of service they received. On rating the overall purchase/sale experience, 
about 73% of the respondents stated that the quality of service was excellent as 
compared to 15% who said that the quality of service was not good. Looking at all the 
role players, REAs gave 69% positive responses, buyers gave 67% and sellers gave 
64%. Quality level perceptions seem to be on par for all the role players. 
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Principals’ satisfaction with the relationship with the real estate agent 
 
This item was meant to evaluate the nature of the relationship between the principals 
and the REA(s). On this one, the percentage of those who were very satisfied with 
their relationship with the agents was 69% and those who were not were about 26%. 
About 71% REAs thought that their relationship was satisfactory as opposed to 55% 
of sellers and 53% of buyers. 
 
6.5: ACCURACY ANALYSIS 
 
Under this broad classification, the following checks were performed: validity and 
reliability checks. Validity and reliability in quantitative research relate to data quality 
and has vast ethical implication (UNISA: 2015).  
 
6.5.1: Reliability 
 
All the latent variables and their corresponding indicator variables consisted of multi-
item questions. As reported by Gliem and Gliem (2003), a single item question is not 
reliable to draw conclusions as compared to summated multi-item questions. Three 
methods, that is, Cronbach’s Alpha test (Cronbach α), Composite Reliability test (CR) 
and Average Value Extracted (AVE) test were used in this thesis to check on the 
reliability of the research measures. Table 6.12 below shows the results of all these 
three tests used to check the research measure reliability. The specific values of 
interest are further discussed below. 
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Research constructs 
Descriptive 
statistics* 
Cronbach’s test 
C.R. AVE 
Measurement 
Item Loadings 
Mean 
SD Item-total α Value 
Dual Mandate 
System (DMS) 
DMS1 
6.11 0.821 
0.723 
0.737  0.861 0.500 
0.512  
DMS2 0.749 0.801 
DMS3 0.872 0.683 
DMS5 0.962 0.519 
Ideological 
Outlook (IO)  
IO1 
6.60 0.696 
0.789 
0.841 0.908 0.712  
0.883 
IO2 0.761 0.903 
IO3 0.759 0.809 
Conflict of 
Interest (CO) 
CO1 
6.32 0.681 
0.837 
0.717 0.717 0.643 
0.647 
CO3 0.756 0.801 
CO4 0.778 0.823 
CO6 0.785 0.666 
Compromised 
Principal (CP) 
CP2 
6.54 0.697 
0.824 
0.736 0.920 0.743 
0.717 
CP3 0.775 0.842 
CP6 0.919 0.740 
CP7 0.837 0.680 
Sub-Optimal 
Outcomes (OT) 
OT3 
6.27 0.812 
0.918 
0.951 0.866 0.685 
0.825 
OT4 0.758 0.956 
OT5 0.807 0.950 
OT6 0.799 0.954 
OT7 0.732 0.746 
OT8 0.821 0.943 
* Scores: 1 – Strongly disagree; 4 – Neutral:  7– Strongly agree. 
C.R.: Composite reliability; AVE: Average variance extracted. 
Measurement model fits:  χ2/df =2.841; GFI=0.911; CFI=0.907; IFI=0.927; RFI=0.915; 
NFI=0.936; NNFI=0.957 and RMSEA=0.078. 
a significance level p<0.05; b significance level p<0.01; c significance level p<0.001 
 
Figure 6.3: Reliability test results 
 
From the above table the following information can be extracted: 
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Variable  Cronbach’s Alpha 
 
 CO 
 
0.717 
CP 0.736  
 
DMS 0.737  
 
IO 
 
0.841 
OT 
 
0.951  
 
Table 6.6: Cronbach's Alpha Test 
 
According to Nunnally and Bernstein (1994), the Cronbach’s Alpha value must be 
equal to or greater than 0.7. As it can be seen in Table 12, all the Cronbach’s Alpha 
values range from 0.717 to 0.951 with exceeds the recommended threshold 0.7 by 
(Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). 
 
Variable  
 
Composite Reliability 
CO 
 
0.826 
CP 
 
0.834 
DMS 
 
0.728 
IO 
 
0.903   
OT 
 
0.962 
 
Table 6.7: Composite Reliability 
 
According to Fornell and Larcker (1981) and Yang and Lai (2010), in reliability 
analysis, an acceptable CR value must exceed 0.7. The internal reliability of each 
construct was also evaluated using the Composite Reliability (CR) index test. It is 
calculated using the following formula: As can be seen in Table 14 above, the CR 
values range from 0.728 to 0.962 with is above the recommended threshold of 0.6. 
(CR): CRη = (Σλyi) 2/ [(Σλyi) 2+ (Σεi)]  
Composite Reliability = (square of the summation of the factor loadings)/ {(square of 
the summation of the factor loadings) + (summation of error variances)}. 
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Variable  
 
Average Variance Extracted  
CO 
 
0.546 
CP 
 
0.558 
DMS 
 
0.500  
IO 
 
0.756   
OT 
 
0.809 
 
Table 6.8: Average Variance Extracted 
 
The average variance extracted estimate reveals the overall amount of variance in the 
indicators accounted for by the latent construct (Fraering & Minor, 2006). In addition, 
higher values for the variance extracted estimate (greater than 0.50) reveal that the 
indicators well represent the latent construct (Fraering & Minor, 2006).  As it can be 
seen in Table 14 above, the AVE values ranged from 0.546 to 0.809 with is above the 
recommended threshold of 0.5. 
The formula below is used to calculate Average Variance Extracted (AVE):  
Vη = Σλyi2/ (Σλyi2+Σεi) 
AVE = {(summation of the squared of factor loadings)/{(summation of the squared of 
factor loadings) + (summation of error variances)} 
 
6.5.2: Validity 
 
Validity checks on research scales were based on confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
of all the scale items. After analysis, the two types of validity were tested differently. 
See Figure 6.1 below for path modeling results. 
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Figure 6.4: Confirmatory factor analysis 
  
6.5.2.1: Convergent validity 
 
Convergent validity ensures that concepts that should be related are indeed related 
(Zikmund, Babin, Carr & Griffin, 2010). Therefore, the convergent validity of the 
measures was tested by evaluating the extent to which each indicator variable 
represented its respective latent variable. Use was made of coefficients that measure 
the extent to which the indicator variables define their respective latent variables. 
Using the original data, loadings of each scale item to the latent construct were 
examined and that resulted in other items being removed as shown in the original and 
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final model shown below. Those items removed had non-significant loadings to the 
latent constructs. The remaining ones are those whose loadings are greater than 0.5 
and thus proved that they converge on a common construct and provided evidence of 
convergent validity. Therefore, the result supported convergence of the research 
scales (Chin-Hung Wang, Ming-Sung Cheng, Purwanto & Erimurti, 2011). Also, 
Composite Reliability was above the recommended threshold of 0.6, and therefore 
further confirming the existence of covergent validity.   
  
  
 
Figure 6.5: Originally measurement model results 
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Figure 6.6: Final model 
  
  
6.5.2.2: Discriminant validity 
 
The inter-construct correlation matrix was utilised to check discriminant validity of the 
research constructs. Correlations among latent constructs were evaluated in order to 
observe if they were lower than 1.0. As indicated in Table 3 below, the inter-correlation 
values for all paired latent variables are less than 1.0, indicating the existence of 
discriminant validity (Chinomona, Lin, Wang & Cheng, 2010). Nunnally and Bernstein 
(1994) recommended correlation values between constructs to be less than 0.7 in 
confirming the existence of discriminant validity. 
 
 
 CO CP DMS IO OT 
CO 1.000     
CP 0.314 1.000    
DMS 0.477 0.350 1.000   
IO 0.304 0.369 0.352 1.000  
OT 0.321 0.613 0.436 0.663 1.000 
 
Table 6.9: Inter-Construct Correlation Matrix 
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6.5.3: Model fit assessment 
 
In accordance with the two-step procedure suggested by Anderson and Gerbing 
(1988), prior to testing the hypotheses, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was mainly 
performed to examine scale accuracy (including reliability, convergent validity, and 
discriminant validity) of the multiple-item construct measures using AMOS 7. Initial 
specification search led to the deletion of some of the items in the construct scales in 
order to provide acceptable fit and the resultant scale accuracy. Acceptable model fit 
was indicated by Chi-square value over degree of freedom (χ2/df) of value between 1 
and 3, the values of Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI), Normed Fit Index (NFI), Nominal Normed Fit Index (NNFI) 
equal to or greater than 0.90, and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA) value to be equal to or less than 0.08. Given below is a table showing the 
standard criteria and study specific values for model fitness assessment decisions. 
 
Measure Scholarly recommended value Study specific value Decision 
 
    
χ2/df 1-3 2.841 Acceptable 
GFI ≥0.9 0.911 Acceptable 
CFI ≥0.9 0.907 Acceptable 
IFI ≥0.9 0.927 Acceptable 
NFI ≥0.9 0.936 Acceptable 
NNFI ≥0.9 0.957 Acceptable 
RFI ≥0.9 0.915 Acceptable 
RMSEA 0.08≥ 0.078 Acceptable 
 
Figure 6.7: Model fit assessment results 
 
Clearly from the table, recommended statistics for the final overall-model assessment 
showed acceptable fit of the measurement model to the data as all the indices were 
above levels recommended in the literature. This suggests that the model converged 
well and could be a plausible representation of the underlying data structure. Since an 
acceptable CFA measurement model fit was obtained, the study proceeded to 
hypothesis testing stage using SEM with AMOS 7 software programme. 
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6.6: HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
 
Before a discussion on the testing of hypotheses, one needs to show the results of 
SEM analysis. Table 4 below gives a summary of the relevant information.  
 
 
Path  
 
 
Hypothesis 
 
Path 
coefficients (β) 
Dual Mandate System (DMS) Conflict of Interest (CO) H1 0.422a 
 
Dual Mandate System (DMS) Compromised Principal (CP) 
 
H2 
 
0.252a 
REA Ideological Outlook (IO)  Conflict of Interest (CO) H3 0.155a 
REA Ideological Outlook (IO)  Compromised Principal (CP) H4 0.280a 
Conflict of Interest (CO) Sub-Optimal Outcome (OT) H5 0.143a 
Compromised Principal (CP)  Sub-Optimal Outcome (OT) H6 0.568a 
 
* Scores: 1 – Strongly disagree; 4 – Neutral: 7 – Strongly agree. 
C.R.: Composite reliability; AVE: Average variance extracted. 
Measurement model fits:  χ2/df =2.631; GFI=0.901; CFI=0.900; IFI=0.912 RFI=0.911; 
NFI=0.916; NNFI=0.907 and RMSEA=0.080. 
Table 6.10: Results of structural equation analysis 
 
6.6.1 Hypotheses test results 
 
The hypotheses test results will be discussed as they appear in the table. This will be 
followed by the discussion of the results. 
   
H1: DMS is positively related to COI with a path coefficient 0.422. This relationship is 
supported; therefore, we fail to reject the hypothesis posited. This implies that the DMS 
has a positive and direct influence on COI. This also implies that the more the DMS is 
utilised, the higher the likelihood of a COI becomes.  
 
H2: DMS is positively related to CP and the relationship has a path coefficient 0.252. 
We therefore fail to reject the hypothesis. This implies that the DMS has a positive and 
direct influence on a compromised principal’s interests. When the DMS is used, the 
interests of other participants are more likely to suffer. 
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H3: IO is positively related to COI with a path coefficient 0.155. Again, the proposed 
relationship is supported and we therefore fail to reject the hypothesis proposed. 
Therefore, IO has a positive and direct influence on COI. This implies that chances of 
COI are increased when important parties to a transaction hold strong IO to life. 
 
H4: IO is positively related to CP with a path coefficient 0.280. The proposed 
relationship is therefore supported and we consequently fail to reject the proposed 
hypothesis in this study. Therefore, IO has a positive and direct influence on a CP. 
This implies that when important participants to a housing deal hold strong IO to life, 
chances of one or more of the other participants’ interests getting compromised are 
increased. 
 
H5: COI is positively related to sub-OT with a path coefficient 0.143. This proposed 
relationship between COI and OT is supported and we therefore once again fail to 
reject the hypothesis. COI has a positive and direct influence on sub-OT. COI leads to 
an increased likelihood of sub-OT for other participants. 
 
H6: CP is positively related to sub-OT with a path coefficient 0.568. The proposed 
relationship is supported and we therefore fail to reject the hypothesis. Therefore, CP 
has a positive and direct influence on OT. If there the interests of one of the 
participants are compromised, the ultimate outcomes for that participants are more 
likely to be sub-OT. Given below is a table giving the hypotheses findings. 
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# Hypotheses Findings 
   
H1 There is a positive relationship between DM system and conflict of interest  
 
Supported 
H2 There is a positive relationship between DM system and compromised 
principal in REI 
 
Supported 
H3 There is a positive relationship between ideological outlook and conflict of 
interest   
 
Supported 
H4 There is a positive relationship between Ideological outlook and 
compromised principal in REI. 
 
Supported 
H5 There is a positive relationship between conflict of interest and suboptimal 
outcomes for both principals and settlement patterns in REI. 
 
Supported 
H6 There is a positive relationship between compromised principal and 
suboptimal outcomes for both principals and settlement patterns in REI. 
Supported 
 
Figure 6.8: Hypotheses results  
 
6.6.2: Discussion of hypotheses results 
 
The results lend support to all the hypotheses proposed. However, they also reveal 
some differences on the strength of the relationships between the variables as 
evidenced by the individual hypothesis coefficients. As an example, DMS has a 
stronger influence on COI than it does on CP (coefficients are DMS and COI=0.42 and 
the DMS and CP=0.252). This indicates that DMS brings more COI than it 
compromises the interests of any one party to the transaction. Also when compared 
with the effect of IO, DMS has a much higher positive influence on COI. Therefore, the 
DMS leads to more opportunities for REAs to be conflicted. As shown before, COI has 
many negative consequences such as cheating and concealment of information from 
other interested parties (Callif, 2013; Luebke, 1986). Indeed, it is known that when an 
agent represents two or more people in one deal, there is a good chance that at least 
one client will not receive full representation (Shaulys, 1983). This has serious 
implications for managerial decisions should a situation arise as to which of the 
predictor variables to prioritise when dealing with the SA REI. Another significant 
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observation is that IO has much stronger influence on CP than DMS (coefficients are 
DMS and CP=0.252 and for IO and CP=0.28) in the SA REI. This again suggests that 
whenever people hold strong IO, they are more likely to compromise the interests of 
other parties. Also, the interests of principals are more likely to be compromised when 
REAs hold strong IO than under a dual mandate agreement. This has serious 
implication in the operation of the REI in SA. The racial classification of the participants 
shows that the majority of buyers are black and the majority of REAs are white.  
 
Compared to dual mandate, the influence of IO on COI is not big as the coefficient 
relating the two is only 0.155. The last comparison would be between the influences 
of COI and CP on the final outcomes. Again, the results reveal that CP has a much 
stronger influence on OT than COI does. This clearly shows that given a choice 
between influencing the outcomes for the industry, CP should be given more priority.  
Deals should be structured in such a way that the interests of the public are protected 
and no one should be compromised.  
 
6.6: CHAPTER 6 SUMMARY  
 
The data from the field for this project were collected and recorded from REAs, sellers 
and buyers by use of questionnaires. This chapter set out to give the results of the 
fieldwork and the analysis thereof. This has been accomplished by giving results on 
sample location, scale development, sampling and data collection, respondents’ 
analysis, responses analysis, determining the accuracy of the research scales and by 
discussing the hypotheses originally proposed. When the results in this chapter are 
compared to the conceptual framework discussed in Chapter 1 and 4, the concepts 
indicated in the conceptual framework have been confirmed. The next chapter 
synthesises and analyses the results of this study, gives conclusions, 
recommendations and managerial implications, limitations of the study and finally 
concluding remarks of the whole study. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND 
LIMITATIONS  
 
7.1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 7 provides detailed discussion on the research results in light of the theoretical 
foundations presented in the literature review section and the survey outcomes as 
given on Chapter 6. This chapter also presents the conclusions, recommendations 
and limitations of the study on the basis of the objectives and the empirical findings. 
Discussion will be done in the following order: findings, conclusions, 
recommendations, managerial and future research implications, limitations of the 
study and concluding remarks.  
 
7.2: FINDINGS  
 
The findings and supportive discourse of this study will be done under the proposed 
hypotheses. 
 
7.2.1: There is a positive relationship between dual mandate system and conflict 
of interests in the South African real estate industry 
 
The study has empirically shown that when the DMS is practiced, it is likely to create 
a COI situation in the SA REI. This finding confirms a string of other findings. In a dual 
agency relationship, the interests of agents and their principals are not aligned 
(Deutsch, Keil & Laamanen, 2010) and opposing interests create problems and 
conflicts (Evans & Kolbe, 2015). Kaplan (2004) also confirmed that one person cannot 
dance at two weddings at the same time. Also, Kadiyali, et al (2014) point out that the 
interests of both the buyer and seller may be compromised. Furthermore, in the DMS, 
conflicting expectations create tension within an individual and leads to prima facie 
conflicts between two demanding roles (Robertson & Garry, 2008). Shaulys (1983) 
also confirmed that dual representation is virtually always improper because of the 
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very high probability of COI. These findings seem to contradict other writings from SA 
REI players (among others Spies, 2013; Reynolds, 2011; Goslett, 2011; Rademeyer, 
2014). They actually do not; they just give the other side which is generally neglected 
by major players in the REI in SA. 
   
7.2.2: There is a positive relationship between dual mandate system and 
compromised principal in the South African real estate industry 
 
Our results show that if DMS is in operation, it is likely to result in one or both principal’s 
interests getting compromised in SA. This again is in line with other studies. Gardiner 
and Heisler (2007) also state that in a property transaction, dual agency is damaging 
to one party in terms of sale price and marketing time. This may result from IA which 
brings about hidden actions, hidden knowledge and hidden information (Palazzo & 
Rethel, 2008; Nanda & Pancak, 2010). It has been shown that in a property transaction 
in SA, there is a huge amount of IA. People normally use their superior information to 
exploit their principals (Miller & Sardais, 2011). However, the study does not indicate 
who benefits between the seller and the buyer (Evans & Kolbe, 2005). Trust, which 
has been shown to be the glue for stable business dealings and future business 
prospects, appears to be misused (Wimmer & Mandjak, 2002; Kauser & Shaw, 2004; 
Elg, 2002; Van Bruggen, et al., 2005). Both parties who contract with the REA have 
reasonable expectations that their interests are going to be protected and not be 
compromised. 
 
7.2.3: There is a positive relationship between the ideological outlook and 
conflict of interests in the South African real estate industry 
 
The present study has confirmed that the presence of IO in the SA REI and the industry 
should alarm people to the possibilities of COI with all its difficulties. When people 
have a particular IO, it will most likely create COI in their business dealings. This study 
confirms that ideology finds expression in the way REAs do their work (as also shown 
by among others: Baressi, 1968; Palm, 1985; Chin, et al., 2013; Roseberg, 1956). 
Some scholars have defined ideology as a tool of distortion and exploitation (Marx & 
Engel, 1976). Ideology facilitates taking a stance on particular issues as ideologues 
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have a clear value commitment and mutually supporting value commitments (Martin, 
2015).  
 
7.2.4: There is a positive relationship between the ideological outlook and 
compromised principal in the South African real estate industry 
  
The findings from the hypothesis posited on the relationship between ideology and 
compromising one party in a property transaction has shown that when an agent has 
strong IO, it is likely to be followed by sacrificing one party to the deal. Where people 
deal with others in property transactions, their ideological outlook are likely to bring 
about a situation wherein one principal gets compromised (Soborski, 2015). Ideology 
reflects values and may influence their decisions. Other studies also confirmed the 
same thing (Rosenberg, 1956; England, 1967). Ideology matters in consumer 
behaviour (Crockett & Wallendorf, 2004). As an individual representative and 
intermediary between sellers, potential buyers and actual buyers in the real estate 
markets, whose vested interests are in maximising the probability of profitable 
outcomes for him/her, he/she will side with the better off between the two principals.  
 
7.2.5: There is a positive relationship between a compromised principal and the 
sub-optimal outcomes in the South African real estate industry 
 
When the interests of one party in a deal are compromised, it is more likely that the 
final outcomes will not be favourable to that party. The present findings also prove that 
when a principal’s interests are compromised, there is a big possibility of him/her 
getting sub-optimal results. The outcomes that may be suboptimal may be those 
associated with perceptions of fairness in transactions, confidence in the REA, 
perception of quality of service and possibilities of future business. The REA may 
disclose sensitive information to one party or may pressure either the seller (to accept 
a lower price) or the buyer (to accept a higher price) to hasten the sale (Kadiyali, et al. 
(2014; Izzo, et al., 2003). The study has shown that brokers have an impact on 
property price and that buyers lose out (Zietz & Newsome, 2002). For instance, in the 
present study, it has been observed that buyers were more likely to be dissatisfied 
with property prices. 
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7.2.6: There is a positive relationship between conflict of interests and sub-
optimal outcomes in the South African real estate industry 
 
Conflict of interests (COI) is evident in the behaviour of people experiencing it. This 
study has shown that when COI is present, it is likely to result in one principal or all 
the principals getting the short end of the stick. As is generally the practice, in the SA 
REI, only one principal (seller principal) pays the commission (Gardiner, et al., 2007). 
The findings of this study suggest that the buyer principal will generally get less than 
optimal outcomes. Conflicting interests of principals give rise to COI to the agent 
(Walter, 2003). This study has also shown that even the seller can also get sub-optimal 
results from a deal if for instance the REA stands to gain from a quick sale.   Both 
principals’ interests may be damaged by the actions of the REA (Izzo, et al., 2003).  
 
7.3: CONCLUSIONS 
 
Given the history of SA, the DMS and IO are a reality in the REI. Nevertheless, the 
untransformed nature of the industry has limited opportunities to study and to 
understand what impact these have on COI and CP and ultimately on the outcomes 
for sellers and buyers. This study attempted to find out whether there were any 
relationships between these concepts and the final outcomes for principals. The 
research model predicted that DMS and IO are likely to lead to COI and CP which in 
turn bring about suboptimal outcomes (OT) to either one or both principals in a housing 
transaction. The present study has shown that these issues are actually very important 
and has confirmed all the proposed hypotheses. The DMS in operation in SA leads to 
many unfortunate situations. REAs get seriously conflicted due to the mandate 
contract type and their own IO to life. The interests of the agent can be in conflict with 
their buyers and also with those of the sellers, which has serious implications for the 
operation of the industry. Also, the industry is dominated by one race group and as the 
study has shown, people’s ideological persuasion does have an influence over day-
to-day dealings with their customers. The ultimate outcomes also show that 
dissatisfaction is not only limited to buyers of properties, sellers do also have issues 
with how they are served. The findings of this study represent a pioneering work on 
how DMS and IO influence the outcomes in the SA REI. As the licensing body for 
REAs, the EAAB should take a serious look at how REAs are trained (especially with 
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regards to their valuation role) and how consumers experience their service. The DMS 
is one area in which to start as the study has shown that when the latter (DMS) is 
used, it most probably leads to COI and consumers’ interests getting compromised. 
This has serious implications for the whole residential REI. Also on the IO, something 
needs to be done to take the industry forward. From the profile of the participants, it is 
clear that the possibilities of having both sellers and buyers agents in any property 
deal should be investigated. 
 
7.4: RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The following recommendations are made based on the results of this study. 
 
7.4.1: Dual mandate system and conflict of interests  
 
The study has revealed that DMS is likely to create COI and CP. Some form of 
intervention to improve the operation of the industry is therefore suggested for the 
health of the industry. This may take a form of disallowing agents from representing 
two opposing interests as this may create COI (Nanda & Pancak, 2010). This would 
be in line with practices in other countries Like New Zealand and the UK (Gardiner, 
Heisler, Kalberg & Liu, 2007; Mersel, 1996; Kadiyali, et al., 2014). Another possible 
remedy would be to insist that all parties to a transaction sign an informed consent 
form whenever a deal is to be concluded under the DMS. This can be facilitated by the 
EAAB introducing compulsory informed consent form wherein consequences are 
clearly stated when a REA represents both principals in a single transaction. The 
rationale is that a party to a real estate transaction has a right to full representation 
(Shaulys, 1983). 
 
7.4.2: Dual mandate system and compromising of principals’ interests  
  
This study has established that the DMS may lead to consumers’ interests getting 
compromised. The study has also revealed that REAs have information advantage 
over consumers, which they can exploit to the detriment of other parties to a deal. In 
addition, IA is inherent in a DMS. Whenever people’s interests are represented by 
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somebody else, their interests are likely to be compromised (De Jong, Forsythe & 
Lundholm, 1985). In order to limit the opportunities for misuse of IA, pre-sale and pre-
purchase counselling can be introduced to sensitise the public on the implications of 
property transactions through REAs. This can be done to protect consumers against 
their own inexperience, IA and incomplete contracts (Vosselman & Van Der Meer-
Kooistra, 2006; Greenberg, et al., 2008; Levitt & Syverson, 2008; Scott & Lizieri, 2012). 
 
7.4.3: Ideological outlook and conflict of interests  
 
The IO of REAs has been shown in the present study to influence COI which ultimately 
affect what consumers get out of a transaction. Indeed, other studies have shown that 
people’s ideologies are self-serving, have an adverse effect over other people with an 
enormous impact on social relations (Shelby, 2003; Unger, 2002; Van Dijk, 1998). 
Therefore, it is recommended that REAs be given ideological transformation training 
before they are licensed to practice. The curriculum for REAs training can be 
structured in a way that includes training on ideological change. It has been shown in 
some studies that people’s ideologies and personality are malleable and can change 
(Levy, 1998; Pratto, Tatar, Conway & Lanz, 1999). Alternatively, a way should be 
found and used to limit the possibilities of adverse effects of the ideological persuasion 
of REAs the majority of whom are white in the SA REI. This can take a form of legally 
enforceable signing of consent forms by all the participants which can guarantee 
minimal service levels that REAs need to render to their principals. It is suggested that 
can go a long way toward mitigating the effects of IO on the COI which also have a 
bearing on the ultimate outcomes. 
 
7.4.4: Ideological outlook and compromising of principals 
 
The study has found that IO has significant impact on compromising the interests of 
principals. REAs are mainly tasked with doing the initial valuation and the marketing 
of properties. This is in line with practices from other countries as “REAs are always 
called upon to do initial valuations before asking prices are set” (Green & Vandel, 
1995; Yavas & Young, 1995). However, in SA, the general practice is that REAs do 
not do any formal training on property valuations. This study has also shown that 
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whatever valuation results they get are not communicated to buyer principals. In order 
to limit the damage that can arise, legislators and industry regulators can either insist 
that REAs be barred from engaging in valuations of properties all together (Bowles, 
McAllister & Tarbert, 2001; Diaz, Gallimore & Levy, 2002) or REAs undergo 
compulsory property valuations training. A good example is the situation in New 
Zealand, USA and UK where all property valuers have to obtain a junior degree to 
qualify as property appraisers (Matthew & Hansz, 2003). 
 
7.4.5: Conflict of interests and sub-optimal outcomes 
 
The study has established that whenever COI takes place, it is likely to give rise to 
one of the parties getting less than OT. Therefore, it is recommended that if a REA 
represents two competing interests, there should be a formal disclosure like it is done 
elsewhere (see Yavas & Yang, 1995; Arnold, 1999; Green & Vandel, 1995). Whenever 
two parties are represented by one agent, one client is usually the direct primary client 
who pays the commission (Shaulis, 1983). This is actually the case in the SA REI as 
the buyer principal only comes into the picture after contractual agreements have been 
reached between the REA and the seller principal.  Therefore, it is recommended that 
a requirement for minimum mandatory service level to buyer principals be introduced 
(Nanda, Pancak, 2010). Another recommendation is that there should be a separation 
of functions between buyer agent and seller agent. 
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7.4.6: Compromising of principal and sub-optimal outcomes 
 
The study has also shown that CP has a huge impact on OT. The people who have 
been shown to get a raw deal are once again the buyers, the majority of whom are the 
black population in the City of Johannesburg. Therefore, it is recommended that a pre-
purchase counselling be made compulsory before any deal is concluded. At the 
conclusion of a transaction, a customer satisfaction form should be filled in by all 
buyers and that information should be made available to all prospective property 
buyers and sellers working through REAs. The other issue would be a disclosure to 
principals of all possible issues that may lead to less than optimal outcomes for 
principals (Green & Vandel, 1995).  
  
7.5: IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY  
 
The present research project has succeeded in bringing to the surface issues inherent 
in IO of REAs and dual agency relationships in SA REI and how those issues affect 
the interests of sellers and buyers of properties. This has been achieved by bridging 
the gap between DMS and COI, DMS and CP, IO and COI, IO and CP, COI and OT 
and CP and OT. This research therefore makes an important conceptual contribution 
to the understanding of the operation of the real estate industry in SA. Both these 
conceptual and empirical results of the study have important theoretical, managerial 
and policy implications.  
 
Firstly, a need to reorganize the industry and to install properly organised programmes 
for training of REAs and educating the public has been identified. Possibilities of 
starting some form of “Property Social workers” programme to render counselling 
services to especially first time sellers and buyers is strongly recommended. This will 
ensure that they are better informed of what they are getting themselves into under 
the present operation of the industry. It is expected that even the banking industry as 
major financiers of real estate will benefit from this project. It is a general practice that 
banks only send their valuers after contracts have been signed, for instance. The DHS 
as the custodians of policy-formulation in the industry should be in the forefront in 
spearheading policy reforms in the industry. For instance, they can begin with the 
minimum requirements for REAs’ licensing.  
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Secondly, the study suggests that REAs should be trained for property valuations or 
a different body be created to deal with that area. The training of REAs should not be 
left to different REFs as is presently the case. REAs are generally the first people 
called upon to do the initial valuation before a property is marketed. There should be 
a neutral body not affiliated to any firm to do that task. It is hoped that after the results 
of this study will have been made widely available, it will not be business as usual in 
the REI. In situations of limited resources, in order to limit opportunities for new 
entrants (as buyers and as sellers) getting the short end of the stick, this study 
suggests that influencing the ideology of participants should be the starting point. The 
study has shown that IO influences CP more than DMS does. Also CP has more 
impact on the results of any transaction. If resources are not a limiting issue, both DMS 
and IO need urgent attention for the overall health of the industry. 
 
Lastly, a number of future directions for academics have opened up based on the 
current study findings. The first area would be to expand the current study by doing a 
comparative analysis with other metros in SA using the framework used in the present 
study. The current research may be replicated in SA cities and township environments. 
It can, for instance, be carried out in Cape Town, Durban or in some of the big 
townships in SA. The study can further be extended to all metro centres in other 
African states after careful considerations and suitability checks of the model. Another 
area of possible future research would be to investigate whether there is any direct 
relationship between COI and CP and if there is, how strong is that relationship. This 
would further clarify factors impacting the ultimate outcomes in the industry as these 
two have a huge impact on the performance outcomes. Additional possibility for 
academic pursuit would be to investigate what material to be included in the curriculum 
for training of future REAs and for educating consumers. A research project can also 
be undertaken to find out whether IO of REAs are race-based or not. This would be 
deemed merited on the basis of the findings on this study that the majority of REAs 
are white and their majority buying public are black. These suggestions would go a 
long way toward addressing some of the concerns raised by this study. Such 
comparative research would go a long way in supporting/refuting the results put 
forward in this research.  
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7.6: LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND FUTURE RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS 
 
The current research was based on a robust literature review and empirical analysis. 
However, some research limitations remain that provide opportunities for future work. 
When data were collected, the researcher had to do house-to-house visits which were 
both costly and limiting on the number of respondents. It was both expensive and 
intrusive. It is further acknowledged that this research is biased towards large cities in 
SA and therefore cannot be generalised across the entire country without further 
replications. Data were only collected from Johannesburg areas and the opinions of 
the respondents might not be representative of the whole SA public. Due to these 
limitations, prudence must be exercised when generalizing the findings.  
 
7.7: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This research was set to assess the influence that the DMS and the IO have on the 
operations of the SA REI. This was achieved by looking at the relationship between 
DMS and COI, DMS and CP, IO and COI, IO and COI, COI and OT and lastly, CP and 
OT. All the hypotheses posited have been validated. The REI is one area of economic 
activity that generates huge amounts of money and impacts many in a big way. 
Therefore, a serious relook of the industry is suggested. Academics should be in the 
forefront in order to generate knowledge in the industry for public use. The EAAB 
would be the best organisation to initiate serious reforms on what agents can do and 
what they cannot do. Many deals are done daily and they involve big amounts of 
money which people have to pay over a very long time. The banks as major financiers 
of property transactions can also be influential in the implementation of the suggested 
reforms. 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Dear sir/madam, 
  
I, Freddy Marilahimbilu Mgiba am doing a research towards a PhD degree at the 
University of the Witwatersrand in the department of Marketing. Prof Richard 
Chinomona (Head of Marketing Department) is the supervisor. This is a self-funded 
project undertaken purely for academic purposes. We are inviting you to participate in 
a study entitled: The influence of the mandate system and the political ideological 
persuasion on the performance of South Africa’s real estate industry.  
The aim of the study is to investigate the mandate system in operation and the 
ideological outlook of all participants in the real estate industry in South Africa. Their 
influence and effect on the participants’ interests and the ultimate outcomes in any 
property transaction will be explored. You have been selected to be part of this study 
because as a recent participant in the industry you have fresh experience on how it 
operates. The benefits of this study are that the outcomes from the study will assist 
institutions of higher learning to better understand the industry and thus facilitate better 
training of prospective players in the industry. The study will also create a debate as 
to how best the operation of the industry can be improved. All participants in the study 
are assured of strict confidentiality and protection of their privacy both in the data 
collection and analysis stages. All responses will be coded upon receipt of the 
completed questionnaires. The information obtained will be statistically analysed in 
order to draft a comprehensive report that will be made available to all interested 
stakeholders and participating firms and individuals after the university has assessed 
it. Your early response will ensure that a representative range of voices are taken into 
account before any conclusions are made. Your assistance will be highly appreciated.   
 
Yours faithfully 
 
 
 
------------------------------------                       ---------------------------- 
Freddy Mgiba (0799765162)                     Prof R Chinomona 
 
Annexure A: Participant information sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESEARCH CONSENT FORM 
(Participant) 
1: Project title: 
  
The influence of the mandate system and the political ideological persuasion on 
the performance of South Africa’s real estate industry. 
 
2: Declaration 
 
Freddy Mgiba from the Department of Marketing of the University of the Witwatersrand 
has requested my permission to participate in the above-mentioned research project. 
The nature and the purpose of the research project and of this consent declaration 
have been explained to me. 
 
I have also read the information presented in the information letter about the study and 
had the opportunity to ask any questions related to this study. I received satisfactory 
answers to my questions. I am aware and can confirm that:  
 The University of the Witwatersrand has given ethical clearance certificate to 
this study and I may request to see it.  
 My participation is voluntary and should I at any stage wish to withdraw my 
participation I may do so without any penalty by advising the researcher.  
 The researcher intends to publish the research results in the form of a 
dissertation.  
 The confidentiality and anonymity of records will be maintained and that my 
name or identity will not be revealed to anyone who has not been involved in 
the conduct of the research.  
 I can obtain feedback of the research results and that  
 I will be furnished with a copy of this consent. 
With full knowledge of all foregoing, I agree, of my own free will, to participate in this 
study. 
  
 
 
Name: -------------------------                  Researcher: --------------------------- 
Signature: ----------------------                Signature: ------------------------------- 
Date: ----------------------------                 Date: -------------------------------------- 
 
Annexure B: Research consent form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE COVER LETTER 
 
Dear sir/madam 
 
The real estate industry forms a crucial part of the South African economy. Some 
estimate its contribution to the country’s GDP to be about 8.3%. Real estate agents 
and firms as well as consumers play a crucial role in this industry. Whenever anything 
untoward happens and comes into the public domain in the industry, it does not have 
any coherent and formal way to respond to the shock. In order to gain understanding 
and guide policy making from academic institutions, government department and the 
private sector the present personally funded research project was conceived.   
Before any conclusions can be reached and solutions suggested, the researcher 
requests your assistance by filling in the questionnaire attached herewith which will 
take a maximum of 10 minutes of your time. Responses will be treated with great care 
and your confidentiality protected. The Real estate industry will benefit from this study 
as: academic institutions will be able to tailor training programs to the industry needs; 
government departments will gain insight on the operations of the industry and its 
challenges, real estate firms and agents will benefit from well-trained new entrants and 
real estate firms will also standardize their internal training programs. The greatest 
value of your response can be derived if it is received by or before the 15/07/2015. If 
you wish to see the results of this survey, please do not hesitate to contact the 
researcher about 60 days from the due date for the responses. The outcome of the 
survey will be submitted to the university in a form of a dissertation. Strong adherence 
to the university’s ethical conduct of research will be observed. 
Yours faithfully 
 
Researcher: Freddy Mgiba                               Supervisor: Prof Richard Chinomona 
freddymgiba@webmail.co.za                           Richard.Chinomona@wits.ac.za        
 
Annexure C: Questionnaire cover letter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
SECTION A 
 
 
1: GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
The section is asking your background information.  Please indicate your answer by 
ticking () on the appropriate box. 
A1: Please indicate whether you are a seller, buyer or a real estate agent 
 
Seller 1 
Buyer 2 
REA 3 
 
A2: Please indicate your gender 
 
Male 1 
Female 2 
Other 3 
 
A3: Please indicate your ethnic group 
 
African 1 
White 2 
Asian  3 
Coloured 4 
Other 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A4: Please indicate your age group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A5: Please indicate your work experience in the real estate industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A6: Please indicate your position 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 – 24 years old 1 
25 - 34 years old 2 
35 - 39 years old 3 
40 – 44  years old 4 
45 – 49  years old 5 
Above 49 years 
old 
6 
Less than 1 year 1 
1 to 4 years 2 
5 to 8 years 3 
9 to12 years 4 
13 years and 
above 
5 
Owner/Franchisee 1 
Manager 2 
Fieldworker 3 
Admin & Support 4 
 
 
SECTION B 
 
1: Dual mandate system (DMS) 
 
Below are statements about the mandate that was given by the seller/buyer for your 
latest property transaction. You can indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree 
with the statement by ticking the corresponding number in the 7 point scale below 
where: 
1= Strongly Disagree 2= Disagree 3= Somewhat Disagree 4= Neutral 5= Somewhat 
Agree 6= Agree 7= Strongly Disagree 
 
Please tick only one number for each statement 
 
DMS1 Instruction to market the property was 
given to one real estate agent. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
DMS2 Giving instruction to one agent is the 
best way to sell a property  
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
DMS3 Initial valuation of the property was 
done by the agent/agent’s firm  
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
DMS4 More than one real estate agent was 
used to sell in this transaction 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
DMS5 Offers for the sale of this property were 
presented by the listing agent 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
DMS6 The instructed agent/firm acted for the 
buyer in the present transaction  
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
DMS7 None of the transacting parties 
received any other assistance for this 
sale 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
DMS8 Only the instructed agent received 
commission for the deal  
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2: Outlook 
 
Below are statements about your values and life outlook. You may agree or disagree 
with each statement by ticking the appropriate number provided below where: 
1= Strongly Disagree 2= Disagree 3= Somewhat Disagree 4= Neutral 5= Somewhat 
Agree 6= Agree 7= Strongly Disagree 
 
Please tick only one number for each statement  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IOO1 It is important for the agent to fulfil 
his/her responsibility to the 
principal  
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
IOO2 The agent who sold this property 
can accurately predict a client ‘s 
preferences in a housing deal    
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
IOO3 This agent can determine where 
people choose to sell/purchase 
properties  
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
IOO4 I was flexible when negotiating this 
housing transaction 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
IOO5 I hold very strong personal values Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
IO06 My principles will not be 
compromised regardless of 
possible gain 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
IO07 Personal values should influence 
the way I do business 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
IO08 Free-market economy is the best 
economic system  
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
3: Interests 
 
Below are statements about your interests and those of the other participants in your 
last transaction. You are required to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree 
with the statements below by ticking the appropriate number where: 
1= Strongly Disagree 2= Disagree 3= Somewhat Disagree 4= Neutral 5= Somewhat 
Agree 6= Agree 7= Strongly Disagree 
 
Please tick only one number for each statement 
 
 
CO
1 
The real estate agent was involved 
in  setting the initial asking price 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
CO
2 
The lowest possible transaction 
price was disclosed   
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
CO
3 
The interests of both buyer and 
seller are similar in a property 
transaction 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
CO
4 
The interests of the buyer, seller 
and the real estate agent are similar 
in a property transaction 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
CO
5 
It is beneficial to me when the 
property is in the market for a long 
time 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
CO
6 
I wanted to get the highest price for 
this property transaction 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
CO
7 
Other parties to the transaction 
assisted me in achieving my target 
price 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
CO
8 
Huge amount of marketing effort  
and other resources were used to 
do this deal  
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly  
Agree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4: Principal treatment 
 
Below are statements about the treatment you received in your last property 
transaction. You may agree or disagree with each statement by ticking the appropriate 
number provided where: 
1= Strongly Disagree 2= Disagree 3= Somewhat Disagree 4= Neutral 5= Somewhat 
Agree 6= Agree 7= Strongly Disagree 
 
Please tick only one number for each statement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CP1 Reasons for the sale/buying the 
property were disclosed for 
purposes of this deal 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
CP2 I knew how to do property 
valuation before this transaction 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
CP3 There were no winners or losers in 
this transaction 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
CP4 I am satisfied with the time on 
market (TOM) of the property 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
CP5 The duration of the transaction 
process was too long 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
CP6 Valuation and pricing information 
was disclosed to me 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
CP7 I received maximum benefit with 
regards to pricing 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
CP8 My knowledge of property 
transactions is close to the level of 
the other parties in this deal 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
5: Outcomes 
 
Below are statements about the outcomes of your latest property transaction. You may 
agree or disagree with each statement by ticking the appropriate number provided 
where: 
1= Strongly Disagree 2= Disagree 3= Somewhat Disagree 4= Neutral 5= Somewhat 
Agree 6= Agree 7= Strongly Disagree 
 
Please tick only one number for each statement 
 
 
 
ANNEXURE E: Research instrument 
 
 
 
 
 
OT1 The property in located in an ideal 
neighbourhood 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
OT2 The price for this property should 
have been lower  
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
OT3 I received a fair treatment from all 
parties involved in this transaction 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
OT4 I have confidence in the real estate 
who handled the present 
transaction 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
 
OT5 I would use the same real estate 
agent for my next property deal if I 
decide to buy/sell in the same 
suburb  
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
 
OT6 I will continue buying/selling my 
property (properties) through this 
real estate agent 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
 
OT7 The quality of service I got for this  
transaction was excellent 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
OT8 In general, I am very satisfied with  
the relationship with this real estate 
agent 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
